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ABSTRACT 
 
The health insurance industry is faced with risk selection issues affecting insurers’ 
sustainability and enrolment of consumers in an insurance programme. Inefficient 
selection results in the insurer having a pool of severely unhealthy participants who 
are costly to insure. Thus, this study was conducted to examine the current profiles of 
policyholders and to investigate the presence of advantageous or propitious selection. 
The specific objectives were to compare the profiles of insureds and uninsureds, and 
to determine the factors affecting an individual’s decision to own personal health 
insurance. More importantly, the study was to demonstrate empirically whether the 
selection of risk is favourable and advantageous to insurers by examining the 
association among risk attitude, health risk level and ownership of health insurance. 
The fundamental theories used were the Theory of Asymmetric Information and the 
Theory of Propitious Selection. The data in this study was obtained from the National 
Health and Morbidity Survey 2011 and analysed using bivariate analysis tools and 
Logistics Regression. The analysis reveals that insureds are generally younger, 
employed in the government and the private sectors as well as self-employed, with 
low health risk levels and high risk aversion. The empirical analysis suggests three 
main findings. First, ownership of personal health insurance is predicted by age and 
gender. Second, individuals with low health risks and individuals who are risk-averse 
are more likely to own personal health insurance. Third, health risk level is negatively 
correlated with risk aversion. The findings suggest that there is evidence of 
advantageous selection in the Malaysian health insurance market. The study 
concludes that the selection of insureds has been effective and favourable to insurers, 
suggesting greater ability to counter the effect of adverse selection.  
 
Keywords: health insurance, risk selection, advantageous selection, Theory of 
Propitious Selection, Theory of Asymmetric Information 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Industri insurans kesihatan berhadapan dengan isu-isu pemilihan risiko yang memberi 
kesan kepada  kemampuan penanggung insurans untuk membolehkannya kekal dan 
mengambil peserta dalam program insurans. Ketidakberkesanan pemilihan 
menyebabkan penanggung insurans mempunyai kumpulan peserta yang sangat tidak 
sihat yang mahal untuk diinsurankan. Oleh itu, kajian ini dibuat untuk memeriksa 
profil individu yang memiliki insurans dan menyelidiki kewujudan pemilihan yang 
menguntungkan. Secara khususnya, objektif spesifik kajian adalah untuk 
membandingkan profil individu yang memiliki dan tidak memiliki insurans serta bagi 
menentukan faktor-faktor yang memberi kesan kepada keputusan individu untuk 
memiliki insurans kesihatan peribadi. Lebih penting lagi ialah kajian ini akan 
menerangkan secara empirikal sama ada pemilihan risiko yang dibuat menguntungkan 
dan memberi kebaikan kepada penanggung insurans melalui pemeriksaan kaitan di 
antara sikap terhadap risiko, tahap risiko kesihatan dan pemilikan insurans kesihatan. 
Teori asas yang digunakan ialah Teori Asimetri Informasi dan Teori Pemilihan Yang 
Menguntungkan. Data diperolehi daripada Tinjauan Kebangsaan Kesihatan dan 
Morbiditi 2011 serta analisa dibuat menggunakan Analisis Bivariat dan Regresi 
Logistik. Hasil analisa mendedahkan yang pemilik insurans pada umumnya adalah 
muda, bekerja di sektor-sektor kerajaan, swasta, dan bekerja sendiri dengan tahap 
risiko kesihatan yang rendah serta tahap keengganan mengambil risiko yang tinggi.  
Analisa empirikal mencadangkan tiga penemuan utama. Pertama, pemilikan insurans 
hayat peribadi boleh diramal melalui umur dan jantina. Kedua, individu yang tahap 
risiko kesihatannya rendah dan individu yang enggan mengambil risiko diramalkan 
lebih berkemungkinan untuk memiliki insurans hayat peribadi. Ketiga, tahap risiko 
kesihatan menunjukkan korelasi negatif dengan yang tidak mengambil risiko. 
Penemuan-penemuan ini mencadangkan terdapatnya bukti wujudnya pemilihan yang 
menguntungkan di pasaran insurans kesihatan di Malaysia. Oleh itu, dapatlah 
dirumuskan yang pemilihan peserta insurans adalah berkesan dan memberi 
keuntungan kepada penanggung insurans sekaligus menunjukkan kemampuan industri 
untuk melawan kesan pemilihan yang merugikan.  
 
Kata kunci: insurans hayat, pemilihan risiko, pemilihan menguntungkan, Teori 
Pemilihan yang Menguntungkan, Teori Asimetri Informasi 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The government of a country has the responsibility to ensure the attainment of the 
highest possible level of health for its people (World Health Organization, 1978). 
Ensuring equity of access to (public) healthcare has always been the objective 
although the government is aware of the continued increase of healthcare spending 
every year. In a two-tier health system with heavy subsidy from the public sector, as 
in the case of Malaysia, the government shapes the optimum financing strategy. The 
government’s commitment to financial resources charts the provision and distribution 
of healthcare services to wider regions. Encouragement initiatives by the government 
enlarge private sector involvement through insurance programmes to facilitate public 
access to private healthcare services.  
 
Private health insurance serves the different healthcare environments 
differently such as in substitutive, complementary, or supplementary environments 
(Olivella & Vera-Hernández, 2013). In complementary and supplementary 
environments, private health insurance provides access to services not fully or 
sufficiently provided by the public sector. In countries where private healthcare is a 
substitute to public services such as in Malaysia, private health insurance has the 
larger overall impact on the access to healthcare although there are arguments such as 
by Thomson and Mossialos (2004) that private health insurance in a substitute 
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environment widened the gap of access to healthcare, especially for the poor, the 
older, and lower income individuals.  
 
The private health insurance market in Malaysia will continue to play a major 
role in financing the healthcare needs of Malaysians. While it recorded steady growth 
over the years, growth is still low compared to more advanced nations. The 
penetration rate of health insurance was 18 per cent in 2008 (Institute for Public 
Health, 2008) and insurance contribution to the overall funding of healthcare was 6 
per cent in 2013 (Ministry of Health, 2015a).  At the same time, the industry has not 
been spared from the same challenges as those faced by its counterparts in the rest of 
the world. The biggest challenge is to maintain the balance between commercial 
viability and providing greater access to healthcare services. 
 
In providing continuous access to healthcare, it is also essential to ensure that 
health insurance providers run actuarially sound business through the collection of 
fair premium and the ability to pay claims. Insurers are advised to continue to look for 
new ways to improve selection of insureds and reduce claims cost. The 
recommendation to use lifestyle-based analytics is an example of a suggestion to 
improve prediction on claims (Shreve, 2006).  
 
In the enrolment of an insured, in a market where information failure exists, it 
is technically difficult to make accurate risk assessment of a potential insured; 
furthermore, it is costly to administer. Consequently, insurers are motivated to enrol 
only lower than average health risk individuals and leave out the rest. Alternatively, 
health insurers may enrol the higher than average risk individuals and impose 
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additional premium on them or limit the coverage such as by excluding pre-existing 
conditions or imposing expense participation through deductibles or co-insurance.   
 
The current manner of selection which is based on underwriting criteria may 
not be sufficient to fully predict healthcare utilisation among the insured, which is the 
determining factor for health insurance claims. Other criteria such as risk preference 
of individuals have been found to have impact on the ownership of insurance.  
 
Inefficient selection of insureds relates to the issue of information failure. 
Adverse selection (anti-selection) and moral hazard are the consequences of 
information failure that have been discussed widely in previous studies. The adverse 
selection theory suggests positive relationship between health risk level and purchase 
of health insurance. The implication is that a higher-risk individual will be more likely 
to purchase health insurance. Since health insurers are not aware of the health status 
of insurance applicants due to asymmetric information (Akerloft, 1970), insurers will 
set premium at average price instead of differentiating based on risk level. This results 
in higher-risk individuals getting a bargain by purchasing at the lower than expected 
price while low-risk individuals are less likely to buy at the average offer price.  
 
While the adverse selection theory predicts people with high health risk are 
more likely to own health insurance, a competing theory, propitious (advantageous) 
selection, proves the positive correlation between insurance purchase and risk 
avoidance activity (Hamenway, 1990). Since health insurance premium is not related 
to risk preference, a test of the importance of a number of risk preference factors 
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related to health insurance ownership will be pivotal for consideration in risk selection 
as risk avoidance behaviour may lead to increased health insurance purchases.   
 
Much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between individuals’ 
riskiness, their risk preference and health insurance ownership, particularly in 
different healthcare markets. In the Malaysian context, up to now, far too little 
attention has been paid to the problem of insurance selection, with the exception of 
Abdul Rahman and Mohd Daud (2010), and Kefeli@ Zulkefli and Jones (2012) who 
suggested that there was no evidence of adverse selection. Using datasets from 
National Health and Morbidity Surveys (NHMS) of 1996 and 2006, Kefeli@ Zulkefli 
and Jones (2012) did not find strong evidence for adverse selection when comparing 
the health conditions variables.  
 
The findings from this study will provide insights into risk status and lifestyle 
behaviour of Malaysians and the impact of their preference on health insurance 
ownership. This will serve the industry and policymakers with the opportunity to 
relook the strategies towards broadening the participation of the population in health 
insurance through appropriate initiatives and incentives. Increase in health insurance 
ownership will reduce the over-reliance on public healthcare facilities and offer more 
access to private healthcare institutions. 
 
 
1.2 Background of Study 
Southeast Asia is a growth area in healthcare development. Roland-Berger reported 
that the healthcare spending for the region increased by 250 per cent to USD 68 
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billion between 1998 and 2010 (Roland-Berger, 2013). The development of the 
market varies by countries. Malaysia and Thailand are the more advanced countries 
trailing behind Singapore, while the rest of the countries in the region are at a lower 
maturity. 
 
In the same report, Roland-Berger (2013) estimated the growth of the sector in 
the region to reach USD270 billion in 2020. Private health insurance accounted for 6 
per cent in 2013, an increase from 4 per cent in 2010. The total premium for personal 
accident and health insurances is expected to increase to USD24 billion in 2020 from 
USD6 billion in 2010. Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia will remain as 
the largest markets until 2020. The development in the region is shaped by steady 
population growth, steep increase in medical costs and increase in per-capita 
consumption of healthcare services.  
 
Strengthening health systems and services is one of the major areas to be 
improved as highlighted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2015). The world 
body suggested improvements in health systems for better access, equity, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and quality, with the involvement of the private sector. 
 
1.2.1 Malaysian Healthcare System  
Malaysia has a long-established healthcare system providing access to a 
comprehensive package of healthcare services.  The development of the healthcare 
system in Malaysia started in 1950s with the establishment of a few main health 
centres, health sub centres, midwife clinics, and maternal and child health clinics. The 
current healthcare system comprises two sectors: the public and the private sectors. 
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The public sector provides primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of promotive, 
preventive, curative and rehabilitative services. The public healthcare system is highly 
subsidized and financed mainly through general taxation. Private sector participation 
in the healthcare services is mainly curative care and rehabilitative. Private sector 
healthcare services are financed through a combination of employee medical benefits, 
out-of-pocket (OOP) payments or medical insurance (Wan Abdullah and Eng, 2009). 
Other sources of financing are Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and Social Security 
Organisation (SOCSO) (Yu, Whynes & Sach, 2008).  
 
In 2015, the Malaysian government allocated RM23.3bilion for public health 
expenditure, representing about 8.5 per cent of total government spending. Of this 
amount, 93 per cent was allocated for operating expenditure and the balance was for 
development.  This was an increase of about 5.2 per cent from the 2014 allocation of 
RM22.1 billion (Ministry of Health, 2015b). Malaysia is not a high-spending country 
on health. The total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP in 2012 and 2013 
was 4.5 per cent and 4.53 per cent respectively. The expenditure is in the middle 
range compared to the high and middle-income countries in the Asian region.   
 
Despite progressive improvement in the public healthcare system, the demand 
for private care has increased over the years. This can be seen in the growth of private 
hospitals. There were only 50 private hospitals in 1980 in the entire country providing 
a total of 1,171 beds.  By 2014, there were 184 private hospitals providing 13,038 
beds or 32 per cent of total hospital beds in the country (Ministry of Health, 2015b).  
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The continuous improvement in healthcare services in Malaysia has contributed 
significantly to the health status of the Malaysian population. The life expectancy (at 
birth) for males improved steadily from 71.9 years in 2010 to 72.5 years in 2014 and 
for females it improved from 76.6 years to 77.2 years for the same period (Ministry of 
Health, 2015c). 
 
As the Malaysian government continues with its large expenditure on health- 
care provision, there are concerns regarding the sustainability of the government 
continuing to fund healthcare services. In addition to the factors that influence 
regionally the increase in healthcare expenditure, Malaysia faces the additional 
challenge of changes in the socio-demographic structure. The change in demographic 
structure where the number of the older population aged 65 and above increased from 
3.9 per cent in 2000 to 5.6 per cent in 2014 indicated a steady increase in an older and 
less healthy population (Ministry of Health, 2015c). Individual healthcare costs would 
increase as a person depreciated in the health stock due to ageing (Grossman, 1972). 
The increase in population has created an increase in the number of visits to health- 
care facilities. It was reported that there was a 3 per cent increase in admissions to 
government hospitals in 2010 (Ministry of Health, 2010). 
 
The total expenditure on health (public and private) amounted to RM42.3 
billion in 2012 and RM44.7 billion in 2013. The government spent 51.96 per cent of 
its total expenditure in 2013 on healthcare as compared to 53.19 per cent the year 
before (Ministry of Health, 2015b). The expenditure for inpatient care amounted to 
RM12.1 billion or 50 per cent of the total curative care expenditure in 2013. The 
amount reflected 27 per cent of the total health expenditure for 2013 (Ministry of 
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Health, 2015a). In the 2011 health and morbidity survey, 6.9 per cent of respondents 
experienced hospital admission (Institute for Public Health, 2011a).  
 
Unlike in the private sector, the utilisation of public healthcare services is 
almost free with minimum OOP payment charged for certain expenses. In contrast, 
the utilisation of private healthcare requires a larger share of OOP expenses or health 
insurance or co-payment with the insurer. Private health insurance mainly provides 
coverage for inpatient benefits and insureds who seek treatment at public health 
facilities are given incentive in terms of cash daily income.  
 
The effect of the low penetration of health insurance in the country is seen in the 
comparison of the amount of OOP expenses against the total expenditure on health. In 
2013, OOP expenses were 39 per cent of the total health expenditure while private 
health insurance contributed 6 per cent of the total funding of health expenditure 
(Ministry of Health, 2015a). Over reliance on OOP expenditure can negatively impact 
on treatment-seeking behaviour. The adverse impact of OOP expenditure on access 
and healthcare utilisation has been documented in the study by Onah and Govender 
(2014).  
 
The increase in overall healthcare cost, change in the population demography, 
and change in the healthcare delivery system with the emergence of managed care, 
has led to the dependence on health insurance for greater access to healthcare 
providers.  
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The provision of healthcare and health-seeking behaviour in Malaysia has 
attracted multidimensional studies. For example, Kefeli@ Zulkefli and Zaidi (2013) 
studied behaviour towards the use of healthcare services based on socio-economic 
differences; Abu-Bakar, Samsudin and Suhadah (2016b) on profiling the insured and 
health utilization; Wan Abdullah and Eng (2009) on the impact of private health 
insurance on utilisation of healthcare; Abu-Bakar, Samsudin, Regupathi, and Aljunid 
(2016a) on the role of private health insurance in healthcare-seeking behaviours; and 
Kefeli@ Zulkefli and Jones (2012) on moral hazard. Abdul Rahman and Mohd Daud 
(2010) studied the behaviour of health takaful participants towards healthcare 
utilisation.  Others studied the macro perspective of healthcare; for example, Yu, 
Whynes and Sach (2008) studied financing progressivity; Almualm, Alkaff, Aljunid 
and Alsagoff (2013) studied support for national health insurance. 
 
1.2.2 Medical and Health Insurance (MHI) Industry in Malaysia 
Contrary to some other countries, Malaysia does not have compulsory health 
insurance. Individual medical and health insurance (MHI) products have been offered 
in the market by life and composite companies since the 1970s. The growth of 
individual MHI in Malaysia is expected to more than triple by 2020 to US$5 billion 
from US$1.5 billion in 2010 (Roland-Berger, 2013). The expected growth is driven 
by the increase in awareness among the population of the need to make adequate 
provision for their personal healthcare expenditure to meet the preference for better 
health through private providers.  
 
Medical and health insurance may be designed as a stand-alone policy or as a 
rider to a life insurance policy. A rider is a supplementary benefit that is attached to a 
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life insurance policy. Examples of riders are accidental death, critical illness, and 
permanent and total disability. The difference between a stand-alone and a rider lies in 
the structure of the policy. A stand-alone policy is a “term” policy which will expire 
at the end of a period which is normally one year. The policy may be renewed 
annually and the premium on renewal will be higher due to increase in age. Life 
insurance is not a term policy and the rider will not expire as long as the life insurance 
policy is enforced. For a stand-alone policy, the premium is only to cover the medical 
benefits whereas for a rider to life insurance, the premium covers both the medical 
benefits and life insurance. In both categories, the premium will depend on the 
benefits of the policy. These are normally associated with the type of room and board, 
surgical fees or annual limit of claims. 
 
The traditional products of individual MHI are medical expense 
(hospitalisation and surgical) insurance, and critical illness (dread disease) insurance. 
Medical expense insurance covers the cost of hospitalisation and surgery, while 
critical illness insurance gives a lump sum benefit if the insured is diagnosed with any 
of the illnesses stated in the policy (InsuranceInfo, 2007). Some insurers offer newer 
products such as disability income insurance which pays the insured income stream to 
replace part of the income received during the pre-disability period. Hospital income 
insurance pays the insured daily, weekly, or monthly allowance if the insured is 
hospitalised (InsuranceInfo, 2007). The majority of private individual health 
insurance plans in Malaysia are offered by the life insurance industry as riders to life 
insurance plans. 
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The MHI product that continues to be dominant in the market is the hospital 
and surgical insurance policy which covers medical, surgical and hospitalisation 
expenses, and accounted for 63 per cent of total premium written. The critical illness 
policy was second, accounting for 28 per cent of total premium written, and hospital 
income and long term care policies made up the rest (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2005).  
 
Unlike in the United States where insurance is substantially regulated by the 
state, Malaysian insurers are regulated centrally by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). 
Even though insurance is a private contract between the insurer and the insured, 
insurance is a concern to the public. Regulation is enforced to ensure that public 
interest is protected.  For the MHI sector, the role of BNM is to ensure improvement 
in the functioning of the private health insurance market that focuses both on the 
economic aspects of supporting the sustainability of health insurance providers and 
promoting policy objectives of higher accessibility of higher-risk individuals (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2005).  
 
1.2.3 Issues in Health Insurance   
A healthcare system is a network of entities that work towards the common goal of 
achieving optimum health of a population. The system entities include providers of 
personal healthcare, preservers of a healthy environment, suppliers of expertise and 
new information, and providers of financing. Arrow (1963) suggested that an ideal 
system is one where insurance is available to cover against all conceivable risks. 
Health insurance is needed to lessen the risk when one is ill and to recover from 
illness.  The absence of suitable insurance for the risks indicates the loss of welfare as 
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the risks cause not only discomfort but also loss of productive time, death or long 
deprivation of normal function (Arrow, 1963).  
 
Health insurance is important for several reasons. Having timely access to 
medical care is crucial as the consequences of not having access can be distressing. 
Buchmueller, Fiebig, Jones, and Savage (2013) recorded five reasons for people in 
Australia having health insurance. Almost half of respondents cited sense of security, 
peace of mind and having protection. An almost equal number stated being treated as 
private patient, having greater choice and less wait. Another 20 per cent mentioned 
financial reasons, including getting tax incentives. Continuing to have health 
insurance was another reason given and finally, anticipating the need for medical care 
due to age or medical condition was stated by 4 per cent of respondents as a reason 
for having health insurance.  The summary of the findings of a study by Haley and 
Zuckerman (2003) revealed that those who did not have insurance were unable to get 
early treatment and were only treated for serious diseases. Often, if they managed to 
get treatment, they received less post-treatment care. The study also noted that the rate 
of mortality could be reduced by 10 to15 per cent if individuals had health insurance.  
 
While health insurance serves as the key enabling factor for access to health- 
care services, the issues surrounding health insurance can have profound effect on 
insurers and consumers. The most widely discussed issues in the health insurance 
market are the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. A considerable 
amount of literature has been published on these issues in several health insurance 
markets, which may affect the profitability of insurance companies. The problem of 
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adverse selection may lead insurers to face the possibility of enrolling an unbalanced 
share of people who are costly to insure.  
 
The market in which the insurance industry operates exerts continual pressure 
to achieve and maintain high performance through lowering administrative costs, 
improving efficiencies, managing healthcare costs and growing the business 
(Accenture, 2009). Additionally, Accenture (2009) noted that health insurers were 
facing low return, especially in the individual health insurance markets.  The profits 
generated are mainly from specific market segments and from the return on 
investments of the pool of premium collected prior to the pool being used to pay 
claims.  
 
The financial shape of health insurers is measured by the loss ratio which is 
the total health benefits paid divided by premium income. In 2008 for example, the 
loss ratio for major publicly traded health insurers in the U.S. was between 70.7 per 
cent and 89 per cent (Austin & Hungerford, 2010). In Malaysia, premium is decided 
after a mark-up of 30 per cent to 50 per cent, depending on the loss ratio (Wan 
Abdullah & Eng, 2009). Looking specifically at the underwriting profitability of 
individual policies, Harrington and Weiner (2014) found that health insurance 
companies in the U.S. lost 3.1 cents for every dollar of premium collected with the 
cost of claims accounting for 85 per cent of the premium due to the escalating costs of 
healthcare. In Malaysia where individual health insurance is offered as a rider to a life 
insurance policy, the life insurance industry paid a total of RM2.7 billion in medical 
claims, an increase of 37 per cent from the previous year. The increase was 
contributed mainly by the strong growth of medical health insurance and partly by the 
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increase in medical costs (Life Insurance Association of Malaysia, 2014). In 2004, the 
Malaysian government approved an increase of 14.4 per cent in private medical fees, 
resulting in the increase in health insurance premium (The Star Online, 2014). 
 
Austin and Hungerford (2010) in their report for US Congress acknowledged 
that the increase in the cost of medical and healthcare to about 80 per cent of premium 
income would lead to increase in premiums paid by participants. PwC Health 
Research Institute (2014) studied the trends of medical costs and predicted that 
healthcare costs would continue to increase due to changes in the costs of medical 
products and services and increase in the number of services used.  
 
Further, in their study on the underwriting cycle, Kipp, Cookson, and Mattie 
(2003) noted that besides healthcare cost trends that directly influence the changes in 
health insurance premiums, other factors such as competition, legislation, regulation 
and difficulty predicting future costs were all contributors to the repeating pattern of 
gains and losses within the insurance industry. Similarly, Accenture (2009) outlined 
other challenging areas facing health insurers, including pay-for-performance and data 
transparency, operation efficiency, and consumer and uninsured growth. In ensuring 
the objectives of health insurance plans which are to maintain and improve the health 
status of subscribers through efficient financing of healthcare are achieved, increase in 
costs and other influences exert pressures for insurers to balance the above objectives 
with sufficient revenue generation for continued sustainability. 
 
Insurance ownership may sometimes cause unnecessary consumption among 
insureds. The over consumption occurs when people who are more sick buy more 
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insurance and insureds consume more than the optimal. The insurance market is likely 
to suffer the adverse impact if risks that have a higher chance of loss are selected. The 
resulting outcomes of inefficient selection are two important phenomena in insurance: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the 
issue of moral hazard as the central theme is the problem of risk selection and its 
relation to the issue of adverse and advantageous selection. 
 
Since the seminal work by Akerlof (1970) on information asymmetry and on 
equilibrium models (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), studies have been conducted to 
determine the presence of adverse selection in individual health insurance markets. 
Equilibrium is a state of balance in a system that is produced and maintained by a 
variety of forces.  In insurance this only exists when there is a perfect market full of 
identical people. A separating equilibrium is when individuals with different 
characteristics choose different actions. For example, high-risk individuals and low-
risk individuals will choose different insurance contracts. A pooling equilibrium is 
when individuals with different characteristics choose the same action such as 
choosing the same insurance contract. Browne (1992) tested and confirmed the 
hypothesis that in a market that was characterised by asymmetric information, low- 
risk individuals would purchase less insurance. However, in a study of medical and 
health takaful in Malaysia, Abdul Rahman and Mohd Daud (2010) could not prove 
substantial presence of adverse selection.  
 
Rejda (1998) defined adverse selection as strategic behaviour by the more 
informed partner in a contract, against the interest of the less informed partner(s). 
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Faden, Vialle-Valentin, Ross-Degnan, and Wagner (2011) described adverse selection 
as follows: 
“An economic term which, in the context of health insurance, refers to the 
scenario in which people with higher risk (in terms of current or predicted 
need for health services) buy insurance. Asymmetric information between the 
insurer and consumer is necessary for adverse selection to occur i.e. the 
consumer knows his health status and the insurer does not.” 
 
The existence of adverse selection makes it difficult for the contracting party 
to distinguish between high and low risk transactions (Belli, 2001). This occurs when 
one party in a contract has private information not known to the other party. In an 
insurance contract, information asymmetry will affect demand whereby demand for 
insurance will be positively correlated with the individual level of risk of loss. In a 
health insurance market, if there is asymmetric information in favour of the applicant, 
insurers will sell the insurance product at the price of an average applicant. The 
outcome as suggested by Akerlof (1970) is that “bad” risk will drive “good” risk from 
the insurance market.  
 
If information on health risks is not revealed to the insurer or the insurer has 
no means of knowing the illness history, there is a possibility that someone in the 
greater risk group will buy health insurance at the same price as people in the lower 
risk group. Another reason for the inability to observe the difference can be due to 
regulation such as that which requires insurers not to deny coverage to people with 
risky health status. In jurisdictions where no such regulations are enforced, 
underwriting failure to screen applicants and set premiums may also result in adverse 
selection. 
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Donnely (2011) described adverse selection (anti-selection or negative 
selection) as one of the greatest threats to a life insurance company as it brings four  
adverse consequences to a life insurer, namely 1) the insurer pays higher claim pay-
outs to the high-risk group; 2) the high-risk group purchases more insurance because 
they pay a relatively lower price; 3) to cover the costs, the insurer raises rates for 
everyone; 4) due to increase in price, customers with lower risk will leave the 
company and buy insurance from other companies that offer a lower price. 
 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) suggested that adverse selection impacts the 
insurance market greatly and causes a major theoretical concern as it results in three 
market inefficiencies. According to Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998), the presence of 
adverse selection results in insureds being unable to buy insurance at the price that 
reflects marginal costs that give the best option based on cost and benefit; no risk 
spreading; and insurers tend to manipulate the product offerings to avoid higher-risk 
individuals.  
 
By charging everyone the same rate, including in the case of community 
rating, health insurance will only be attractive to people with chronic illness and not 
to healthy people. Healthy policyholders will drop out, leaving only the sick people in 
the insurance pool. Insurers will then increase the rate to match the higher claim cost. 
As the rates go higher, insurance will not be attractive to almost everyone. Both 
insurers and the public find this unfavourable as price increase results in a fall in 
demand. This phenomenon, also known as health insurance death spiral, was 
discussed by Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) where adverse selection potentially causes 
losses in efficiency, risk-sharing ability, and from trying to improve the mix of 
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insureds. Arguments on death spiral continue and there is no explicit solution to the 
adverse selection problem. 
 
In the attempt to safeguard the company from the negative effects of adverse 
selection, insurers implement an underwriting policy and include provisions that will 
protect the company. For example, insurers will state the exclusion from coverage of 
pre-existing conditions which are health problems that an individual has had before 
coverage begins.  
   
The effect of asymmetric information suggests positive correlation between 
risk and insurance ownership.  In the case of adverse selection, more insurance is 
purchased by higher-risk individuals, whereas in moral hazard, higher-risk individuals 
utilise more benefits from health insurance. 
 
1.2.4  Health Insurance Underwriting  
Health insurance companies earn profit from two sources: the underwriting surplus 
and the investment return. The underwriting surplus is the difference between 
premium collected and claims paid. Between the time the premium is collected and 
the time payment of claims is made, the available premium collected is invested to 
earn investment income. Quality and careful underwriting is crucial in ensuring that 
the company generates sufficient underwriting surplus for allocation as profit or to be 
invested to generate profit for the company. 
 
The financial survival of health insurers depends on the ability to predict the 
future claims cost and expenses that they will incur for individuals they cover. When 
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healthcare costs increase unexpectedly, the premium collected will not be sufficient to 
cover the claims costs. Insurers will then increase the premium to reflect the current 
costs and to cover the previous losses. As in other markets, competition is inevitable 
with new entrants joining the market and offering lower premium for the same types 
of cover.  Some insurers fail to compete and exit the market (Kipp, et al., 2003). 
 
Insurance companies place emphasis on careful underwriting and development 
of contractual provisions. The American Academy of Actuaries (1997) defined 
underwriting as the process of selecting and classifying insurable risks.  Based on this 
definition, underwriters are responsible to determine which individual risks can be 
accepted. This is known as risk selection. The next step in underwriting is risk 
classification where the underwriters place the accepted applicants together into 
groups which comprise those who roughly have equivalent level of risk. In the pricing 
of health insurance, an underwriter will start the process with evaluating the degree of 
morbidity risks of an applicant for health insurance. The underwriter will evaluate 
each application and place it into one of the risk categories – preferred, standard, sub-
standard, or declined. Figure 1.1 provides the basic steps involved in the underwriting 
process. 
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Figure 1.1. Basic Steps Involved in the Underwriting Process. Adapted from   
Operations of Life and Health Insurance Companies (2nd ed.), by K. Huggins 
and R.D. Land. 1999. USA: LOMA Life Management Institute. 
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Underwriting is not a new subject. Historically, in the 18th and 19th century, 
health insurance was organised on local basis and only offered to members of 
fraternity (fraternal insurance). Proposed prospects for health insurance were required 
to appear before the Board of Directors to answer questions on their health status.  
The board would usually have a physician among its members (Society of Actuaries, 
1999). The purpose of underwriting is to evaluate the risk of potential clients and 
understand their health risk over a long period of time. The MHI policy is a contract 
that can last very long and represents a significant promise by the insurer to pay future 
claims.  
 
In Malaysia, a health insurance policy can cover an applicant up to the age of 
100 years and the premium will be determined based on the age of the applicant 
during entry. The shorter the duration to the expiry date, the higher the premium. An 
insurer must be financially viable to fulfil its promises. Therefore, to remain 
sustainable, a health insurer will need to be efficient in its administration, investment 
strategy, competitiveness, and effectiveness in risk selection. 
 
The underwriting process protects the company from taking on clients who are 
prone to illness and conditions that make the company responsible for paying the 
healthcare expenses. Eventually, underwriting benefits both insurers and insureds as 
premium will be kept at the minimum and the risk of loss to the company will be 
lower.  In typical underwriting, underwriters usually exclude pre-existing conditions 
from insurance cover. This is as not only do insurers find it difficult to assess future 
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cost from the existing illness, it also avoids the problem of adverse selection 
(Foubister, Thomson, Mossialos & McGuire, 2006). 
 
1.2.4.1  Risk Selection  
Issuing a policy to an applicant who is uninsurable is an unwise decision as it means 
financial loss to the company. Health insurers need to exercise care in deciding who is 
qualified to buy health insurance. It is the responsibility of the company underwriter 
to ensure each application for health insurance is reviewed in accordance with the 
company’s standards to determine if the applicant qualifies for insurance coverage 
and at what premium.  
 
In risk selection, the underwriter’s attention will be on the factors that will make 
up the picture of the client’s current health. Typically, an underwriter will use a 
number of sources to get the information about an applicant and to develop the risk 
profile. The key information will be from four sources, namely the current medical 
condition, personal medical history, family history and actuarial trends.   
 
Other third party sources of information are sought when the need arises. 
Dearborn Financial Institute (1994) listed several sources of information, namely the 
application, the medical reports, an attending physician’s statement (APS), the 
Medical information Bureau, special questionnaires, inspection reports and credit 
reports. The usage of the sources of information will depend largely on several 
factors, particularly on the size of the policy requested or other triggering questions 
about the applicant.  
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The basic source of information on insurability is from the application. Where 
necessary, insurers will contact an applicant’s medical doctor for verification of the 
information stated in the form. The purpose is to establish the extent of pre-existing 
condition, past conditions and whether such condition may recur in the future that 
may impact on the finances of the insurers.  Such strict approach of full medical 
underwriting received criticism in the past (Foubister, et al., 2006).  
 
In an agency-based operation, an agent who acts as a field underwriter will 
initiate the process of underwriting through proper solicitation, ensuring of completed 
application, and obtaining appropriate signature for confirmation. Field underwriters 
assist insurers in risk selection through the screening of applicants before the decision 
to accept or reject the risk is made. Hall (2000) noted that field underwriting helps to 
detect if applicants are telling the truth about their health conditions.  
 
The manner the information is gathered differs between companies. Usually, by 
using a portable communication device, field underwriters are connected to the home 
office all the time and they will be able to tell if the application for specific coverage 
is likely to be approved. The usage of an application form is still common in 
Malaysia. Insurance companies generally request similar information in the 
application form. Besides demographic information, applicants need to answer a 
series of questions on self and family medical history, occupation, income, and 
lifestyle. The information provided by the applicant in the application form will most 
of the time become the main source of information used by underwriters to decide 
whether to accept, accept with condition, or reject an application.  
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Quality selection through having more information on a potential insured is 
central to the underwriting practice. Failure on the part of the insurer by continuously 
underestimating the risks it assumes will result in inadequate premium rates to 
provide the insured with the promised benefits. Insurers will continuously look for 
additional information that will assist them in estimating the risk. The ability to 
leverage information and business intelligence are initiatives to be considered to 
improve predictability (Accenture, 2009). To be ahead of competitors in terms of 
numbers and quality of new insureds, insurers need the ability to identify new 
selection criteria. Couchman (2006) described one of the actuarial competitive 
objectives as matching price with risk. If an insurer was able to attract better risk by 
offering a lower price, competitors would be left with poorer risks. 
 
Insurance works on the principles of utmost good faith and equity between 
policyholders (Donnelly, 2011). Under the principle of utmost good faith, applicants 
are obliged to reveal at their own risk any information to the insurer that may 
influence the decision of the company in offering coverage. However, the available 
information is often insufficient to price efficiently the risk protection offered to the 
applicants. This information asymmetry might result in adverse selection (Akerlof, 
1970; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
 
In the study on checking service, Shreve (2006) indicated that one of the biggest 
challenges a health underwriter has is to be faced with insufficient information on 
health conditions as provided by the applicant. A checking service is provided by a 
third party at the request of an insurer to find more information about an applicant for 
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an insurance policy. Usually the checking service provider is a corporation owned by 
a group of insurers.  
 
One of the reasons for insurers not getting enough accurate information is 
applicants find it difficult to complete the medical questionnaire, resulting in their 
overlooking providing relevant information needed by the underwriter. Some 
applicants may ignore historical medical information thinking that the condition is not 
worth mentioning or has been treated. The worst situation is when applicants omit 
information in the attempt to receive a more favourable rating or increase the 
insurability. In these cases, health insurers run the risk of inaccurate selection of risks, 
which may result in higher medical claims from the insured and affect the profitability 
of the company.  
 
To improve predictability, health underwriters in the United States leverage  
information from an industry-wide database of pooled medical information from prior 
insurance applications to verify information provided by applicants (Shreve, 2006) 
using a checking service. However, not all regions in the world have industry-wide 
databases as in the United States. 
 
1.2.4.2  Risk Classification  
Risk classification is the process of grouping together applicants with similar 
characteristics. An underwriter will review thoroughly the application as the first 
source of information and classify the risk that the applicant may pose to the insurer. 
Persons with similar risk profiles are believed to have similar level of medical costs. 
Grouping applicants by homogeneous risk categories will help insurers in their 
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decisions to enrol, decide coverage, and charge. People in the same class will be 
charged a class-wide premium. 
 
An underwriter will classify the applicant’s risk based on the company’s 
underwriting guidelines. Dearborn Financial Institute (1994) described the 
classification of risks as follows: “Standard risk is the risk of individuals who fit the 
insurer’s guidelines for policy issue without special restrictions or additional rating.”  
Substandard risk falls below the insurer’s standard or average risk guidelines. An 
individual can be rated substandard due to poor health, dangerous occupation or 
habits that could be hazardous. Under this classification, the application may be 
rejected or accepted for coverage with an increase in the policy premium. Preferred 
risks are exceptionally good risks to the insurer. Individuals within this classification 
generally pay lower premium rates.  
 
The typical classifying of applicants will be based on demographic criteria 
such as age, gender, and smoker and non-smoker. These classifying factors which 
apply for both health and life insurance set the first level of the pricing structure as 
medical costs typically increase with age and are different for men and for women. 
Smokers and non-smokers are charged different premium as smokers are associated 
with illness such as cancer. Subsequently, medical impairments are evaluated to 
establish if the medical condition of the applicants will impact future claims, 
including weight within ideal range and favourable cholesterol levels. Table 1.1 
provides some examples of underwriting decision based on the impairment of health 
or life insurance applicants. Besides the classifying factors, the health insurance 
industry typically investigates other risk factors that may affect the mortality of 
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applicants (American Academy of Actuaries, 1999). These include occupation, 
dangerous sports, foreign travel, drugs and alcohol and financial needs. 
 
Table 1.1  
Portion of an Impairment Guide 
 
Impairment Type of Coverage Typical Underwriting Decision 
   
Appendicitis  Health 
 
Unoperated – Impairment rider 
Operated within one month – Decline  
One month after successful, uncomplicated operation 
– probably standard 
Life  Usually standard 
Asthma  Health Mild, occasional – usually standard 
Moderate to severe – rate to decline 
Life  Mild – usually standard 
Moderate to severe – rate to decline 
Burns  Health If no impaired function – standard 
If possible future plastic surgery – impairment rider  
Life  Usually standard 
Concussion of 
brain 
Health After recovery depending on severity – standard to 
decline 
Life  Recovered, no remaining signs – standard 
Diabetes Health Mild – individual consideration 
Others – decline 
Life  Depending on age, duration and other medical factors 
– standard to decline  
Epilepsy Health Individual consideration  
Life  Depends on history – rate to decline 
Some types, after five years - standard 
Fractures Health According to location, severity, complications, and 
recovery – standard, impairment rider, or both 
Life  After recovery – standard  
Note. Adapted from Life and Health Insurance Underwriting (2nd ed.), by M.C. 
Bickley, B.F. Brown, J.L. Brown, and H.E. Jones. 2007. Georgia: LOMA 
 
1.2.4.3  Setting of Premium 
The purpose of risk selection and risk classification is to ensure that the insured will 
be charged premium that will match the expectation of value received from the 
purchase of insurance. Insurers refer to pricing of risk as risk rating.  
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Based on the risk classification, an applicant may pay a standard rate without 
any exclusion or reduction in benefits. Those in the sub-standard category may be 
required to pay higher premium or benefits may be reduced. Risk classification will 
reduce the subjectivity in the above decisions. However, since insurers are free to 
develop their own underwriting guidelines, there is the tendency that subjectivity may 
occur at the industry level.   
 
Foubister et al. (2006) listed four dimensions of price that become the basis for 
setting premium. The first is the scope of cover which relates to whether the cover is 
comprehensive, standard or budget, depending on the benefits offered. The second 
dimension relates to the characteristics of the applicant determined through 
underwriting. The pricing decision will reflect the combination of these two 
fundamental dimensions. At this point, the price is based on how the 
underwriter/actuary rates the risk of the applicant in relation to the potential cost to 
the insurer and comes up with fair pricing. Price also depends on the third dimension 
known as product options such as the choice of hospital, types of accommodation, 
level of cost-sharing, or the availability of discounts from non-claims. The final 
dimension is the “loading charge” which reflects the insurer’s administrative costs 
and profit added into the price components. 
 
In facing competition, some insurers will reduce premium to attract new 
policyholders. It must be noted that while reducing premium may attract new 
policyholders, insurers may put the policyholders in jeopardy if the company is left 
with sustainability issues. To decide on the premium that is neither too low nor too 
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high will require of insurers the ability to reliably forecast the level of future claims 
which depend largely on the risk characteristics of the insured (American Academy of 
Actuaries, 2009). Although insurers rely on actuaries to make projections on claims 
and calculate the appropriate premiums, the task of the underwriter during risk 
selection is vital. Data including self-reported health status, claims trend, and selected 
demographic data are used as predictors of future expenditures. For example, a study 
by Hastings, et al. (2014), using the data from elderly emergency department patients, 
found that 73 per cent of patients aged 65 and above had low to average risk of return 
while the other 27 per cent had higher than average risk of subsequent return for 
hospitalisation. For an underwriter, the medical history of a patient is an important 
consideration for deciding on classes of premium. While other variables such as 
number of claims and visit to pharmacy have successfully been used to predict future 
cost, data on illness still is the key predictor (American Academy of Actuaries, 2009). 
 
In Australia, the setting of premium is based on community rating. This means 
health insurers will charge the same premium to all consumers regardless of the 
consumers’ characteristics such as age, gender and health status (Buchmueller, et al., 
2013). As the result of preventing insurers from using information on the insured in 
underwriting, insurers use average rate of premium and all consumers will pay the 
same premium regardless of risk level. For this reason, community rating encourages 
information asymmetry (Buchmueller, et al., 2013) and can result in low-risk buyers 
dropping out of the market, with only high-risk individuals remaining. Risk rating on 
the other hand allows health insurers to select insureds based on individual health risk 
factors. The insurance regulator will decide whether to allow the flexibility to insurers 
to choose the risk factors in the selection of insureds and decide the premium. In 
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Malaysia, the insurance industry is allowed the flexibility to use observable risk 
factors to classify risks and determine premium rates. The underwriting process and 
pricing can be based on factors such as age, sex, smoking status, health status or 
occupational status. This is also applicable in some OECD countries including the 
United Kingdom (Karl, 2014). 
 
In conclusion, risk selection and risk classification can have a profound impact 
on consumers and insurers. It may result in an individual being uninsurable or being 
only offered limited benefit. Risk classification may also affect affordability if 
individuals are assigned to higher risk class. Lack of ability to access medical care 
may result in the bigger issue of health inequality. Such an impact will trigger 
regulators to act by introducing regulations that have profound impact on insurers. 
Such regulations may include the restriction of underwriting as in the United States or 
the practice of community rating in Australia. 
 
The American Academy of Actuaries (2009) considered protecting an 
insurance programme from the impact of adverse selection was important to ensure 
the continuity of the programme and the ability to fulfil the promise to pay claims. For 
insurers, the ability to effectively select and classify insureds will enable insurers to 
decide on the premium to charge to level with the risks assumed.  Underwriting is 
necessary to ensure people buy insurance as a protection mechanism and not only at 
the point when they are already sick and need medical care as this will impact 
adversely on insurers. At the same time, the ability to redefine the criteria in the 
selection and classification of insureds will improve demand for health insurance. 
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1.3 Problem Statements 
The health behaviour model by Andersen (1968) addressed the issue of access to 
healthcare. In his model, Andersen (1968) defined “enabling component” as the 
“conditions which permit a family to act upon a value or satisfy a need regarding 
health service use”.  It is basically the variables that help an individual to be able to 
access healthcare services.  Enabling factors are the family means to attain the 
services, which include family resources (including economic resources such as 
having health insurance or family savings) and community resources (including the 
availability of services convenient to be accessed).  
 
Poor access to healthcare can be costly to individuals as well as to society.  
Failure of individuals in seeking treatment will affect society, especially if the 
untreated illness is contagious. The financial burden for the uninsured in getting 
treatment can be very high. CNBC (2013) reported that bankruptcy due to unpaid bills 
affected almost 2 million people in the US in 2013. Prolonged delay in seeking 
treatment can seriously impact a person’s health. Uninsured individuals often 
postpone seeking care and once they are diagnosed they receive less therapeutic care 
(Haley & Zuckerman, 2003). 
 
While health insurance is essential in facilitating access to healthcare, the health 
insurance industry is faced with the continuous issue of risk selection which affects 
insurers’ sustainability and consumers’ admission to a health insurance programme. 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) defined the purpose of risk selection as the incentives 
to attract healthy insureds and repel sick insureds. Therefore the fundamental task of 
health insurers is to evaluate risk and pricing of risk protection. Failing to perform the 
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task effectively risks insurers with competitiveness and financial problem. Inefficient 
selection of insureds could mean the insurer will have a pool of severely unhealthy 
insureds that will utilise more of healthcare services and be costly to insure. 
Financially, the insurer runs the risk of paying high claim costs which may affect the 
solvency of the company.  
 
Health insurance underwriters use similar factors as in the three sets factors 
(predisposing, enabling, and need) by Andersen (1968) and Andersen and Newman 
(1973) in their evaluation of applicants for insurance. Studies confirm the association 
of predisposing, enabling, and need factors with the utilisation of healthcare. These 
factors when administered carefully should be able to predict if an applicant will be 
using more or less healthcare services. Among the factors used in underwriting are 
health risk status and lifestyle risks. They form the basis for medical and health 
insurance underwriting to screen and deny individuals from MHI coverage. 
Responsiveness to the association between utilisation factors and underwriting factors 
will provide more accurate prediction of the risk status of health insurance applicants 
and reduce the negative consequences of the presence of asymmetric information in 
selection.   
 
The issue of risk selection is often discussed in relation to the theory of adverse 
selection and the limitation posed by asymmetric information in insurance 
transactions. In the enrolment of an insured, in a market where information failure 
exists, it is technically difficult to make accurate risk assessment of a potential 
insured. Furthermore, it is costly to administer. Adverse selection (anti-selection) is 
the consequence of information failures resulting in inefficient selection of insureds. 
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The adverse selection theory suggests positive relationship between health risk level 
and purchase of health insurance. It has the implication that higher-risk individuals 
will be more likely to purchase health insurance. Since health insurers are not aware 
of the health status of insurance applicants due to asymmetric information (Akerloft, 
1970), insurers will set premium at average price instead of differentiating based on 
risk level. This results in higher-risk individuals getting a bargain by purchasing at the 
lower than expected price while the low-risk individual is less likely to buy at the 
average offer price. In the long run, the problem of adverse selection will affect the 
financial sustainability of insurance companies. 
 
While adverse selection has been found to exist in several health insurance 
markets, a competing model, propitious (advantageous) selection, attests the positive 
correlation between insurance purchase and risk avoidance activity (Hemenway, 
1990). In other words, insureds are risk-averse and are more likely to practise healthy 
lifestyles, resulting in less insurance claims.  
 
According to Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), individuals could be different in 
their risk types and preference for insurance in which both the information is private 
and not made available to insurers. Individuals with preference for insurance are more 
cautious and willing to spend on preventive health activities, making them low health 
risk individuals. This is in contrast with adverse selection where riskiness and 
ownership of insurance is positively correlated; in other words, individuals with bad 
risks are more likely to own health insurance.   
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Propitious selection has positive impact on health insurers. However, propitious 
selection that results in actuarially unfair premium paid by policyholders who are risk- 
avoiders may lead to reduced health insurance purchases.  In addition, if propitious 
selection dominates the market, it may select the “wrong” insureds and individuals 
who will need health insurance the most will not be covered by health insurance 
(Hemenway, 1992).  
 
Several studies have shown that propitious selection exists in the U.S. health 
insurance markets (Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006), in the United Kingdom (UK) 
(Olivella et al., 2013) and in Australia   (Buchmueller et al., 2013). An analysis of the 
2006 data of the National Health Morbidity Survey (NHMS) III by Abu-Bakar et al. 
(2016a) suggested that adverse selection might not be present in the Malaysian health 
insurance market. However, the study was descriptive in nature.  
 
Thus, this study aims to contribute to this growing area of research by 
investigating the relationship between individual risk preference and riskiness and 
health insurance ownership. The findings from this research may offer new evidence 
as the health insurance market in Malaysia is voluntary and is in demand despite the 
fact that public healthcare is almost free.  
 
In addition, this study provides the opportunity to use lifestyle risk variables as 
proxy for attitude towards risk. The variables are smoking, physical inactivity, and 
alcohol use. Previous studies used various measures of risk preference. The use of 
lifestyle variables shall contribute to the current body of knowledge in risk preference 
and ownership of health insurance. 
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In summary, this study is mainly motivated by the following problems: 
1) Very little is known about the relationship between individual risk 
preference with riskiness and health insurance ownership. The findings offer some 
important insight into the existence of propitious selection in the health insurance 
market. Risk-avoiding behaviours of insurance applicants have not been studied in 
Malaysia.  Such studies conducted in other countries show that individuals who are 
risk-averse are also subscribers to health insurance.  A study on the risk preference in 
the Malaysian health insurance market will provide new knowledge for decision 
making in the selection of insureds. 
 
2) The sustainability of health insurers depends very much on the ability to 
select the appropriate mix of insureds. Understanding individual characteristics and 
how they relate to the ownership of health insurance may qualify the current manner 
of selection which is based on underwriting criteria. These factors can be utilized to 
promote health insurance ownership as evidence suggests that health insurance 
ownership improves access to healthcare.  
 
This study aims to contribute to this growing area of research by exploring the 
existence of propitious selection in a health insurance market where access to health- 
care is almost free. It extends the current researches in health insurance by providing 
new evidence on risk preference behaviour among insureds in Malaysia.  The study 
also offers some important insights to insurers and policy-makers in promoting health 
insurance ownership. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
The findings of this study are expected to answer the following research questions: 
1) Do the profiles of individuals with and without health insurance differ? 
2) What is the relationship between the different underwriting factors of 
health insurance (i.e. gender, age and occupation) and the ownership of 
health insurance? 
3) What is the relationship between health risk level and ownership of health 
insurance? 
4) What is the relationship between risk preference level and ownership of 
health insurance? 
5) Does advantageous selection exist in the health insurance market? 
 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The research is conducted to meet the following objectives: 
1) To profile individuals with and without personal health insurance  
2) To determine the association between: 
a. underwriting factors (gender, age, occupation) and health 
insurance ownership 
b. health risk level and health insurance ownership 
c. risk preference and health insurance ownership 
3) To investigate the existence of advantageous selection in the health 
insurance market 
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1.6  Scope of Study  
The selection of specific and suitable datasets for the study was driven by the research 
questions and research objectives. Datasets were obtained from the National Health 
Morbidity Survey 2011 (NHMS 2011) by the Institute for Public Health (IPH).  The 
NHMS 2011 encompasses health-related data and information for use by the Ministry 
of Health in reviewing health priorities and the development of programme strategies, 
activities, and resource planning.  The range of data in NHMS 2011 is wide, which 
includes load of illness and disability among the population, health status, health 
services utilization, nutritional status and dietary practices, health risk behaviours, 
mental health problems, and home injury. While NHMS 2011 has an abundance of 
data to answer many more research questions, the access to the data was limited to 
those strictly needed to answer the hypotheses derived from the objectives. Three 
categories of information were of particular interest: socio-demographics, health 
insurance ownership, and health risk behaviours. Specifically, this study employed 
socio-demographic data of respondents, data on funding of healthcare through 
personal health insurance, health status of respondents, risky behaviours of smoking 
and alcohol use, and physical activity. Only respondents aged 18 years and above 
were selected as this age group is eligible to own personal health insurance. This 
study uses the term “personal health insurance” even though most of the literature 
refers to it as “private health insurance”. Personal health insurance is used to 
differentiate between individually-owned and company-sponsored health insurance, 
both offered by private insurers. To avoid duplication in the funding of healthcare, 
information on health insurance provided by employer was excluded.  
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1.7 The Importance of the Study 
The existence of advantageous selection has profound impact on insurers and policy- 
makers in that it conflicts with the classical insurance theory. In advantageous 
selection, the presumed implication is that those who buy health insurance are also 
risk-averse. However, there is no evidence in the Malaysian market that individuals 
with health risk take precautionary actions to control loss. Such existence if prevalent 
in the Malaysian market will have deep policy and industry implications. Propitious 
selection brings favourable impact on insurers in terms of enrolment of lower than 
average risk individuals. However, it may result in decreasing willingness to pay 
among individuals who are risk-averse. The government may view risk avoidance 
efforts taken by insureds as the encouraging effect on the government’s initiatives to 
promote lessening of lifestyle-related risks such as smoking, sedentary habits, and 
alcohol use. Nevertheless, it may impact on the number of new insureds, especially 
those who believe that risk avoidance efforts are sufficient to avoid major health risks 
that require healthcare services and financing from health insurance.  
 
Currently, the government’s concern is the availability and the cost of health 
insurance considering that a large number of the population is still uninsured. The 
industry, on the other hand, is concerned with the competitiveness in attracting new 
policyholders.  While health insurers seek to maximise premium income by accepting 
as many applicants of health insurance as possible, they are limited by the concern 
that substandard applicants will bring adverse impact on the insurers’ ability to cover 
the cost of risks. Failure to enrol good-risk-insureds will hamper the efforts to achieve 
a higher contribution of insurers to the overall healthcare financing. Balancing the 
needs of access and sustainability will be an ongoing challenge for both policymakers 
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and insurers. The ability to identify new elements that will encourage participation in 
a health insurance plan will be the prescription for the challenges facing both insurers 
and policymakers. 
 
Taken as a whole, this research effort will broaden the existing body of 
knowledge in the field of medical and health insurance underwriting, in particular, the 
risk preference of individuals and their demand for medical and health insurance.   
 
 
1.8 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis comprises five chapters. This chapter provides the background of the 
study. Starting with the current environment of the Malaysian healthcare system, the 
discussion extends to the medical and health insurance landscape of Malaysia. 
Following this is a discussion of the issues facing the health insurance industry to 
provide the background to the problems facing the industry. Reference is made to the 
United States and other countries where the issues have been documented quite 
openly. One of the main areas of concern is the practice of underwriting. The subject 
is discussed quite at length with a reference to the Malaysian practice.   
 
The need for empirical study for Malaysia is discussed in the problem 
statements. The specific research questions and objectives are then presented. The 
study explores the effects of various factors including health risk level, risk 
preference, socio-demographic factors, and the underwriting factors on personal 
health insurance ownership in the Malaysian market. This study will provide further 
evidence to the current literature on medical and health insurance studies.  
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 The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the healthcare system 
including the medical and health insurance industry and presents the problems, the 
objectives of the study as well as the importance of the study. Chapter 2 discusses the 
theoretical background and reviews the literature in the field. Chapter 3 explains the 
theoretical framework and the research methods employed in this study. The research 
findings are described in Chapter 4 and the recommendations are put forth in Chapter 
5 together with the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of risk classification in health insurance 
underwriting and a review of the theoretical foundation of health insurance risk 
selection though Akerlof’s (1970) theory of asymmetric information and Hemenway’s 
(1990) theory of propitious selection.   
 
An examination of relevant literature on health insurance and healthcare 
utilisation to reveal the references to medical and health insurance underwriting will 
be presented in the next section. In cases where relevant examples from other 
insurances are available, they may be included in the review. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2.1 discusses the relevant 
theories in health insurance selection. Section 2.2 discusses past empirical evidence of 
the risk factors used in the study. Section 2.3 compares the theories from the empirical 
perspective, and Section 2.4 concludes.  
 
 
2.2 Theories and Models Related to Underwriting of Medical and Health 
Insurance 
 
This study presents two theories that form the foundation for the study of 
underwriting of medical and health insurance: Akerlof’s theory of asymmetric 
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information and Hemenway’s theory of propitious selection. The first theory, 
Akerlof’s theory of asymmetric information, sets the basis for the selection of 
insureds for which insurers often have inaccurate information needed for decision 
making. Insurers need to carefully examine the variables associated with health 
insurance application prior to extending insurance coverage.  In addition, the theory 
provides the underlying explanation of the selection challenges facing individual 
health insurers in selecting insureds. The second theory, Hemenway’s theory of 
propitious selection, is a theory that is in contrast to the theory of adverse selection.  
The theory explains individual risk preference behaviours in the decision to own 
health insurance. Both the theories are central to the development of the research 
model and selection of variables for this study. The choice of the theories is based on 
the following assumptions:  
a) Personal health insurance operates in a competitive market 
Insurers will sell health insurance policies at a premium that will cover the 
cost as any premium lower than the cost will reduce insurers’ profitability. 
Insurers find it is less profitable to charge high premium to high-risk 
individuals compared to charging the same premium to low-risk individuals. 
However, in a competitive market, low-risk individuals will only be willing to 
buy when the price is low, thus forcing insurers who are after low-risk 
individuals to reduce the premium. In a competitive market, risk is defined as 
a measure of expected benefits (Pauly & Herring, 1999) where premium will 
vary according to risk involved.  
b) Health insurance relies on information 
Under the principle of utmost good faith, “a higher degree of honesty is 
imposed on both parties to an insurance contract than is imposed on parties to 
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other contracts” Rejda (1988: 65). Applicants for insurance schemes have the 
duty to disclose any information they know about their risk profile while 
insurers have the duty to explain to applicants the nature of the insurance 
product being applied for (Donnely, 2011).  
 
It is not economically viable for an underwriter to review and to check for 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation of the information stated in each 
application. The intentional concealment of material information may result in 
dispute which can be in the favour of the insurers. Insurers will rely on good 
faith of the applicants to select the applicants and set the premium rates while 
being aware of other methods of detecting risk to maintain their 
competitiveness (Macedo, 2009).  
 
2.2.1 Theory of Asymmetric Information  
The theory of asymmetric information was first postulated in the work of Arrow 
(1963) who emphasised that when there is uncertainty, information or knowledge 
becomes a commodity. In a market that is characterised by competitiveness, 
consumers are able to differentiate the quality of products that they intend to buy.  
However, according to Arrow (1963), the healthcare market does not fit the free 
market ideal due to, among others, the imperfect marketability of information.  In 
medical care, much of what a buyer gets is advice from a physician and less of actual 
dexterity such as in surgery. In this situation buyers will not be able to put a value to 
the information that comes in the form of advice or skilled care bought from most 
physicians.  
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The work of Arrow (1963) was expanded by Akerlof (1970) who noted that the 
uncertainty due to asymmetric information causes a reduction in the quality of goods 
and a failure of the market. In his paper, Akerlof (1970) developed the concept of 
asymmetric information using the automobile market as an example. The basic 
premise of this theory is that buyers will use market statistics to value goods in the 
market and develop the average value, while the sellers know the value of specific 
items.  
 
In the case example, Akerlof assumed the automobile market had four 
categories of cars: new car and old car and for each kind there was good car and bad 
car. Bad cars are commonly known as “lemons”. As suggested earlier, potential 
buyers will not know which car actually has a high or a low value. They will be 
willing to buy at the average price of good cars and lemons. For the price that buyers 
are willing to pay, the sellers are only willing to sell lemons and ultimately the good 
cars have to be withdrawn from the market since they are not getting the right price. 
Soon the market will be left with only lemons.  In essence, Akerlof’s theory noted 
that: 
a. Driven by larger profit incentives, people will sell lower quality goods more 
expensively. 
b. Buyers, for not knowing the actual value of the goods, will only be willing to 
buy at the average price between good quality and poor quality goods and 
what they get will be poor quality goods.  
c. Poor quality goods bring down the average price of goods.  
d. Poor quality goods will drive good quality goods out of the market.  
e. The market size of goods will reduce and only feature poor quality goods. 
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Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) applied this theory in the accidental insurance 
market where potential insureds came with different risk levels. In their study that 
used cost and coverage as the varying factors, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
suggested the possibility of insurance companies facing imperfect information when 
different customers have different accident probabilities. Due to asymmetric 
information, insurers are unable to distinguish between high-risk and low-risk 
individuals and for that insurers will charge a higher premium on average to cover the 
potential claims cost of riskier individuals. Only the high-risk individuals will find the 
premium to be fair with their risk level and buy the cover. The lower-risk individuals 
find the price too high for the cover than they require and leave the market. This 
results in adverse selection whereby the insurance company selects insureds that are 
adverse to the company.  
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) suggested that when there is imperfect 
information in a competitive market, a separating equilibrium could exist where 
individuals with different types of risk choose different insurance contracts. 
Separating equilibrium refers to when companies offer different insurance plans for 
different types of customers while pooling equilibrium refers to when insurance 
companies offer the same type of plan for different types of customers.  
 
Barr (1992) suggested that adverse selection due to asymmetric information 
problem could be experienced by both consumers and firms. For consumers, 
deficiency in information could cause imperfect consumer understanding about 
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quality and price. For insurance firms, adverse selection could cause failure to the 
insurance market.       
 
The basic understanding of adverse selection in insurance relates to the 
correlation between risk level and insurance coverage.  In the insurance market, 
adverse selection occurs when the potential insured has more information about a risk 
than the insurers. Under this theory, the purchaser of insurance who knows to himself 
that his risk level is higher will buy insurance with higher coverage or lower 
deductibles. While the presence of asymmetry in information can be proven, the type 
of information must be relevant to both the insurer and the insured. Relevant 
information is the “common values” that is important to both parties, such as 
information that will help insurers to charge premium to insureds (Chiappori, Jullien, 
Salanié & Salanié, 2006). 
 
This positive correlation between risk and coverage has attracted empirical 
works in this area. Evidence of adverse selection has been found in many studies even 
though the magnitude of the occurrence varies. In the Canadian automobile insurance 
market, Dahlby (1983) found that the prohibition of discriminating insurance 
coverage by gender led to reduced purchase of insurance by women drivers. Before 
the prohibition of charging different premium by gender, females with similar 
characteristics as males paid less for auto insurance premium. Statistically, females 
have lower risk of accident compared to males of the same age group. In this study 
Dahlby (1983) found that by not lowering premium for female drivers, the number of 
purchases for collision insurance dropped by between 2 to 10 per cent for different 
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ages of female customers. The study was consistent with Akerloft’s hypothesis that in 
a market with adverse selection, low-risk individuals drop out of the market.  
 
In the study to determine if adverse selection was present in the medical 
expense insurance market in the United States, Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993) 
found that there was also no difference in the buying behaviour of the higher and low 
risk individuals based on the generosity of coverage. High and low risk individuals 
purchased the same insurance policy. This result pointed to adverse selection as well 
as the presence of pooling equilibrium (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).   
 
In a natural experiment on health insurance plans offered to employees of 
Harvard University and Group Insurance Commission, Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) 
found that both institutions experienced adverse selection that affected the plans. For 
example, when Harvard decided to contribute equally to all plans, the premium paid 
by participants for the more generous plan increased substantially. Many of the 
affected employees of Harvard switched to the cheaper plan and those who switched 
were mainly younger and healthier. As a result, the plan became difficult to maintain 
and adverse selection death spiral took its course when the plan was finally disbanded.  
  
Studying Harvard University’s experience, Cutler and Reber (1998) noted that 
in a competitive market, changes in the pricing would impact the demand for health 
insurance.  They estimated that a one per cent increase in premium would reduce 
enrolment by two per cent.  
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In Iran, Haddad and Anbaji (2010) found the evidence of adverse selection in 
some types of insurance. In Iran different health insurance plans are subscribed by 
different groups of vocations. In the test of the association of high coverage with 
higher risks, the researchers found evidence that personal health insurance had the 
worst health status of subscribers who needed medical care and had encountered 
health shocks. The finding suggested positive correlation between risk and coverage, 
indicating the presence of adverse selection in personal health insurance for the 
personally insured individuals.    
 
The general prediction of adverse selection is when there is a positive 
correlation between risk level and insurance coverage in the presence of asymmetric 
information. The presence of asymmetric information may not be proven in many 
studies. For example, in the study of vehicle insurance, Chiappori and Salanie (2000) 
found no evidence of correlation between frequency of accident and coverage. The 
authors concluded that asymmetric information was not present in the contract 
between participants and insurers because the participants, especially the younger 
drivers who had very little driving experience, were not more knowledgeable about 
their risks than the insurers.   
 
Cardon and Hendel (2001) tested the presence of adverse selection through the 
link between demand for insurance and consumption of healthcare. In the study, 
adverse selection was only predicted if the link was characterised by unobservable 
information on healthcare utilisation. The authors however found that the link was 
based on observable information, suggesting no evidence of informational 
asymmetries. Therefore their model did not find the evidence of adverse selection. 
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The Theory of Asymmetric Information is applicable in the selection of insureds 
for medical and health insurance.  Asymmetric information occurs when insurers are 
unable to distinguish between good health and poor health individuals. The 
underwriting process often fails to establish the overall health picture of potential 
insureds due to the withholding of private information or weakness in the process to 
confirm on the health status of the applicants. Insureds may hide certain critical 
information from the knowledge of insurers, resulting in the failure of insurers to 
determine the correct premium, which risks insurers paying excessive claims in the 
same class of insureds. Not knowing the actual health conditions of the applicants, 
insurers will charge a higher premium on average to cover the potential claims cost of 
poor health individuals. Increase in premium in a competitive market drives the 
healthier individuals out of the market, leaving only those in less good health in the 
market. This in turn prompts the insurer to increase the premium even more to 
maintain profitability. Ultimately the premium will be so high that only certain people 
with definite needs of health insurance will remain in the market, resulting in insurers 
suffering from much reduced profits. Weaker insurers will ultimately drop out of the 
market. Barr (1992) suggested that the problems with adverse selection could be 
solved if only insurers could “get inside the head” of the insureds to verify the true 
risk status and compare the behaviour of the insureds if without insurance.  
 
Although evidence of adverse selection is mixed, previous literature exhibits 
that asymmetric information is relevant and sufficient information is important in the 
achievement of equilibrium in a competitive environment. The presence or absence of 
information that is of value and can impact the payoff of one party forms the 
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foundation of the applications of this theory. Akerlof’s theory of asymmetric 
information will remain as the lead theory in the study of health insurance 
underwriting. This theory will be used as the foundation for the effective operation of 
risk selection of health insurance applicants. 
 
2.2.2 Theory of Propitious Selection 
The theory of propitious or advantageous selection was postulated by Hemenway 
(1990). It posits that individuals who are more likely to purchase insurance try to 
reduce risk at the same time, a state which Hemenway (1990) calls “propitious 
selection”. Hemenway (1990) stated:  
 “…… the concept of propitious selection compares people with different levels 
of risk avoidance. Those with higher levels are more likely both to buy 
insurance and to exercise care. Those with low levels, or who are actually risk 
seeking, will tend to do neither.” 
 
Risk seeking and risk aversion are individuals’ preference resulting from their 
attitude towards risk. From the perspective of economists, risk preference is when the 
outcome of a choice is not known with certainty whereas psychologists view risk 
preference as a personality trait of an individual (Dave & Saffer, 2008). Depending on 
the personality and the possible return, individuals may choose either a risky or a less 
risky option, making them risk-takers or risk-averse.  
 
In his study, Hemenway (1990) analysed the risk preference of two different 
groups of individuals: American Automobile Association (AAA) members and car 
rental clients. An AAA member will benefit from the towing services provided in case 
of automobile breakdown. Such membership should attract the young and more 
reckless drivers who will be less likely to maintain their vehicles and will rely more 
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on AAA services. This will be an evidence of adverse selection. However, the study 
showed that AAA members were older and richer individuals and were more likely to 
prefer to avoid the risk of breakdown, suggesting the case to be more of propitious 
selection.   
 
In the same study, Hemenway (1990) tested the ownership of car rental 
insurance and the risk preference of the clients of a car rental company. Car rental 
insurance is a voluntary policy that carries the benefits of collision damage cover. At 
the premium of $9 per day, the cover should be worth more than having to pay claims 
from collision damage. Risk preference was measured on the usage of the seatbelt 
while driving as safe drivers tended to use the seatbelt more often. The evidence from 
the study was more consistent with propitious selection when 39 per cent of 
respondents bought insurance and 77 per cent used the seatbelt. 
 
The findings of Hemenway (1990) suggest that individuals who are more risk- 
averse will take action in protecting themselves and assets from injury and financial 
loss through the purchase of insurance and at the same time take physical precautions. 
This is consistent with the general assumptions of the theory which asserts that 
individuals have different taste for risks that is consistent across physical and financial 
dimensions and they can take action whether to increase or lower their risks.  
 
The theory of Propitious or Advantageous selection assumes that riskiness and 
risk aversion are negatively correlated. In other words, risk-averse individuals or risk- 
avoiders take more care and look for financial security including taking physical 
precaution compared to risk-takers who tend to be less cautious and more prone to 
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experience losses. The risk-seekers on the other hand do not have any reason to seek 
financial security such as by buying insurance. 
 
Fang, Keane & Silverman (2008) generalised the model of advantageous 
selection by providing a clearer relationship between health risk, attitude towards risk 
and ownership of health insurance. They suggested that advantageous selection could 
arise if people have private information (attitude towards risk) that is positively 
correlated with both health risk and ownership of health insurance. 
 
 The necessary condition for the presence of advantageous selection arises when 
risk aversion is higher among the low health risk individuals. It is in the best 
advantage of health insurers if they are able to select individuals who are in the low 
health risk but high in risk avoidance (risk-averse) to be accepted as insured.  
 
The adverse selection model proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) did not 
take into consideration individual preferences where individuals not only differed just 
in their risks but also in their willingness to bear risk (Einav and Finkelstein, 2011). 
According to Einav and Finkelstein (2011), differences in preferences suggest 
different action towards ownership of insurance. In essence, individuals who are 
willing to pay for insurance are high in risk aversion and most likely have lower 
expected cost or risk.  
 
Evidence suggests that adverse selection may not be present in the market 
featured by asymmetric information (Chiappori & Salanie, 2000; Cardon & Hendel, 
2001). Their studies found negative correlation between risk and insurance ownership. 
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Buchmueller et al. (2013) suggested the presence of other information such as risk 
aversion that was not used in setting the prices.  Chiappori and Salanie (2000) 
suggested that risk might not be the only possible source of asymmetry and negative 
correlation might be explained by the taste for risk of the individual. In different 
insurance markets, Wang, Huang and Tzeng (2009) found firms that purchased 
commercial fire insurance at the same time exercised self-protection activities and 
were less likely to suffer fire accidents. 
 
The theory of propitious selection offers an alternative mechanism in the 
selection of insureds. The existence of propitious selection will mitigate the problem 
of asymmetric information and benefit insurers. Although the health insurance market 
may attract high-risk individuals, these individuals take extra precaution to reduce 
their risk exposure, thus resulting in lower claim. The theory will be a leading theory 
in the selection of insureds due to its ability to offset the effect of adverse selection. 
 
 
2.3 Adverse Selection vs. Advantageous Selection  
Adverse selection occurs when the insurer is faced with the possibility of loss due to 
inability to factor risk during the time of sale. The insured may hide certain critical 
information from the knowledge of the insurer, resulting in the failure of the insurer to 
determine the correct premium, which risks the insurer paying excessive claims in the 
same class of insureds. Cardon and Hendel (2001) suggested that adverse selection 
might impact market efficiency. Due to the large number of people who are 
uninsured, inefficiencies in health insurance market is a policy concern. There are 
several ways in which market efficiency is affected by adverse selection. One 
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common example is where insurance providers structure their products at higher 
premium to cover high-risk individuals. Low-risk individuals find it a problem to pay 
the same premium as the high-risk individuals and thus drop out of the market, 
leaving only the higher-risk insured in the insurance plan. This suggests that under 
adverse selection, insurers may attract sub-optimal buyers in voluntary market 
transactions.   
 
Adverse selection in insurance is observed when potential buyers of insurance 
have better information about their risks than the insurers, resulting in positive 
correlation between risk and the amount of insurance purchased. In contrast, 
propitious selection compares individuals of different levels of risk preference – a 
higher level of risk avoidance (risk-averse) individuals purchase insurance while at 
the same time take precaution to avoid risk while the risk-taker will do neither.  
 
The correlation between risk and insurance coverage has attracted empirical 
work in this area. The theory of adverse selection postulates that riskiness and 
insurance ownership is positively correlated while the theory of advantageous 
selection postulates that riskiness and risk aversion are negatively correlated. In the 
health insurance market, evidence of both adverse selection and propitious selection 
have been observed. Evidence of adverse selection has been found in the U.S. market 
(Browne & Doerpinghaus, 1993; Cutler & Zeckhauser, 1998; Cutler & Reber, 1998); 
in the Canadian market (Dahlby, 1983); and in the Iranian market (Hadad & Anbanji, 
2010). Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008) studied the relationship between 
insurance purchases and risk behaviours in five different insurance markets and found 
adverse selection is more likely to be present in the health insurance market. Other 
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studies suggested adverse selection might not be present in the markets studied, 
leading to support for propitious selection (Buchmueller et al., 2013; Cawley & 
Phillipson, 1999; Chiappori & Salanie, 2000; Cardon & Hendel, 2001; Fang, et al., 
2008; Finkelstein & McGarry, 2006; Wang, Huang & Tzeng, 2009; Olivella & Vera-
Hernandez, 2013). Evidence of the negative correlation between riskiness and risk 
aversion has been found in the long-term care insurance market (Finkelstein & 
McGarry, 2006) and in Medigap insurance (Fang et al., 2008) although the authors in 
the latter study emphasized selection was due to higher “cognitive ability”. More 
recent evidence has been found in private health insurance in the UK (Olivella & 
Vera-Hernandez, 2013) and in Australia (Buchmueller et al., 2013). 
 
Buchmueller et al. (2013) suggested the reason for no evidence of adverse 
selection in some studies was asymmetric information that was central to the study of 
insurance markets was not empirically important or because of the presence of other 
information such as risk aversion that was not used in setting the prices. Their 
argument was consistent with DeMeza and Webb (2001) who justified that there is a 
positive correlation between insurance purchase and precautionary activity where 
cautious individuals not only buy more insurance but also put more efforts into 
limiting risk exposure. DeMeza and Webb (2001) cited an example where 4.8 per cent 
of credit cards were lost or stolen every year in the UK and only 2.7 per cent of 
insured credit cards were lost.  
 
Buchmueller et al. (2013) tested the presence of propitious selection in a market 
with strong form of asymmetric information. The Australian health insurance market 
is highly regulated with restrictions on using observable risk factors to select insureds. 
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Under this community rating requirement, the same premium will be charged for an 
insurance plan regardless of age, gender, or health status. Using two national 
household surveys, the study documented that adults with private hospital care 
insurance are better in self-reported health status and have lower hospital utilisation 
compared to those without insurance. Combining with another data set, Buchmueller 
et al. (2013) found the majority of the respondents who also reported slightly better 
health than those without health insurance cited risk aversion as the reason for buying 
health insurance. The study suggested the presence of propitious selection where 
individuals who purchase health insurance are risk-averse and at the same time are 
less likely to utilize healthcare.  
 
In their study involving individuals who own long-term care insurance, 
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) noted two types of individuals whose preferences 
were not known to insurers - those who believe that they would use more care, and 
those who prefer more insurance. They found that the first group had more than 
average use of nursing care and the second group had less. According to the authors, 
the second group was wealthier and willing to invest in preventive health activities. 
While the first group was more likely to be adversely selected, the second was more 
akin to propitious selection. Such offsetting equilibrium is in contrast to the standard 
prediction that individuals who own more insurance are more likely to be of higher 
risk.  
 
The mixed evidence of adverse selection suggests that the selection of insureds 
in certain markets may be effective. Another reason is the presence of unobservable 
factors related to the risk preference of individuals (Buchmueller et al., 2013). The 
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negative correlation between risk level and risk aversion suggests that individuals 
who are more risk-averse are more likely to take precautions to reduce risk of loss, 
including spending on insurance. The presence of propitious or advantageous 
selection suggests that the effects of adverse selection are offset by healthier and risk-
averse individuals buying insurance. 
 
 
2.4 Risk Factors Used in Underwriting of Medical and Health Insurance 
Underwriting is the process of assessing and classifying the degree of risk of an 
application for a specific insurance coverage and making the decision whether to 
accept the risk.  In the process of underwriting, underwriters of health insurance will 
focus their attention on the factors that will make up the picture of the client’s current 
health. These are the factors that increase the likelihood that the proposed insured will 
suffer loss such as ill health, disability, disease or death. According to Hamilton 
(2003), the identification of these risk factors and the quantification of their effects is 
a critical stage in the process of making accurate decisions in underwriting. 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines risk factor as “any attribute, 
characteristic or exposure of an individual that increases the likelihood of developing 
a disease or injury”. Being overweight, smoking and consuming alcohol are examples 
of risk factors. Risk factors are not necessarily the cause of ill health but these factors 
are correlated with negative outcomes. Risk factors can range from family 
background to broad environmental conditions. The Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare (AIHW) categorises risk factors as behavioural, biomedical, environmental, 
genetic, and demographic. Risk factors may be classified as modifiable and non-
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modifiable where factors such as age, gender or family history cannot be changed, 
whereas behavioural risk factors such as cigarette smoking, alcohol use, physical 
inactivity, poor diet and biomedical risk factors including excess weight, and high 
blood pressure can be modified using effective intervention and change of lifestyle. 
Previous studies also categorised behavioural risk factors as risk preference factors. 
Risk preference is the tendency to choose between higher or lower risk. An individual 
who understands the consequences of smoking may choose to continue or stop 
smoking depending on their risk preference.   
 
Insurance companies identify risk factors used in underwriting from three main 
sources: the proposal form/application; external information; and internal information.  
Each insurer will decide which combination of information is necessary to evaluate 
applications and set premium rates. Bickley, Brown, Brown, and Jones (2007) 
identified 10 factors that need to be evaluated for application of medical expense 
insurance, disability income insurance and long-term care insurance. They are age and 
sex, health and family history, availability of existing insurance coverage, financial 
information, occupation, avocation, driving history, alcohol and substance abuse, 
foreign travel and insurance, and foreign citizenship. However, the underwriting of 
disability income insurance requires a more detailed review, especially of health 
history and occupation to avoid adverse selection especially of suspicious behaviour 
of buying excessive amounts of disability income coverage.  
 
The American Academy for Actuaries (1999) noted that medical history and 
current physical condition are the most significant factors that influence future 
medical care. Other important factors include occupation, dangerous sports, foreign 
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travel, and drugs and alcohol. However family history is not significant in predicting 
short-term medical cost and therefore not used for medical expenses underwriting.   
 
Jones and Long (1999) listed the primary factors that determine the morbidity 
risk of individuals as: 
a) Age - As people grow older, they are more likely to become ill, and the average 
duration of illness will be longer and the time to recuperate will increase. 
b) Health – current and health history - Many illnesses have the tendency to recur 
and future illness is strongly affected by past and present illness or injuries. 
c) Sex - Females generally have a higher morbidity rate than males of the same 
age, and the cost of healthcare for females is higher. 
d) Occupation - The degree of morbidity depends on the hazards inherent in the 
occupation. Typically, underwriters will have rating of classes of occupation 
that range from least hazardous to the most hazardous.   
e) Work history - A person’s work history with a number of gaps in work records 
may be associated with poor risk for disability.  
f) Habits and lifestyle - A person’s habits and lifestyle may present higher degree 
of risks. These may include recent criminal record, and abuse of drug or 
alcohol. 
 
 
The usage of risk factors in the underwriting of health insurance is well 
established in Malaysia. Table 2.1 is a review of samples of proposal forms. Health 
insurance providers use very similar risk factors to evaluate applications for health 
insurance. There could be some variation in the factors but insurers generally request 
similar information from potential clients. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary of Content of Proposal Form for Underwriting of Medical and Health 
Insurance  
Underwriting Factors Company  1 
Company 
2 
Company 
3 
1 Weight & Height – Changes in the past 6 months      
2 Medical Health – history        
 a Told or treated on: Cancer, tumour, cyst       
 b Told or treated on the following    
  b1 Cardiovascular system       
  b2 Respiratory system       
  b3 Digestive system       
  b4 Mental health or central nervous system       
  b5 Eyes, ears, nose, & speech       
  b6 Endocrine system       
  b7 Muscles & bones      
  b8 Urinary & reproductive system       
  b9 Skin or immune system       
 c Told or treated on AIDS, HIV or sexually 
transmitted disease 
      
 d Female only    
  1 Pregnant?       
  2 Pregnancy related complications      
  3 Disease or disorder of breast, cervix, uteri, 
uterus, ovaries 
      
  4 Children suffered from spina bifida, etc.     
 e Undergone any investigation/screening tests in the 
past 5 years 
      
 f Medical treatment/advice – admitted or surgery        
 g Personal doctor details     
 h Parents/siblings medical history       
3 Lifestyle     
 a Smoke or use any form of tobacco in the past 12 
months. How many sticks per day for how many 
years 
      
 b Consume alcohol. Type of alcohol and average 
quantity  consumed 
      
 c Non-prescribed Drugs       
 d Participation in hazardous occupation,  sports or 
past-time activities 
      
Personal details (among others)    
1 Occupation - exact duty       
 Occupation – class (1,2,3,or 4) based on risk     
2 Monthly personal income       
Note. From proposal forms of insurance and takaful companies.  
 
Empirical evidence of health insurance underwriting is very limited in Malaysia. 
Previous researchers explored the demographics and demand for health insurance 
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(Abu-Bakar, Che Razak & Tolos, 2005; Abu-Bakar et al., 2016b; Abu-Bakar, et al., 
2012); the influence of health insurance on healthcare utilization (Abu-Bakar et al., 
2016a;  Kefeli & Jones, 2012; Samsudin, Jamil & Zulhaid, 2012; Wan-Abdullah & 
Ng, 2009); and the issue of adverse selection and moral hazard in medical and health 
insurance (Abdul Rahman & Mohd Daud, 2010; Abu-Bakar et al., 2016a; Kefeli & 
Jones, 2012). Abu-Bakar et al. (2012) found income, age, gender, race and religion, 
level of education, job sector and risk attitude influenced the decision to purchase 
health insurance for salaried individuals. The researchers used data from NHMS 
2006. Abu-Bakar et al. (2005) found that income and gender were statistically 
significant in the decision to purchase health insurance. The researchers collected data 
through the distribution of questionnaires at hospitals and through one insurance 
company. 
 
The following section will present an investigation of the medical and health 
insurance risk factors used in this study. Each of the underwriting classifying factors 
(age, gender, and smoking behaviour) will be investigated separately and its impact 
on the ownership of medical and health insurance will be presented. Factors under 
health status and risk preference will be discussed in detail. As the factors that affect 
ownership decisions are somewhat related to the types of MHI policies, the discussion 
will focus on the underwriting of hospitalisation and surgical insurance and how these 
variables relate to the ownership of health insurance. 
 
2.4.1  Socio-Demographic Variables  
Economic and socio-demographic factors have been found to have significant 
influence on underwriting and the ownership of health insurance. Previous studies 
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have discussed extensively the factors associated with health insurance ownership. 
For example, in modelling for health insurance ownership in the UK, King and 
Mossialos (2005) found that females, individuals above 60 years of age, having 
secondary and post-secondary education, and having professional or managerial 
position were variables associated with higher likelihood of having personal health 
insurance.  This study identified three of the factors used by underwriters in making 
underwriting decisions, namely age, gender, and occupation. An investigation of the 
association between these underwriting factors with ownership of health insurance 
will be presented. Foubister et al. (2006), in an analysis on private health insurance 
subscribers in the UK, outlined a number of characteristics found to be common 
among subscribers. For example, demand for private health insurance was highest 
among individuals between the ages of 55-64, the likelihood of ownership was higher 
among individuals with higher income, higher education (post-secondary school), and 
higher level of employment status or roles.  
 
In a study to determine the decision to own private health insurance and the 
decline of private health insurance ownership in Australia over two different periods 
(1989-1995), Barrett and Conlon (2003) found mixed results concerning the effect of 
age on the decision to own personal health insurance.  Younger individuals were less 
likely to own health insurance. The likelihood of purchase of private health insurance 
increased when single individuals reached the age of 50; however, for heads of 
families, the likelihood of purchase started when they were 45, and for spouses the 
likelihood of purchase differed by both age and period of study.  The same study 
found that female individuals were more likely to own personal health insurance. 
Similarities with Hopkins and Kidd (1996) were observed. They had earlier 
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investigated the importance of various characteristics in influencing the demand for 
health insurance in Australia and found a number of factors influencing the demand 
for health insurance, including age, health status, and smoking behaviour. Older age 
was found to influence to the likelihood of ownership of health insurance and the 
experience of being admitted into a hospital increased the likelihood of ownership, 
whereas smokers had a lower likelihood of purchasing health insurance.  
 
In profiling health insurance ownership among women of Kenya, Kimani, 
Ettarh, Warren and Bellows (2014) found the factors that were associated with health 
ownership of health insurance included being employed in the formal sector and 
having attained primary and secondary education; and the likelihood of ownership of 
health insurance tended to increase with age and household wealth index. Kiplagat, 
Muriithi and Kioko (2013) studied the determinants of health insurance choice in 
Kenya and found that age, gender, education level and income had significant effect 
on the choice of health insurance. In their study, increase in age and increase in the 
level of education were associated with the likelihood of ownership of health 
insurance. Being employed was only significantly associated with certain types of 
health insurance.  Males were more likely to own private health insurance whereas 
females were more likely to choose other types of health insurance, while wealth 
index was positively related to all types of health insurance.  
 
Kirigia, et al. (2005) conducted a study to determine the factors affecting 
ownership of health insurance among women in South Africa. They found age, white-
collar occupations and being gainfully employed predicted the ownership of health 
insurance.  
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In Malaysia, the profile of health insurance policyholders and non-policyholders 
was presented in the study by Abu-Bakar, et al. (2016b) who found that policyholders 
were generally younger and were male, and there were no differences in their health 
and smoking status.  
 
2.4.1.1  Age  
Age is the first factor used in the classification of risk for the purpose of setting 
premium rates. The rate of medical need increases as a person advances in age. 
According to Society of Actuaries (1981), the rate of premium increases as a person 
grows older and the rate for the oldest male in an insurance plan could be four times 
higher than that for the youngest male. It is expected that the tendency to seek care 
and the use of healthcare services will increase during the later stages of life. A 
descriptive study by Al-Ghanim (2010) indicated that elderly patients made more 
visits to all formal healthcare facilities in Saudi Arabia. In the study, 77.6 per cent of 
elderly patients used health services within a year compared to only 48.9 per cent of 
younger patients. The Association of British Insurers (2012) provided average index 
premium based on age band as per Figure 2.1. This indexed price explains how the 
premium increases in comparison to the premium when age is at 35. For example, an 
individual aged 60 would pay approximately twice the price paid by someone at age 
35.  
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Figure 2.1. Average Index Premium by Age. Adapted from “Are You Buying 
Private Medical Insurance?”. 2012. Association of British Insurers.  
 
A number of studies have found that age is significantly associated with 
ownership of health insurance. For example, Cameron and Trivedi (1991) who 
studied the determinants of insurance choice between the government Medibank fund 
and private insurance funds in Australia, found that older individuals who used more 
health services would be more likely to own private health insurance. A similar 
situation was observed in the United Kingdom (UK) where Foubister, et al. (2006) 
noted that the demand for private medical insurance in the UK was highest for older 
individuals aged 55-64 and lowest for individuals aged 16-24. An earlier study by 
Wallis (2004) found only 2.7 per cent of individuals in the same age group (16-24) 
owned private medical insurance in 2001 in the UK. In King and Mossialos (2005), 
the withdrawal of tax incentive for individuals above 60 did not discourage 
participants from staying with the health insurance plan suggesting that individuals in 
that age group placed greater value on the insurance plan than younger individuals. 
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In the study using comprehensiveness of coverage and actual utilisation as 
endogenous variables, Resende and Zeidan (2010) found age had positive and 
significant effect on both comprehensiveness of coverage and hospitalisation. The 
increased need for medical care increased the likelihood of elderly individuals owning 
more comprehensive health insurance. A study by Kimani et al. (2014) concluded that 
as individuals advanced in age, they tended to invest more including for health 
insurance.  
 
Cardon and Hendel (2001) earlier argued that in a market where health 
insurance was employer-provided, the demand for health insurance could not be 
concluded as age sensitive. Similarly, in countries where private healthcare was a 
substitute and public healthcare was financed by the public sector, as in the case of 
Malaysia, older age might be a good predictor to ownership of health insurance up to 
a certain age. Using the Malaysian data, Abu-Bakar et al. (2012) found that age had a 
significant and nonlinear relationship with ownership of health insurance for salaried 
individuals. The researchers stated that ownership of health insurance increased with 
increased age and decreased at a certain age. They suggested that the decrease in 
ownership might be due to the fact that the premium was higher for older individuals, 
resulting in a lower take-up rate for this group.  
 
2.4.1.2  Gender  
The word “gender” is often used interchangeably with the word “sex”.  The average 
medical cost typically differs between men and women. According to Bickley et al. 
(2007), the morbidity rate of women is generally higher than that of men of the same 
age whereas men have a higher mortality rate. Therefore the cost of medical coverage 
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is generally higher for women than for men. Most health insurers, subject to limitation 
by the regulators, set different premium rates for men and for women. For example, 
an insurer may set for younger females a rate 50 per cent higher compared to that for 
younger males. However, at an older age, the rate for females is 10 per cent lower 
than that for males. If maternity benefits are included, the rate for females will be 100 
per cent higher than that for males (Society of Actuaries, 1981).  In a study involving 
non-pregnant adults, Bertakis, Azari, Helms, Callahan, Robbins (2000) found that 
women utilised more healthcare services involving higher charges compared to men. 
On the other hand, Resende and Zeidan (2010) found that women had a stronger 
likelihood of being hospitalised, in part, due to childbirth procedures. An earlier study 
in Spain by Redondo-Sendino, Guallar-Castillón, Banegas and Rodríguez-Artalejo 
(2006) found that for adults 60 years and above, a higher percentage of women visited 
medical practitioners, took medication and received home medical visits.  However, 
in a study of a takaful (Islamic insurance) provider in Malaysia, Abdul Rahman and 
Mohd Daud (2010) found that men registered a higher amount of medical claims with 
a ratio of 2:1. The highest registered medical expenses claims among men were for 
heart and eye disease.  
 
Cameron and Trivedi (1991) noted that women showed higher propensity for 
purchasing private health insurance. According to Hopkins and Kidd (1996), the 
probability of insurance ownership was significantly higher for women. A similar 
finding was reported by Barrett and Conlon (2003). In contrast, in profiling the health 
insurance market in the UK, Wallis (2004) found that in 2001 more men were covered 
by personal health insurance compared to women. Kirigia et al. (2005) found that 
women with better education, high incomes and living in affluent provinces and 
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permanent accommodation had a higher likelihood of being insured. In a study to 
examine the determinants of health insurance coverage among young adults, Gius 
(2010) found that women were more likely to have health insurance than men. 
Kiplagat, et al. (2013) studied the determinants of health insurance choice in Kenya 
found that females of child-bearing age were more likely to own non-private health 
insurance compared to males who formed the majority without insurance cover. 
Another study in Kenya by Kimani et al. (2014) found that married women and 
women living in female-headed households were more likely to own private health 
insurance. This result is not consistent with an earlier study in Australia by Cameron 
and Trivedi (1991) who found that the propensity to own health insurance was higher 
among single women and lower among females living in female-headed households. 
This may be due to the different family structure in both countries. Women living in 
female-headed households might have better control over their resources and thus 
make the decision to enhance/support their own wellness. However, in high-income 
countries such as Australia, single parent households are usually low-income and 
thus, the resources may be insufficient for health insurance. In Malaysia, gender is 
statistically significant in the decision to purchase health insurance (Abu-Bakar et al., 
2005; 2012).  
 
As females are less willing to take risks, female individuals are expected to be 
more likely to own health insurance, as found in a study involving participation of 
females in sports and a number of other domains (Dohmen, et al., 2005) and 
according to DeMeza and Webb (2001), highly risk-averse individuals are more 
cautious and find insurance to be important to prevent potential loss. 
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2.4.1.3  Occupation  
A medical underwriter places more concern on the occupation of an applicant for 
health insurance than does a life insurance underwriter. This is because occupation 
brings about a higher morbidity risk than mortality. Health insurance underwriters are 
concerned with the occupations that bring greater-than-average risk of accident and 
health hazards. 
 
Depending on the risk level, health insurers will classify occupation into 4 
classes with Class 1 for occupations that present few physical dangers and Class 4 for 
occupations with high injury incident (Bickley et al., 2007). Refer Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 
Insurer’s Occupational Rating Classes in the United States 
 
Occupational 
Rating Classes  Definition and Examples 
 
Class 1 
 
 Least hazardous occupation - attorneys, auditors, bookkeepers, 
pharmacists, admin assistants 
 
Class 2  Non-hazardous occupation with possible injuries - musicians, 
laboratory workers, medical technicians, surgeons 
 Supervisory responsibility in manufacturing plant or 
construction sites – architects, plant managers, contractors 
 
Class 3  Blue collar workers  
 Drivers of passenger of light delivery vehicles 
 
Class 4  Most hazardous – high incident of injury – boilermakers, 
structural steelworkers, stevedores 
 
Uninsurable  Exposed to unusual hazards – professional athletes, aerial 
photographers, divers, underground miners, test pilots 
 
Note. Adapted from Life and Health Insurance Underwriting (2nd ed.), by M.C. 
Bickley, B.F. Brown, J.L. Brown, and H.E. Jones. 2007. Georgia: LOMA 
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The American Academy of Actuaries (1999) however suggested that 
occupation was a more important factor in the decision for life insurance and 
disability income than for medical expenses insurance. The investigation on 
occupation was based not just on its importance in underwriting but also in the 
decision to utilise healthcare services.  
 
 Occupation is associated with income and those with better occupations are 
likely to have a higher wealth index and to be able to spend on health insurance. 
Buchmueller, et al. (2013) noted that ownership of private health insurance was 
positively related to employment status and income which enable the spending on 
health insurance to enjoy reduced waiting time for treatment besides the availability 
of better amenities such as private rooms.  However, an earlier study by Mahdavi and 
Izadi (2012) who categorised management and technical personnel as individuals with 
higher income compared with individuals in service and production occupations did 
not find individuals with higher income level purchased more health insurance. 
 
Studies have categorised occupation in many different ways.  Browne and 
Doerpinghaus (1993) used white collar in their study while Kirigia et al. (2005) 
categorised occupation as blue collar and white collar. Kimani, et al. (2014) 
categorised occupation as formal or informal sectors. Other authors categorised 
occupation by sector (Resende & Zeidan, 2010; Kefeli@Zulkefli & Zaidi, 2013; 
Olivella & Vera-Hernandez, 2013).  
 
While occupation can be analysed by different categorisations, it however is a 
predictor to ownership of personal health insurance as in Browne and Doerpinghaus 
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(1993) who found a positive relationship between white collar occupation and amount 
of insurance purchase. Similarly, Foubister, et al. (2006) identified occupational status 
as a predictor variable and those in higher-level occupations or roles were more likely 
to own private health insurance. Kimani et al. (2014) found that a higher percentage 
of respondents who owned health insurance worked in the formal sector as compared 
to those working in the informal sector.  
 
2.4.2 Attitude towards Risk Variables 
Individuals have different attitudes towards risks. Dohmen et al. (2005) suggested that 
attitude towards risk differed according to personal characteristics. In their 
investigation on the relationship between willingness to take risks and a number of 
personal characteristics, they found that women were less willing to take risks and age 
was negatively correlated with willingness to take risks. With regard to investment in 
insurance, Einav and Finkelstein (2011) suggested that individuals’ risk tolerance and 
the willingness to pay for insurance depended on the privately known probability of 
loss and willingness to pay the premium.  
 
The health insurance underwriter is concerned with the risk behaviours of 
insurance applicants. Riskier individuals will affect the choice of policy and the 
premium that they have to pay. Factors commonly associated with high risk-taking 
behaviours include tobacco use, use of drugs and alcohol, inactivity, thrill-seeking 
activities including being involved in extreme sports such as skydiving, rock climbing 
or bungee jumping.   
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There are not many studies on how risk aversion influences the decision to own 
health insurance. In a study using data from the Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) by the Bank of Italy, Guiso and Paiella (2005) found that the more 
risk-averse individuals were less likely to own health insurance. Their finding was not 
consistent with findings on health insurance ownership which suggest the positive 
correlation between health insurance ownership and risk-aversion, such as that of 
Buchmueller, et al. (2013) who found that health insurance policyholders stated risk 
aversion as the reason for purchasing coverage. Similarly, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, 
and Shapiro (1997) found that individuals who were more risk-averse, who do not 
participate in risky behaviours such as smoking or drinking, were more likely to have 
health insurance coverage. According to these authors, the most risk-averse 
individuals would be willing to pay for health insurance as protection from financial 
risk even if the premium was high.  
 
According to Anderson and Mellor (2008) there was no one standard choice of 
proxy and measures for risk preference. They reported of different methods of 
measuring risk preference which had been used in the past including using 
hypothetical behaviour, actual behaviour, or self-reported behaviour. Guiso and 
Paiella (2005) determined risk aversion by means of a lottery-type hypothetical 
behaviour whereby participants were asked the maximum amount they were willing 
to pay for a risky asset, a method very similar to Anderson and Mellor (2008), the 
result of which was discussed earlier. Anderson and Mellor (2008), using a pairing 
method of lottery choice experiment and actual behaviour in their study, found that 
risk aversion among individuals as defined in the lottery choice experiment was 
negatively and significantly associated with being overweight/obese, engaged in 
73 
 
smoking, heavy drinking, and non-use of seatbelt. However, they found insignificant 
result on driving over the speed limit. 
 
Lifestyle risk factors have been used to proxy for risk preference even though 
few studies use lifestyle risk factors as proxy for health risk (Sturm, 2002; Musich, 
Hook, Barnett & Edington 2003; Bertakis et al., 2000). Lifestyle risk factors are 
habits or behaviours that if not modified will affect health status. Such behaviours 
include those arising from lifestyle include smoking, drinking alcohol, use of the seat 
belt, exercise, obesity, and being physically inactive.  
 
Barret and Conlon (2003) used a number of variables to control for behaviours 
that affected the occurrence of health states. These behaviours were consumption of 
alcohol, smoking status, weight (body mass) and exercise (low, moderate or 
vigorous). In their study of the factors reflecting attitudes towards risk, it was found 
that those who were risk-averse (non-smokers, non-drinkers, active in moderate and 
vigorous exercise) were more likely to purchase health insurance. Their results on 
smoking behaviour was consistent with Hopkins and Kidd (1996) who found that 
smokers had a lower likelihood of purchasing private health insurance. 
 
Smoking and drinking habits have been used to measure risk aversion. Bellante 
and Link (1981) in a study on public sector employment status used an index to 
measure risk aversion from questions on smoking and drinking habits, among others. 
Even though the use of this index to proxy risk aversion can easily be criticized, it had 
been used by Feinberg (1977) in a study that hypothesized a more risk-averse 
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individual would have a shorter expected duration of unemployment. In both studies, 
the index of risk aversion used performed as predicted by the theory.   
 
2.4.2.1  Smoking Behaviour and Alcohol  
Smoking behaviour and drinking alcohol are often used together in the measure of 
attitude towards risk.  Each of these factors is associated with specific health 
problems. For example, according to OECD (2011) tobacco consumption still remains 
the leading cause of early death. Life and health insurance underwriters consider 
alcohol abuse and alcoholism as factors that will increase mortality and morbidity 
risks and the extent of consumption of alcohol will risk participants being rated or 
denied coverage. Evidence that the proposed insured had abused alcohol in the last 
five years might result in declination of coverage (Bickley et al., 2007). According to 
the American Academy of Actuaries (1997) drug abuse or alcohol could place 
individuals under the high-risk category which could cause them to be uninsurable. 
Due to the magnitude of illness that is contributed through smoking and drinking, 
insurance companies typically charge additional premium for smoking and alcoholic 
behaviour. 
 
Smokers and drinkers have different tolerance for risks on different domains. In 
the measure of employment status, Dohmen et al. (2005) found that smoking had a 
strong and positive impact on the willingness to take risk in general and greater on 
health matters. However, there is no association between smoking and financial 
matters. Bellante and Link (1981) found that risk-averse individuals were expected to 
seek employment in the public sector due to its stability. Barsky, et al. (1997) found 
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that in general, current smokers were more risk-tolerant than those who did not smoke 
and individuals who drank were more risk-tolerant than those who did not drink. 
 
An individual’s risk tolerance is associated with ownership of health insurance. 
Kirigia et al. (2005) found that alcohol, smoking, and use of contraceptives had 
significant influence on ownership of health insurance. The use of contraceptives and 
alcohol both had negative coefficient with demand for health insurance, implying that 
people who drink alcohol were less likely to own health insurance. The authors 
suggested that the use of contraceptives might not be linked to risk aversion. Smoking 
however was positively related to demand for health insurance. Their result on 
smoking was consistent with Wallis (2004) who suggested that smokers had lower 
probability of purchasing private health insurance. Kiplagat et al. (2013) found that 
those who were less risk-averse such as those who smoked were less likely to own 
health insurance. The result supports an earlier study by Hopkins and Kidd (1996) 
who found that smokers had lower probability of purchasing private insurance and 
Buchmueller, et al. (2013) who found negative correlation between smoking and 
health insurance and other insurances including life, home content and motor. 
However, a study in Malaysia using NHMS 1996 survey data by Kefeli and Jones 
(2012) found smoking to be positively related to ownership of health insurance. 
Perhaps, despite having to pay higher premium for health insurance, smokers may 
find the value of peace of mind in the assurance of healthcare in a timely manner 
greater than the value of premium paid.  
 
Studies on the prevalence of alcohol usage in Malaysia are limited. Few studies 
have attempted to document drinking behaviour among Malaysians from different 
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perspectives. Tan, Yen, and Nayga (2009) studied alcohol purchase decisions and 
expenditures while Cheah (2014) studied the socio-demographic factors affecting the 
decision to consume alcohol. In the same year, Abdul Mutalip, Kamarudin, 
Manickam, Abd Hamid and Saari (2014) profiled the current drinker and risky 
alcohol-drinking pattern among Malaysians. None of these studies however related 
drinking with health insurance ownership. 
 
Even though there are many studies that have used both smoking and alcohol as 
factors associated with health risk, the use of the variable alcohol in a study in the 
Malaysian context may be subject to argument. Abdul Mutalip, et al. (2014) noted 
that the overall prevalence of alcohol use among the population could be diluted 
because alcohol use among ethnic Malays who form the majority of the population 
was uncommon due to religious prohibition.  For the same reason, it was not 
unexpected when Tan, et al. (2009) excluded Malays in their study on alcohol 
consumption in Malaysia. Based on these factors, alcohol is not deliberated as a proxy 
to attitude towards risk.  
 
2.4.2.2 Inactivity 
The lack of physical activity has been documented to be associated with 
cardiovascular disease and other health conditions. Pietiläinen, et al. (2008) found that 
lack of physical activity strongly predicted obesity and abdominal obesity. Many 
studies including that by Hong, Coker-Bolt, Anderson, Lee and Velozo (2016) have 
confirmed that physical activities lowered the risk of being overweight. Other than 
being overweight, WHO stated that the risks of lack of physical activity include 6 per 
cent of global mortality, 21–25 per cent of breast and colon cancers, 27 per cent of 
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diabetes and approximately 30 per cent of ischaemic heart disease. In a study on 
obesity in Europe, Ekelund, et al. (2015) found that inactivity was responsible for 
twice the number of deaths compared to obesity. From the financial perspective, a 
study conducted in Australia in 2007 found that 9 million Australians did not do 
enough physical activity on a daily basis and that had cost Australia 1.5 billion a year 
in healthcare services and caused higher risks among Australians of coronary heart 
disease, stroke, Type 2 diabetes, breast cancer, colon cancer, depression symptoms, 
and falls (Medibank, 2007).  In Malaysia, a study on physical activity pattern reported 
that only 14 per cent of the population had adequate exercise. The population spent 74 
per cent of the time in a day on sedentary activities, 15 per cent on light intensity 
activities and 10 per cent on rigorous activities (Poh, et al., 2010). A more recent 
study by Häußler (2014) confirmed earlier studies that BMI and inactivity influenced 
visits to medical practitioners and hospitalisation.  
 
Physical activity has been used to proxy for risk aversion. Barret and Conlon 
(2003) used exercise as a proxy behaviour for attitude to risk besides consumption of 
alcohol, smoking status, and body mass.  The findings of Anderson and Mellor (2008) 
that risk-averse individuals were less likely to be overweight suggested that 
individuals who exercised were more likely to be risk-averse. This finding however 
did not support an earlier study by Dohmen, et al. (2005) who used general and 
lottery-like questions to determine individual willingness to take risk and applied the 
risk attitude on a number of context specific behaviours including sporting activities. 
In the study by Dohmen, et al. (2005) it was found that female individuals who were 
generally risk-averse were less likely to participate in sports activities compared to 
men.    
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Therefore, as suggested by Barret and Conlon (2003), physical activity fulfilled 
the criteria for measuring attitude to risk as the presence or non-presence would have 
impacted on the probability of future health state and the demand for access to health- 
care services.  
 
2.4.3  Health Risk Level 
The health history of a proposed insured is a factor that the health insurance 
underwriter pays close attention to before issuing a policy. The focus will be on the 
impairments that may result in future healthcare expenses. The family health history 
may provide additional information on the proposed’s insured health status because 
many health conditions are genetically-related. The health status of an insured will 
determine the amount of premium. 
 
Individual healthcare expenses are derived by analysing medical claims data. 
However, in the absence of claims information, self-reported healthcare utilisation 
may be used as proxy for financial outcomes (Short, et al., 2009). Therefore, it can be 
reasoned that individual risk level is associated with the frequency of utilisation of 
healthcare services. 
 
The influence of health status on the decision to purchase private health 
insurance has been discussed previously. Studies have shown mixed results regarding 
the influence of health risk that affect utilization and the likelihood of having private 
insurance coverage. Browne (1992) found that low-risk individuals purchased less 
private health insurance. Sanhueza and Ruiz-Tagle (2002) found that people who 
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were enrolled in private health insurance plans were more likely to demand health 
services. Barrett and Conlon (2003) found that health status was a significant 
determinant in the purchase of private health insurance. They found that individuals 
who rated their health status as poor and fair were less likely to own personal health 
insurance compared to individuals who rated themselves as having good health status. 
Their result was supported by Wallis (2004) who found that more people with 
excellent health purchased private health insurance compared to individuals with poor 
health. Gius (2010) found that individuals who did not spend much on healthcare 
(good health status) were more likely to own health insurance. Similarly, Buchmueller 
et al. (2013) found adults with health insurance had lower utilisation of healthcare 
compared to individuals without private health insurance. Kirigia et al. (2005) 
however found that the ownership of health insurance was more likely to be low for 
individuals who were of excellent, very good or good health. In Malaysia, using 1996 
survey data, Kefeli and Jones (2012) found that the decision to buy private health 
insurance was not influenced by health condition.  
 
Health risk level has been measured differently by previous different authors. 
Musich, et al. (2003) used five biological risks and three lifestyle risks to measure 
three levels of risks – low, medium, and high levels of health risk. Cutler, et al. (2008) 
used admission to a hospital in the last two years to measure occurrence of risk.  
Grunow and Nuscheler (2014) cited self-assessed health status, objective health, and 
healthcare utilisation as qualified measures of health.  
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a) Self-assessed health status (SAHS) 
SAHS is a common measure of the overall health risk level of an individual. 
Typically, individuals are required to rate themselves on their perceived health 
condition. The rating can be from very poor health status to excellent. The self-
reported health state (excellent, good, fair, poor) has been used by Cardon and Hendel 
(2001). Kirigia et al. (2005) used 5-level SAHS: excellent, very good, good, fair or 
poor as the measure for health risk. Barrett and Conlon (2003) used specific health 
conditions other than self-reported health of good, fair, and poor. Similarly, Gius 
(2010) used self-reported health where health status was measured by very good 
health and otherwise. Buchmueller et al. (2013) used self-reported health (fair or 
poor) and a number of long-term health conditions in the measure of health risk level. 
Self-reported health status was found to be a good predictor of the number of 
physician contacts (Miilunpalo, Vuori, Oja, Pasanen & Urponen, 1997). 
 
b) Objective health 
Objective health is the individual health status based on tests and observation by 
others such as doctors. Objective health is measured by the existence of diseases. A 
number of chronic conditions were used in the study by Cameron, Trivedi, Milne and 
Piggott (1988). Musich et al. (2003) used eight individual risks selected from Health 
Risk Appraisal in Australia which combined both lifestyle risks and biological risks to 
determine the health risk level. The risks considered were lifestyle risks (smoking, 
physical activity, alcohol use) and health/biological risks (blood pressure, cholesterol, 
weight, medical problems, absent due to illness). According to Musich et al. (2003), 
high-risk is when an individual was suffering from one of the chronic diseases.   
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c) Utilisation of healthcare 
An individual’s healthcare utilisation is an indicator of the presence of illness.  The 
utilisation of healthcare can be measured in several ways. Donham, Sensenig, and 
Heffler (1995) used the number of inpatient days and the average of an adult’s length 
of hospital stay while Buchmueller et al. (2013) used inpatient stay (last 12 months), 
inpatient nights (last 12 months) and GP visits (last 2 weeks) as the measure for 
healthcare utilisation.  
 
2.4.4 Controlled Variables    
The influence of income and education on the ownership of health insurance has been 
discussed in a number of earlier studies. Many studies found that income had 
significant and positive effect on the ownership of health insurance coverage: 
Resende and Zeidan (2010) in Brazil, Nguyen and Leung (2010) in Vietnam, and 
Kimani et al. (2014) in Kenya. Nguyen and Leung (2010) found that increased wealth 
motivated individuals to purchase private health insurance instead of reliance on 
compulsory insurance.  An earlier study in Australia by Cameron and Trivedi (1991) 
found that education had strong influence on health insurance ownership and 
coverage even when controlling for income, suggesting that besides greater 
awareness, higher potential income from education increased the likelihood of 
ownership. In South Africa, Kirigia et al. (2005) found that education was a 
significant predictor of health insurance among women. Making the decision on 
personal health insurance requires higher cognitive ability. Buchmueller et al. (2013) 
used three proxies for cognitive ability, namely language proficiency, mental health 
(level of distress), and education.  The study found that individuals were less likely to 
own health insurance if they spoke languages other than English at home, had higher 
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level of distress, and lower level of education. In Malaysia, researchers also found the 
association of income and education level with ownership of health insurance (Abdul 
Rahman & Mohd Daud, 2010; Abu-Bakar et al., 2005; 2012; Kefeli and Jones, 2012). 
These variables, income and education level, will be used as control in the analysis of 
ownership of health insurance. 
 
 
2.5  Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, the relevant theories in health insurance selection and the problems 
associated with selection of insureds were discussed. Generally, the asymmetric 
information theory proposes that imbalance in information can cause inefficient 
outcome. In the health insurance market, the inefficiency occurs during the pricing of 
health of insurance products to match with the risk of the insured. While the presence 
of asymmetric information theory suggests the problems of adverse selection, the 
theory of propitious selection provides a contrasting view which can offset the 
problem of adverse selection. Both theories are compared in the section that follows. 
 
The chapter provides the discussion on ownership of health insurance and the 
selection factors used in the study and the empirical evidence guiding the selection of 
the independent variables that are relevant for use in the study.  Table 2.3 provides a 
summary of the main explanatory variables and the corresponding literatures 
supporting the use of the independent variables. 
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Table 2.3 
Main Independent Variables and Supporting Literatures 
 
S/N Variable Author/Year Results Statement 
     
1 Age Cameron and 
Trivedi (1991) 
+ve  Older individuals who use more health 
services are more likely to own private 
health insurance.   
 
  Hopkins and 
Kidd (1996) 
+ve  Both age and frequency of 
hospitalization and doctor visits increase 
the likelihood of having health insurance. 
 
  Barrett and 
Conlon (2003) 
 
+ve Ownership of health insurance is 
positively related with age and the 
likelihood increases at age 45 for head of 
family and 50 for single individuals. 
 
  Kirigia et al. 
(2005) 
+ve Increase in age is associated with 
likelihood of being insured. 
 
  King and 
Mossialos 
(2005) 
+ve Demand for private health insurance 
increases as individuals get older and 
become more concerned about being 
able to access healthcare. 
 
  Foubister, et al.  
(2006) 
+ve Demand for PMI is concentrated among 
individuals aged 55-64. 
 
  Resende and 
Zeidan (2010) 
+ve As the need for medical care increases 
among elderly individuals, the likelihood 
to own more comprehensive health 
insurance increases. 
 
  Abu Bakar, et 
al. (2012) 
 
+ve Age has significant and nonlinear 
relationship with ownership of health 
insurance for salaried individuals.  
 
  Kimani, et al.  
(2014) 
+ve The probability of having health 
insurance tends to increase with age as 
the tendency of older individuals to 
invest more including in health insurance 
increases.  
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
S/N Variable Author/Year Results Statement 
 
2 
 
Gender 
 
Cameron and 
Trivedi (1991) 
 
 
Women  
 
Women show a higher propensity to 
purchase private health insurance. 
  Hopkins and 
Kidd (1996) 
Women  The probability of insurance ownership 
is significantly higher for women. 
 
  Barrett and 
Conlon (2003) 
 
Women Women have a higher propensity to 
purchase health insurance. 
 
  Wallis (2004) Men There is a relationship between men and 
the purchase of private health insurance. 
 
  Kirigia et al. 
(2005) 
Women Women with better education, high 
incomes and living in affluent provinces 
and permanent accommodations have a 
higher likelihood of being insured. 
 
  Gius (2010) Women Men are less likely to have health 
insurance than women. 
 
  Abu Bakar et 
al. (2012) 
Women Women are found to be more likely to 
own health insurance.  
 
  Kiplagat and 
Muriithi (2013) 
Women Women especially at the child-bearing 
age demand more medical services and 
are hence more likely to purchase 
insurance cover. 
 
  Kimani et al. 
(2014) 
Women Women living in female-headed 
households are significantly more likely 
to be insured. 
 
     
3 Occupation Browne and 
Doerpinghaus 
(1993) 
White 
collar +ve 
A positive relationship exists between a 
white collar job and amount of insurance 
purchase. 
 
  Foubister et al. 
(2006) 
Occupa-
tional 
Status 
Individuals with high level occupation or 
roles are more likely to have private 
health insurance.  
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
S/N Variable Author/Year Results Statement 
     
  Buchmueller et 
al. (2013) 
Employ-
ment 
status 
Employment status is positively related 
to ownership of private health insurance.  
 
  Kimani et al. 
(2014) 
Formal  Being employed in the formal sector is 
associated with having health insurance. 
 
 
4 
 
Attitude 
towards risk 
 
Hopkins and 
Kidd (1996) 
 
Smoking 
(-ve) 
 
 
Smokers have a lower likelihood of 
purchasing private health insurance. 
 
     
  Barrett and 
Conlon (2003) 
Smoking 
(-ve) 
 
Drinking  
(-ve) 
 
Exercise  
(+ve) 
 
Smokers are less likely to own private 
health insurance. 
 
Those with drinking behaviour are less 
likely to purchase health insurance. 
 
Active individuals are more likely to 
purchase health insurance. However, the 
result is mixed according to types of 
exercise for individuals and families.  
 
  Wallis (2004) Smoking  
(-ve) 
Smokers have a lower probability of 
purchasing private health insurance. 
  
  Kirigia et al. 
(2005) 
Smoking 
(+ve) 
 
Alcohol  
(-ve) 
 
Smokers are more likely to own health 
insurance. 
 
Individuals who drink alcohol are less 
likely to own health insurance. 
 
  Kefeli and 
Jones (2012) 
Smoking 
(+ve) 
Smokers are more likely to own health 
insurance. 
 
  Buchmueller et 
al. (2013) 
Smoking  
(-ve) 
Smokers are less likely to own health 
insurance. 
 
  Kiplagat and 
Muriithi (2013) 
 
Smoking  
(-ve) 
Individuals who smoke are less likely to 
own health insurance. 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
S/N Variable Author/Year Results Statement 
     
5 Health Risk 
Level 
Browne (1992) +ve Low-risk consumers purchase less 
insurance. 
 
  Barrett and 
Conlon (2003) 
-ve Negative relationship exists between 
health risk status and likelihood of 
holding insurance. 
 
  Wallis (2004) -ve More people with excellent health 
purchase private health insurance 
compared to individuals with poor 
health.  
 
  Kirigia et al. 
(2005) 
+ve Individuals who are in excellent, very 
good, or good health are less likely to 
own health insurance.  
 
  Kefeli and 
Jones (2012) 
 The decision to buy health insurance is 
not influenced by health condition. 
     
  Buchmueller et 
al. (2013) 
-ve The majority of health insurance 
policyholders are in good health status. 
 
 
The findings of the empirical studies presented on the central issue of the 
relationship between health risk factors, attitudes towards risk and ownership of 
health insurance are mixed, prompting further investigation.  While most of the 
evidence is centred in the U.S., the experiences of other countries including the 
OECD, African and Asian countries including Malaysia are discussed. There are 
common factors that are used to select insureds in all countries but there are countries 
that provide some flexibility for insurers to decide on the factors.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and the methodology employed in 
this study. The first section outlines the research model and defines the independent 
variables with their respective reference sources, followed by a detailed development 
of the hypotheses. The next section details the measurement of variables and the 
statistical analysis applied in this research.  
 
 
3.2  Research Framework 
The theories and literatures discussed in Chapter Two motivate the development of 
the health insurance underwriting risk model used for this study. The theoretical 
framework that constitutes the risk factors in the selection of insureds is presented in 
Figure 3.1.  
 
3.2.1  Theoretical Model 
The theoretical framework of the study aims to explain how insurance ownership, risk 
level, and risk preference are interrelated in the market of health insurance. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
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Figure 3.1. Conceptual Model of Risk Factors Influencing Ownership of Private 
Health Insurance. 
 
 
The dependent variable in the study is ownership of health insurance. It is a 
binary discrete variable that specifies whether an individual in the study owns health 
insurance (1) or does not own health insurance (0) which provides cover for medical 
expenses.  
 
The independent or explanatory variables were classified into five groups. The 
first group comprised demographic and socio-economic variables of age, gender, and 
Demographic Variables 
Age 
Gender 
Occupation  
 
Attitude towards Risk  
Smoking behaviour 
Physical inactivity 
 
Ownership of Health 
Insurance 
Health Risk Level 
Health/Biological Risks 
Utilization of Inpatient Care 
Health risk and risk attitude 
Control Variables 
Income 
Education 
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occupation. The second group in the explanatory variables provided information on 
the health condition. The third group listed the risk behaviour of the respondents. The 
fourth combined the health condition and risk behaviour, and the final group was the 
control variables.  
 
3.2.2  Empirical Estimation 
The current study is to analyse the dichotomous outcome of whether the respondents 
own health insurance Y=1 or do not own health insurance Y=0 was able to be 
explained by the explanatory variables consisting of categorical (example: gender, 
occupation, education, race), ordinal (example: health risk level, attitude towards 
risk), or continuous variables (example: age). 
 
This model was analysed using logistic regression technique. In this type of 
study where the dependent variable is binary, descriptive statistics and the use of logit 
model is appropriate. For the bivariate analysis, Pearson’s Chi-square test was used to 
test the association between explanatory variables and health insurance ownership.   
 
The relationship between variables was estimated using logistic regression 
techniques and the relationship was as follows: 
Log [odds(y=1)] = Logit (Π) = 
yi = β0 + β1Xi1+ β2Xi2 + β3Xi3 + β4Xi4 + β5Xi5 +…+…e    (1) 
where, 
y = 1 = own health insurance 
y = 0 = do not own health insurance 
Π = the probability of owning health insurance 
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β = coefficients / scalars 
X = regressors / predictors 
 
3.2.3 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were formulated to answer the research questions. The 
hypothesised relationship is as shown in Table 3.1. The directions of the relationship 
are based on the findings from previous literatures as summarized in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 3.1  
Hypothesised Relationships between Dependent Variable (Health Insurance 
Ownership) and Independent Variables 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Effect on Probability of 
Ownership Health Insurance 
  
Gender  Female + 
Age  Older + 
Occupation  + 
Attitude towards risk Risk-Averse + 
Health risk level  + 
Low-health risk and high risk 
aversion 
 
+ 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Older individuals are more likely to own health insurance 
Previous studies have found age to be a significant determinant in health insurance 
ownership and that older individuals are more likely to own health insurance 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 1991; Hopkins & Kidd, 1996; Barret & Conlon, 2003; King & 
Mossialos, 2005; Foubister, et al., 2006; Resende & Zeidan, 2010; Abu-Bakar et al., 
2012; and Kimani et al., 2014).  
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Grossman (1972) proposed that health is a capital stock that produces output 
of healthy time and this stock of health will depreciate with age. In order to improve 
health stock, older individuals are to invest more in their health to reduce the rate of 
health status depreciation. Based on the need for healthcare, it is not surprising that 
the demand for private medical insurance in the UK was highest for individuals aged 
55-64 (Foubister, et al., 2006) and lowest among the individuals aged 16-24 
(Foubister, et al., 2006; Wallis, 2004). Similarly, in Australia, personal health 
insurance is more likely to be subscribed by older individuals (Barret & Conlon, 
2003). Based the literatures, it is hypothesized that older individuals are more likely to 
own health insurance.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Female individuals are more likely to own health insurance compared 
to male individuals 
Women have been associated with higher health risk and demand more medical 
services especially at child-bearing age (Bertakis et al., 2000). Current underwriting 
practices have resulted in higher health insurance premium rates for women due to 
their higher morbidity as compared to men (Bickley et al., 2007). Despite this fact, 
most previous studies have found that women or women as heads of families are more 
likely to own health insurance compared to men (Cameron & Trivedi, 1991; Hopkins 
& Kidd, 1996; Barrett & Conlon, 2003; Kirigia et al., 2005; Gius, 2010; Abu-Bakar et 
al., 2012; Kiplagat et al., 2013; and Kimani et al., 2014). They are more likely to own 
health insurance due to their risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2005). Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that female individuals are more likely to own health insurance.  
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Hypothesis 3:  Occupation is associated with the likelihood of owning health 
insurance 
Certain occupations are categorized as at a higher than average risk exposure level. 
Individuals in higher-risk occupations are more likely to own health insurance as 
protection against possible medical expenditure due to illness or injury from their 
occupation.  The health insurance industry has grouped occupation into rating classes 
based on the degree of risks of the occupation (Bickley et al., 2007).  
 
The NHMS 2011 however does not categorise occupation based on exposure to 
risks. Occupation is categorised as the sector employed, namely as government 
employee, semi-government employee, private sector employee, self-employee, 
unpaid worker, homemaker, and retiree.  
 
The study by Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993) found positive relationship 
between white collar occupations and the amount of insurance purchase. Foubister et 
al. (2006) in an analysis of private health insurance subscribers noted the relationship 
between employment status and roles and ownership of private health insurance. 
Similarly, Buchmueller, et al. (2013) found that employment status is positively 
related to ownership of private health insurance. In another study, Kimani et al. 
(2014) found that being employed in the formal sector is positively related to 
ownership of private health insurance. 
 
Based on the previous studies and the fact that individuals in higher-risk 
occupations may have higher needs for health insurance to financially protect them 
from possible medical expenditure due to illness or injury from the occupation, this 
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study hypothesizes that an individual’s occupation is associated with the likelihood of 
owning health insurance. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who are risk-averse are more likely to own health 
insurance 
Individuals who are risk-averse are expected to engage in behaviours that promote a 
healthy and safe lifestyle. Such behaviours may include not smoking, not consuming 
alcohol, regularly doing physical exercise or practising safe behaviour during driving 
or during riding of motorbikes.  
 
Previous authors have studied the relationship between attitudes towards risk 
and ownership of health insurance using behavioural factors.  Kirigia et al. (2005) for 
example, analysed the behaviours of using contraceptives and alcohol consumption 
and found that people who use contraceptives and drink alcohol are less likely to own 
health insurance. Similarly, Barrett and Conlon (2003) found other risk behaviours 
such as physical exercise and alcohol to be positively associated with health insurance 
ownership while Anderson and Mellor (2008) reported that using the seat belt is 
positively associated with health insurance ownership. 
 
      Other studies use smoking behaviours as a proxy for risk attitude in which non-
smokers are considered risk-averse individuals. Most studies found that smokers are 
less likely to own health insurance (Hopkins and Kidd, 1996; Barret & Conlon, 2003; 
Wallis, 2004; Kirigia et al., 2005; Buchmueller, et al., 2013; and Kiplagat & Muriithi, 
2013). 
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On the contrary, in their study using NHMS 1996 data, Kefeli and Jones (2012) 
found a positive correlation between smoking and health insurance ownership. With 
the exception of Kefeli and Jones (2012), other studies found positive relationship 
between risk attitude and health insurance ownership. Thus this study hypothesizes 
that individuals’ risk aversion is positively related to the ownership of health 
insurance as more studies have recorded positive relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a relationship between individuals’ health risk level and the 
likelihood of owning health insurance  
Individuals’ health status is an important determinant for achieving a better life. 
Individuals with higher health risk level are assumed to have bad health status and 
incur higher medical cost (Musich et al., 2003) and most likely to be in need of health 
insurance to cover potential medical expenditures. Studies by Browne (1992) and 
Kirigia et al. (2005) found that the demand for health insurance is low for individuals 
who have excellent, very good, or good health.  However, Barrett and Conlon (2003) 
and Wallis (2004) found that individuals having low health risk are more likely to 
own health insurance.  Similarly, Buchmueller et al. (2013) found that the majority of 
health insurance policyholders in their study are in good health status.  
 
As previous studies offered mixed results on the effect of health risk level on 
ownership of health insurance, this study hypothesizes that individuals’ health risk 
level is associated with the likelihood of owning health insurance. The findings shall 
support the theory of propitious selection if low health risk individuals are found to be 
more likely to own health insurance. 
 
 
95 
 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Individuals with low health risk and are highly risk-averse are more 
likely to own health insurance  
The propitious selection theory suggests that health riskiness and risk aversion are 
negatively correlated. Hemenway (1990) postulated that propitious selection is when 
individuals reduce risk through risk-avoiding behaviours and at the same time buy 
insurance. Fang, et al. (2008) suggested that advantageous selection is present when 
there is private information that is positively correlated with insurance coverage (i.e. a 
risk-averse individual is more likely to own health insurance) and negatively 
correlated with health risk (i.e. a risk-averse individual is more likely to be in good 
health).  In this study, private information in reference is the risk aversion of 
individuals which is negatively correlated with health risk level and positively 
correlated with ownership of personal health insurance.  
 
It was empirically proven in Einav and Finkelstein (2011), Olivella and Vera-
Hernandez (2013), and Buchmueller et al. (2013) that highly risk-averse individuals 
with low level of health risk would remain in the insurance market. Thus, this study 
hypothesizes that individuals with low health risk and are highly risk-averse are more 
likely to own health insurance. 
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3.3  Methods 
 
3.3.1 Data Collection  
The data for empirical analysis was extracted from the National Health and Morbidity 
Survey (NHMS) 2011. NHMS is a nationally representative survey of the population 
in Malaysia conducted by the Institute for Public Health (IPH).  IPH, one of the 
institutes under the National Institutes of Health, focuses on public health research. 
The first NHMS was conducted in 1996 and subsequently it was conducted every 10 
years.  Since 2011, the survey cycle was shortened to every 4 years to ensure 
availability of timely information for planning purposes. 
 
The NHMS 2011 states three specific objectives: 
a. To determine the healthcare demand of the community in Malaysia 
b. To determine the risk factors for cardiovascular disease among the adult 
population 
c. To determine the prevalence of other health-related problems 
 
The scope of the study by IPH covers loads of illness, health-seeking behaviour, 
pattern of utilisation and healthcare cost. The scope for cardiovascular disease risk 
factors includes the study on nutritional status, physical activity, tobacco use, alcohol 
consumption, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and diabetes. Included in the 
survey are other health-related problems such as home injury and mental health.  
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The data of the NHMS 2011 was collected through self-administered 
questionnaires and interviews. NHMS 2011 covered both urban and rural areas in all 
states of Malaysia. The sample was selected based on a two-stage stratified sampling 
design. The first stage was the selection of Enumeration Blocks (EB). In each EB 
there were 80-120 living quarters (LQ) with an average population of 500-600 people. 
For the NHMS 2011, a total of 794 EBs (484 urban and 310 rural) were randomly 
selected from the total EBs in the country. For each EB, 12 LQs were randomly 
selected making the total 9,528 LQs. The survey team of IPH visited 7,522 LQs and 
28,650 individuals were interviewed with response rate of 88.2 per cent and 93 per 
cent respectively (Institute for Public Health, 2011a). Based on the data collection 
method and after comparing the estimated population with Census 2010, the sample 
was representative of the population of Malaysia (Institute for Public Health, 2011b).  
 
A request was made to the Director General of the Ministry of Health of 
Malaysia to access the raw data from the study. The approval was received in August 
2016. The data set was given by the IPH in SPSS format. To ensure originality and 
avoid duplication, the IPH only released the data to the first researcher who studied a 
particular area. 
 
3.3.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis was individuals who were above 18 years of age.  This is the 
minimum age to own private individual health insurance in Malaysia. The total 
number of respondents aged 18 years and above was 18,231. There was no 
information whether the health insurance ownership included ownership of takaful. 
Further discussion on this limitation is presented in Chapter 5. 
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3.3.3  Measurement 
Data management and analysis was performed using SPSS. The summary of the 
definition of variables used is as shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 
Definitions of Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
Ownership of health 
insurance  
 
A categorical variable that equals 1 when an individual owns 
health insurance and 0 when an individual does not own health 
insurance policy. 
Independent Variables  
Age 1 if 18 to 24, 2 if 25 to 34, 3 if 35 to 44, 4 if 45 to 54, 5 if 55 to 
64, 6 if 65 and above 
 
Gender 1 if the respondent is Male, and 0 if the respondent is Female 
 
Occupation   1 if Government employee, 2 if Private employee, 3 if Self-
employed, 4 if Homemaker/unpaid worker, 5 if Retiree 
  
Education 1 if No formal education, 2 if Primary education, 3 if 
Secondary education, 4 if Tertiary education  
 
Income  1 if RM1000 and below, 2 if RM1001to RM3000, 3 if 
RM3001 to RM5000, 4 if above RM5000 
 
Attitude towards Risk 
 
1 if Risk-averse, 2 if Moderate risk-taker, 3 if Risk-taker 
 
Health Risk Level  1 if Low risk, 2 if High risk 
 
 
 
3.3.3.1  Health Insurance Ownership 
Health insurance ownership was a categorical variable that equalled to 1 when an 
individual owned personal health insurance and 0 when an individual did not own any 
personal health insurance policy. The variable ownership of health insurance was 
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derived from question A2302 of the NHMS 2011 survey where respondents had to 
answer the following question with a “yes” or “no” answer:   
“Are you covered by any private personal health insurance plans which you or 
a family member had purchased?” 
 
An individual may be covered by other means of payment for receiving health- 
care such as:  
• Government guarantee letter 
• Employer-sponsored insurance, panel facilities, or other forms of 
employment coverage 
 
This study excluded individuals who were under a government guarantee and 
employer-sponsored health insurance plan. Employer-sponsored health insurance is a 
policy that is offered to employees as part of employment benefits. Individuals under 
an employer-sponsored plan do not make the decision to purchase health insurance 
and the choice of coverage is influenced or decided by the employer.  
 
3.3.3.2 Health Risk Level  
Health risk level has been measured differently by previous different authors. For 
example, Cutler et al. (2008) used admission in a hospital to measure occurrence of 
risk. In this study health risk level was measured by either good or bad based on two 
variables, utilisation of inpatient care (admission to a ward) and the self-assessed 
health status (SAHS). 
 
The first variable was the admission to any ward, the question for which was 
asked through a dichotomous question which required a “Yes” or “No” answer.  
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Inpatient visits (any admission to a ward) in the past 12 months measured for health- 
care service utilisation. Respondents were recorded as 1 = bad (for respondents who 
utilised inpatient care), and 2 = good (for respondents who did not utilise inpatient 
care).  
 
The second variable was self-assessed health status (SAHS).  Answering SAHS 
required respondents to state and record SAHS as 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = 
moderate, 4 = not good, and 5 = very bad.  SAHS was later collapsed and re-coded 
into a dichotomous variable: 1 = good comprising very good and good status; and 0 = 
bad comprising moderate, not good, or bad status. Refer to Table 3.3. This re-coding 
is consistent with the study by Kirigia et al. (2005), Grunow and Nuscheler (2014), 
and Semasaka, et al., (2016).   
 
Table 3.3  
Old and New Categories of Self-Assessed Health Status (SAHS) 
Old categories  New categories 
1 = very good  
1 = good 
2 = good  
3 = moderate  
0 = bad 4 = not good 
5 = very bad 
   
 
Both (admission to any ward and SAHS) variables were computed to become a 
single variable which carried “High” or “Low” measurement of health risk level. High 
health risk level was defined as having at least one “bad” category and low health risk 
level was when an individual had both variables as “good”. In summary, the 
categories of health risk are: 
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 Low Risk :  Not having any of the above bad risks (never admitted to a ward 
and having good SAHS) 
 High Risk:   Having at least one bad risk, either being admitted to a ward or 
having bad SAHS  
 
3.3.3.3 Attitude towards Risk 
This study adopted the lifestyle risk variables in Musich et al. (2003) as proxy for 
attitude towards risk. The variables are smoking and physical inactivity. Musich et al. 
(2003) defined high risk for the two variables as follows: 
a. Smoking is defined as current smoker ( ≥ 1 cigarettes per day)  
b. Physical inactivity is being active for less than 60 minutes a week.  
 
The measurement for smoking was based on the question “Do you currently 
smoke?” asked to respondents. Respondents were required to answer “Yes” or “No”.  
 
Physical activity was measured by the number of minutes of participation in 
activities in a week which included walking, moderate-intensity and vigorous-
intensity activities as in Ying, et al. (2014). The respondents’ weekly duration of 
physical activity was summed and determined whether it met the recommended 
duration.  To qualify as physically active, an individual has to do either 75 minutes a 
week of vigorous activity or 150 minutes a week of moderate activity including 
walking or combination of vigorous and moderate activities.  
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The World Health Organization (2011) Guideline states that:  
“Adults aged 18–64 should do at least 150 minutes of moderate-intensity 
aerobic physical activity throughout the week or do at least 75 minutes of 
vigorous-intensity aerobic physical activity throughout the week or an 
equivalent combination of moderate - and vigorous-intensity activity”. 
 
The NHMS 2011 asked two questions for each category of physical activity to 
determine the number of minutes of activity: 
 Vigorous 
activity 
1. “In the past 7 days, how many days have you done vigorous 
physical activity (eg: carry heavy weights, till the earth, 
aerobic exercises or fast cycling and others) for at least 10 
minutes per session?” 
 2. “On the day you carry out vigorous physical activity, how long 
do you do this activity?” 
 Moderate 
activity 
1. “In the past 7 days, how many days have you done moderate 
physical activity (eg: carry light weights, mop the floor, or 
normal rate of cycling and others) for at least 10 minutes per 
session? This does not include walking.” 
 2. “On the day you carry out moderate physical activity, how 
long do you do this activity?” 
 Walking  1. “In the past 7 days, how many days have you walked for at 
least 10 minutes per session?” 
 2. “On one of these days that you walked, how long did you spend 
walking?”  
 
Two sets of data (vigorous-intensity and moderate-intensity activities) were 
available for analysis. Both data sets were combined and computed.  Based on the 
above guidelines, individuals were classified as active or inactive.  
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In order to have a comprehensive analysis of the effect of the variable attitude 
towards risk on ownership of personal health insurance, the variables were 
categorised into three levels as follows:   
 
 Risk-taker (smoking and physically inactive) 
 Moderate risk-taker (doing one of the behaviours of smoking and physically 
inactive) 
 Risk-averse (do not smoke and physically active) 
 
3.3.3.4  Demographic Variables  
 
Gender 
Male and Female 
 
Age 
Age is a continuous variable. For more efficient use and analysis, age was categorised 
into age groups as follows: 
 18-24 
 25-34 
 35-44 
 45-54 
 55-64 
 65 and above 
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Occupation  
Insurance underwriters classify occupation into classes based on the risk exposure 
level of the occupations, as follows: 
 Class 1: Least hazardous occupation  
 Class 2  Non-hazardous occupation & Supervisory responsibility  
 Class 3  Blue collar workers & Drivers 
 Class 4  Most hazardous  
 Uninsurable  Exposed to unusual hazards  
 
However, the NHMS 2011 is not categorised by risk exposure but by the 
employment types, making it impossible to use the category. The NHMS 2011 uses 
occupational types which include government employee, semi-government employee, 
private sector employee, self-employed, unpaid worker, homemaker, and retiree. In 
evaluating policyholders and non-policyholders by occupation, it was found that 
unpaid workers had a low count of 3. In ensuring that it would not negatively affect 
the result of subsequent analysis, the occupational categories of homemaker and 
unpaid worker were combined. Refer to Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 
Old and New Categories of Types of Occupations 
 
Old categories New categories 
 Government Employee  Government Employee 
 Semi Government Employee 
 Private Sector Employee  Private Sector Employee 
 Self-Employed  Self-Employed 
 Unpaid Worker 
 Homemaker/ Unpaid Worker 
 Homemaker 
 Retiree  Retiree 
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A further regrouping was carried out for government employees and semi-
government employees due to the similarity of the sector. With this combination and 
regrouping, variable occupation was finally categorised into five categories, namely 
government employee, private sector employee, self-employed, homemaker/ unpaid 
worker, and retiree.  . 
 
Income  
Income is a continuous variable and is monthly. For more efficient use, income was 
categorised into 4 bands, as follows: 
 RM 1000 and below  
 RM 1001 to RM3000 
 RM3001 to RM5000 
 Above RM5000 
 
Education 
The NHMS 2011 study classifies individual education based on five categories, 
namely “No Formal Education”, “Primary”, “Secondary”, “Tertiary”, and 
“Unclassified”. “Unclassified” is rather ambiguous in definition and for this study and 
it was grouped together with “No Formal Education”. These new categories were 
more reflective of Malaysian education classification.  
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3.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the theoretical framework that set the grounds 
of the study and the details of the methods employed. It is followed by the 
development of the hypotheses to be tested which are based on the theories and 
empirical findings from literatures. The hypothesized relationships of the variables are 
presented.    
 
The method section explains the data to be used and the how the variables were 
to be measured. The measurement of variables was guided by the previous studies 
with some variation adjusted based on the availability of the data in the NHMS 2011.   
 
The following chapters will focus on the examination of the data; profiling of 
respondents related to the ownership of personal health insurance; analysing the effect 
of underwriting factors, health risk and risk behaviours on the ownership of personal 
health insurance; predicting the factors affecting the likelihood of ownership of 
personal health insurance policy; and examining the existence of advantageous 
selection in the health insurance market.  
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CHAPTER FOUR   
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the analyses and a discussion of the findings. The 
first section provides the descriptive statistics of the respondents who were 18 years 
old and above. The profile of the respondents is further analysed based on who owned 
and who did not own personal health insurance according to socio-demographic and 
underwriting factors of age, gender, occupation, income, education, health risk level, 
and risk preference behaviour. Results that are presented descriptively in numbers and 
in percentages to describe the respondents and variables of interest will answer the 
first research question (Objective 1).  
 
The subsequent sections will present the results of probability of the 
independence of the distribution of the data and logistic regression. These analyses 
will address the relationship between underwriting factors, health risk level, and risk 
preference behaviour of the respondents in relation to ownership of personal health 
insurance (Objective 2) and whether the presence of advantageous selection is 
observed (Objective 3). The final section summarizes the results.   
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The total number of respondents in the NHMS survey is 28,498 with 48.3 per cent or 
13,757 males and 51.7 per cent or 14,741 females. As the information on health 
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insurance ownership was only answered by adult respondents aged 18 and above, 
cases answered by those below 18 were deleted, leaving only 18,231 cases.  
 
Based on the 18,231 cases stated in the previous chapter, a further cleaning of 
the data was carried out through deleting erroneous and missing data to improve the 
usefulness for the intended analysis. Finally, only 13,073 cases were included for the 
analysis after filtering the cases that were covered by employer-sponsored health 
insurance policies, as has been clarified earlier in the previous chapter. The cases 
were subsequently computed or dichotomised into new variables as explained in the 
Methodology chapter. The continuous variables of age and income are presented after 
being computed into categorical variables.  
 
The sample was made up of almost 94 per cent Malaysians and all states in 
Malaysia were represented with Selangor having the largest number of respondents, 
followed by Sabah/Labuan, and Johor. By gender, 55 per cent were female and the 
majority of the sample (57.1%) were Malays, followed by Chinese, Other 
Bumiputeras, Indians and Others. The respondents were between the ages of 18 and 
107 with mean age of 44 years. More than half of the respondents (62%) were 
between the ages of 25 to 54 while another 27 per cent were those 55 years old and 
above. Only 11 per cent were aged 18 to 24.  
 
Almost half of the respondents (45%) had at least secondary education and 
another 18 per cent had completed tertiary education. The largest groups of 
respondents worked in the private sector (26.1%) and were self-employed (25.7%), 
while only 13 per cent worked in the government and semi-government sector 
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combined. In terms of monthly income from employment, the range was between 
RM0 and RM50,000 with mean monthly income of RM1,104. The majority of the 
respondents (66 %) earned below RM1000 while another 27 per cent earned between 
RM1,000 to RM3,000.  A more detailed distribution of the socio-demographics of the 
respondents is provided in the summary statistics of samples in Table 4.1.  
 
4.2.1  Summary Statistics of Samples 
The socio-demographics of the respondents are displayed in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1 
Distribution of Socio-Demographics of Sample 
 
Variables Full Sample N=13,073 
  Frequency Per cent 
Gender 
Male 5896 45.1 
Female 7177 54.9 
Race 
Malay 7467 57.1 
Chinese 2578 19.7 
Indian 954 7.3 
Other Bumiputera 1266 9.7 
Others 808 6.2 
   
Age Group   
18-24 1431 10.9 
25-34 2721 20.8 
35-44 2641 20.2 
45-54 2741 21.0 
55-64 2082 15.9 
65 and above 1457 11.1 
   
Minimum age:  18  
Maximum age  107  
Mean Age:  44.27  
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
 
Variables Full Sample N=13,073 
  Frequency Per cent 
   
Citizenship    
Malaysian 12251 93.7 
Non-Malaysian 822 6.3 
   
Marital Status   
Single 2203 16.9 
Married 9644 73.8 
Widow/Widower/Divorcee 1226 9.4 
   
Education level   
No formal education 1305 1.0 
Primary education 3543 27.1 
Secondary education 5908 45.2 
Tertiary education 2317 17.7 
   
Occupation   
Government employee 1754 13.4 
Private sector employee 3418 26.1 
Self-employed 3354 25.7 
Homemaker/Unpaid 
worker 
2903 22.2 
Retiree 1644 12.6 
   
Income Group   
RM1000 and below 8583 65.7 
RM1001 - RM3000 3586 27.4 
RM3001 - RM5000 704 5.4 
Above RM5000 200 15.2 
   
Minimum income: 0  
Maximum income: 50000  
Mean income: 1104.55  
   
Admitted to any ward   
Yes 990 7.6 
No 12083 92.4 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
 
Variables Full Sample N=13,073 
 Frequency Per cent 
   
Self –Assessed Health 
Status 
  
Bad 2729 20.9 
Good 
 
10344 79.1 
   
Smoking   
Yes 2976 22.8 
No 10097 77.2 
   
Physical Activity    
Inactive 3968 30.4 
Active 9105 69.6 
   
State   
Johor 1075 8.2 
Kedah 788 6.0 
Kelantan 954 7.3 
Melaka 797 6.1 
Negeri Sembilan 722 5.5 
Pahang 737 5.6 
Penang 782 6.0 
Perak 812 6.2 
Perlis 803 6.1 
Selangor 1629 12.5 
Terengganu 876 6.7 
Sabah/Labuan 1432 11.0 
Sarawak 872 6.7 
WP Kuala Lumpur 378 2.9 
WP Putrajaya 
 
416 3.2 
 
 
To compare if the sample used was representative of the population, Chi-square 
test was conducted to determine if there were significant differences between the 
respondents and the general population. The population data was adopted from 
Census 2010 as used in NHMS 2011 analysis (Institute for Public Health, 2011b). The 
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Chi-square test suggested that there was no statistically significant association 
between the selected sample and the corresponding population.  
 
Correlations between independent variables were tested using Spearman 
Correlation. None of the variables were highly correlated.  Variables with highest 
correlation were Age and Marital Status with Pearson r = 0.557, p < .01. 
 
 
4.2.2  Variables under Investigation 
In addressing the research objectives of profiling individuals with and without 
personal health insurance and the association with socio-demographic variables and 
underwriting factors, this section segments the profile of the respondents by 
ownership of personal health insurance according to socio-demographic factors, 
focussing on selected underwriting factors, health risk level, and risk 
preference/attitude. The analysis begins with a summary of the statistics on ownership 
of personal health insurance. Subsequently, the ownership of personal health 
insurance was matched with personal and underwriting factors, health status, and risk 
behaviour to determine significant association between the variables.  
 
4.2.2.1 Ownership of Personal Health Insurance  
Table 4.2 summarizes the number of respondents having personal health insurance. A 
total of 2,461 respondents or 18.8 per cent of the total sample owned personal health 
insurance. The figure is slightly higher compared to the 18 per cent in 2008 as stated 
by Institute for Public Health (2008). The other 10,612 or 81.2 per cent did not own 
personal health insurance.   
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Table 4.2 
Distribution of Personal Health Insurance Ownership  
 
Variables 
Full Sample N=13073 
Frequency (Per cent) 
Own personal  
health insurance 2461 18.8 
Do not own personal health 
insurance 10612 81.2 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Profile of Respondents who Own and do not Own Personal Health 
Insurance  
Studies have found that the socio-demographic factors of age, gender, occupation, 
income, education, and race have significant influence on ownership of personal 
health insurance.  
 
Each of these factors is associated with different levels of health risks. For 
example, age has been associated with a higher tendency to seek healthcare and in 
setting insurance premium, elderly persons would be charged a higher rate. Studies 
have also found that the morbidity rate of women is generally higher than that of men 
of the same age. Similarly, certain occupations are often associated with risk of 
accident and health hazards. Due to the different health risk levels that age and 
gender have been associated with, both are used in risk-based underwriting of health 
insurance. In this study, the profile of insureds is as shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Profile of Insureds and Uninsureds. 
 
 
Age 
The subscription to personal health insurance varied between the age groups of the 
respondents as shown in Table 4.3. In the case of individuals aged 18-24, 13.5 per 
cent subscribed to personal health insurance compared to 86.5 per cent who did not 
while for individuals aged 25-34, 23.9 per cent subscribed to personal health 
insurance compared to 86.1 per cent who did not subscribe. The age group with the 
largest number of those that subscribed to personal health insurance was the 35 to 44 
age group with 24.5 per cent owning personal health insurance while 75.5 per cent 
did not own personal health insurance.  More than twenty per cent (22.6%) of 
individuals in the 45 to 54 age group subscribed to personal health insurance and 
77.4 per cent did not. Lower subscription was seen among individuals aged 55-64 
with 13.3 per cent of them having personal health insurance in contrast to 86.7 per 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
18
-2
4
25
-3
4
35
-4
4
45
-5
4
55
-6
4
65
 a
nd
 a
bo
ve
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t e
m
pl
oy
ee
Pr
iva
te
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
Se
lf 
em
pl
oy
ed
Ho
m
e 
m
ak
er
/U
np
ai
d…
Re
tir
ee
10
00
 a
nd
 b
el
ow
10
01
 - 
30
00
30
01
 - 
50
00
Ab
ov
e 
50
00
No
 fo
rm
al
 e
du
ca
tio
n
Pr
im
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n
Se
co
nd
ar
y e
du
ca
tio
n
Te
rt
ia
ry
 e
du
ca
tio
n
Insured Uninsured
115 
 
cent being non-subscribers. Respondents aged 65 and above comprised the group 
with the smallest number of subscribers of personal health insurance; only 4.8 per 
cent of them owned personal health insurance while 95.2 per cent did not.  
 
 
Table 4.3 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Age Group 
 
Cross Tabulation Matrix 
Age group 
 
Own personal health 
insurance Total 
 No Yes 
18-24 
Count 1237 194 1431 
Expected Count 1161.6 269.4 1431.0 
25-34 
Count 2070 651 2721 
Expected Count 2208.8 512.2 2721.0 
35-44 
Count 1993 648 2641 
Expected Count 2143.8 497.2 2641.0 
45-54 
Count 2121 620 2741 
Expected Count 2225.0 516.0 2741.0 
55-64 
Count 1805 277 2082 
Expected Count 1690.1 391.9 2082.0 
65 and 
above 
Count 1386 71 1457 
Expected Count 1182.7 274.3 1457.0 
Total Count 10612 2461 13073 
 Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
381.620 5 .000  
 
 
A Chi-square test was conducted to determine if there was a relationship 
between the age of the respondents and ownership of personal health insurance. The 
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test results generated Chi-square value = 381.620, p = .000 which showed that there 
was statistically significant association between age and ownership of personal 
health insurance. 
 
 
Examining the actual and expected count, it was noted that individuals in the 
25-34, 35-44, and 45-54 age groups had higher count of 651, 648, and 620 
respectively compared to the expected count of 512.2, 497.2, and 516 respectively, 
suggesting that individuals in these age groups (25-34, 35-44, and 45-54) were more 
likely to own personal health insurance.  
 
Economic theory predicts that as individuals advance in age, the health stock 
depreciates and they are more likely to increase investment in health including 
having personal health insurance to reduce the negative effect of depreciation. This is 
seen in the result which showed that those between 25 to 54 years of age were the 
most likely to own personal health insurance. As understood, health insurance 
ownership provides better access to private healthcare services. Therefore, insurers 
would need to understand the risk profile of individuals in all age categories and their 
healthcare requirements for better selection of risk.  
 
Gender  
Table 4.4 provides the results of cross tabulations between ownership of personal 
health insurance policy and gender. Males had higher subscription of personal health 
insurance compared to females. Almost twenty per cent (19.5 %) of males subscribed 
to personal health insurance compared to 81.5 per cent of males who did not. A 
higher percentage of females were without cover, with only 18.3 per cent having 
personal health insurance compared to 81.7 per cent of females who did not have 
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personal health insurance.  The Chi-square test however did not generate significant 
value with Chi-square value = 3.411, p =.065 which showed that there was no 
statistically significant association between gender and ownership of personal health 
insurance. This means that insureds and uninsureds were equally represented by 
males and females. 
 
Table 4.4 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Gender 
 
Cross Tabulation Matrix   
Gender 
Own personal health 
insurance Total 
No Yes 
Male 
Count 4745 1151 5896 
Expected Count 4786.1 1109.9 5896.0 
Female 
Count 5867 1310 7177 
Expected Count 5825.9 1351.1 7177.0 
Total 
Count 10612 2461 13073 
Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square  
   
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.411 1 .065  
 
 
Occupation 
The cross-tabulation of occupation with ownership of personal health insurance is 
shown in Table 4.5. The tabulation saw that more than one-third (37.2%) of 
government employees subscribed to personal health insurance plans while 62.8 per 
cent did not. More than twenty per cent (20.3 %) of private sector employees 
subscribed to personal health insurance and 79.7 per cent of private sector employees 
did not subscribe to personal health insurance.  The percentage of self-employeds 
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who were enrolled in private health insurance was 19 per cent while 81 per cent were 
not.  Only 12.9 per cent of homemakers/unpaid workers and 6.2 per cent of retirees 
owned personal health insurance.  
 
Table 4.5 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Policyholders and Non-Policyholders by 
Occupation 
 
Cross Tabulation Matrix   
Occupation 
Own personal health 
insurance Total 
No Yes 
 
Government 
employee 
Count 1101 653 1754 
Expected Count 1423.8 330.2 1754.0 
Private sector 
employee 
Count 2724 694 3418 
Expected Count 2774.6 643.4 3418.0 
Self-employed 
Count 2716 638 3354 
Expected Count 2722.6 631.4 3354.0 
Homemaker/Unpaid 
worker 
Count 2529 374 2903 
Expected Count 2356.5 546.5 2903.0 
Retiree 
Count 1542 102 1644 
Expected Count 1334.5 309.5 1644.0 
Total 
Count 10612 2461 13073 
Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 632.188 4 .000  
 
 
A Chi-square test was done to determine the relationship between ownership of 
personal health insurance and type of occupation. The test result generated Chi-
square value = 632.188, p = .000 which showed that there was statistically significant 
association between occupation and ownership of personal health insurance.   
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Looking at the actual count and expected count, it was noted that higher actual 
count was observed for individuals who were government employees (653), private 
sector employees (694), and self-employeds (638) compared to the expected counts 
of 330.2, 643.4, and 631.4 respectively, suggesting that individuals who were 
government employees, private employees, and self-employed were more likely to 
own personal health insurance.  
 
The likelihood of government employees, private employees, and self-
employeds to own personal health insurance suggests their preference for private 
healthcare services is probably due to wanting peace of mind or in anticipation of 
needing medical care as reported earlier by Buchmueller, et al. (2013).  Employees in 
the government sector are typically not provided with the benefits of private health 
insurance while self-employeds would have to finance their own healthcare services. 
Similarly, not all private employees are provided health insurance benefits by their 
employers. For any sector of employment, having personal health insurance makes it 
possible to access private healthcare services and enjoy the benefits of shorter waits.  
 
Income 
Income has been significantly associated with ownership of personal health 
insurance. Table 4.6 shows that subscription to personal health insurance increased 
with income. More than 30 per cent of those who earned RM1001-RM3000 owned 
personal health insurance while 69.5 per cent did not. About 56 per cent of 
individuals in the RM3001- RM5000 income bracket owned personal health 
insurance and 43.9 per cent did not, and almost 60 per cent of individuals with 
income of above RM5000 owned personal health insurance while 41 per cent did not 
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own personal health insurance. Only about 10 per cent of individuals with monthly 
income of below RM1000 owned personal health insurance. 
 
Table 4.6 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Income  
 
Cross Tabulation   
Monthly Income (RM) 
Own personal health 
insurance 
Total 
No Yes 
   
1000 and below 
Count 7730 853 8583 
Expected Count 6967.2 1615.8 8583.0 
1001 - 3000 
Count 2491 1095 3586 
Expected Count 2910.9 675.1 3586.0 
3001 - 5000 Count 309 395 704 
Expected Count 571.5 132.5 704.0 
Above 5000 Count 82 118 200 
Expected Count 162.3 37.7 200.0 
 Count 10612 2461 13073 
Total Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 1617.002 3 .000  
 
The Chi-square test suggested that there was a statistically significant 
association between income and ownership of personal health insurance with the 
result of Chi-square value = 1617.002, p = .000. Based on a comparison of the actual 
count and the expected count, individuals with monthly income of above RM1000 
were more likely to own personal health insurance, with each income group having a 
higher actual count compared to the expected count.  
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Personal health insurance is seen as an option to enable access to private 
healthcare providers. The willingness to spend on personal health insurance depends 
on the availability of disposable income to pay for personal health insurance and the 
value that individuals put on private healthcare despite the availability of public 
health services. Those with higher income may have larger capacity to afford paying 
personal health insurance premium.  
 
Education 
Table 4.7 presents the ownership of personal health insurance by education level.   
 
Table 4.7  
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Education  
 
Cross Tabulation   
Education 
Own personal health 
insurance  
Total 
No Yes 
    
No formal education   
Count 1247 58 1305 
Expected Count 1059.3 245.7 1305.0 
Primary education 
Count 3195 348 3543 
Expected Count 2876.0 667.0 3543.0 
Secondary education Count 4731 1177 5908 
Expected Count 4795.8 1112.2 5908.0 
Tertiary education Count 1439 878 2317 
Expected Count 1880.8 436.2 2317.0 
 Count 10612 2461 13073 
Total Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 920.513 3 .000  
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The largest group of subscribers of personal health insurance comprised 
individuals with tertiary education, with 37.9 per cent owning personal health 
insurance and 62.1 per cent who did not. Almost twenty per cent (19.9 %) of 
individuals with secondary education owned personal health insurance while 80.1 per 
cent did not, and 9.8 per cent of individuals with primary education owned personal 
health insurance while 91.2 per cent did not. Only 4.4 per cent of individuals without 
formal education owned personal health insurance.  
 
The Chi-square test suggested that there was statistically significant association 
between education and ownership of personal health insurance with the result of Chi-
square value = 920.513, p = .000. Based on the actual count and the expected count, 
individuals with secondary and tertiary education were more likely to own personal 
health insurance with both having higher actual counts compared to the expected 
counts.  
 
The result is as expected as individuals with higher level of education are more 
likely to understand the need for personal health insurance in addition to having the 
ability to make financial decisions involving the purchase of personal health 
insurance.  
 
4.2.2.3  Profile of Respondents who Own and do not Own Personal Health 
Insurance by Attitude towards Risk 
This study measured attitude towards risk using two variables, namely smoking and 
physical activity. Smokers and those who are physically inactive are considered risk- 
takers.  
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Smoking  
Table 4.8 provides the results of crosstabs between the smoking status of respondents 
and ownership of personal health insurance. The results of the cross tabulation show 
that 15.2 per cent of smokers owned personal health insurance and 84.8 per cent of 
smokers did not own personal health insurance. Non-smokers who had personal 
health insurance comprised 19.9 per cent while 81.1 per cent did not have personal 
health insurance.   
 
Table 4.8 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Smoking Status 
 
Cross Tabulation   
Smoking Status 
Own personal health 
insurance  
Total 
No Yes 
 
Yes 
Count 2525 451 2976 
Expected Count 2415.8 560.2 2976.0 
No 
Count 8087 2010 10097 
Expected Count 8196.2 1900.8 10097.0 
Total 
Count 10612 2461 13073 
Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.971 1 .000  
 
 
The Chi-square test suggested that there was statistically significant association 
between smoking behaviour and ownership of personal health insurance with the 
result of Chi-square value = 33.971, p = .000. The actual count of individuals who 
did not smoke was 2010 and it was higher than the expected count of 1900.8, 
suggesting that individuals who did not smoke were more likely to own personal 
health insurance. The result was consistent with Hopkins and Kidd (1996) and 
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Buchmueller, et al. (2013) in terms of the negative correlation between smoking and 
ownership of health insurance.  The fact that the insureds did not smoke suggests that 
they were more risk-averse and did not expose themselves to various health risks and 
health insurance would further protect them from the possible financial burden of 
healthcare.  
 
Physical activity 
Table 4.9 presents the results of crosstabs between physical activity and ownership of 
personal health insurance.  
 
Table 4.9 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Physical Activity Status 
 
Cross Tabulation   
Physical Activity 
Own personal health 
insurance  
Total 
No Yes 
 
Inactive  
Count 3278 690 3968 
Expected Count 3221.0 747.0 3968.0 
Active  
Count 7334 1771 9105 
Expected Count 7391.0 1714.0 9105.0 
Total 
Count 10612 2461 13073 
Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.687 1 .006  
 
The results saw that the more active individuals owned personal health 
insurance compared to those who were non-active. About 20 per cent (19.5 %) of 
individuals who were physically active owned personal health insurance and 80.5 per 
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cent who were active and uninsured while 17.4 per cent of those who were physically 
inactive owned health insurance and 82.6 per cent who were inactive were uninsured.  
 
The Chi-square test suggested that there was statistically significant association 
between physical activity and ownership of personal health insurance with the result 
of Chi-square value = 7.687, p = .006.  The higher number of physically active 
insured was further confirmed with the higher actual count of 1771 physically active 
individuals compared to the expected count of 1714. This suggests that individuals 
who are physically active are more likely to own personal health insurance. The 
result is consistent with Barret and Conlon (2003) who found that individuals who 
did moderate and vigorous exercise were more likely to purchase health insurance.  
 
Attitude towards Risk 
Attitude towards risk was categorised using three-level categorisation of risk-taker, 
moderate risk-taker, and risk-averse as was defined in the Methodology chapter.  
 
Table 4.10 shows that the proportion of individuals in the risk-averse category 
who owned personal health insurance was the largest at 20.9 per cent and 79.1 per 
cent in the same category did not. For the moderate risk-takers, 16.5 per cent owned 
personal health insurance while 83.5 per cent did not. As for the risk-takers, only 16 
per cent owned personal health insurance and 84 per cent were uninsured. The Chi-
square value = 43.486, p = .000 suggested that there was a significant association 
between attitude towards risk and ownership of personal health insurance. 
Furthermore, risk-averse individuals were more likely to own personal health 
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insurance based on the higher count of 1430 compared to the expected count of 
1282.9.  
 
Table 4.10 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Attitude towards Risk  
 
Cross Tabulation   
Attitude towards risk 
Own personal health 
insurance 
Total 
No Yes 
 
Risk-Taker  
Count 576 110 686 
Expected Count 556.9 129.1 686.0 
Moderate Risk- 
Taker  
Count 4651 921 5572 
Expected Count 4523.1 1048.9 5572.0 
 
Risk-Averse Count 5385 1430 6815 
 Expected Count 5532.1 1282.9 6815.0 
 Count 10612 2461 13073 
Total Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 43.486 2 .000  
 
    
 
 
This finding suggests that attitude towards risk as represented by smoking 
behaviour and physical activity is significant although they are not the only 
determinants of the decision to own personal health insurance. Risk-averse 
individuals (represented by non-smokers and the physically active) want to lower 
their health risk and related financial risk and are willing to make larger investment 
on lower return for a known risk. For risk-averse individuals, having personal health 
insurance provides some form of security and peace of mind in terms of assurance of 
timely treatment with private healthcare services and being protected from the known 
risk of having to incur high expenses for healthcare treatment.    
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4.2.2.4  Profile of Respondents who Own and do not Own Personal Health 
Insurance by Health Risk Level 
In this study, health risk level was measured using two variables as explained in the 
Methodology chapter. Each of the variables was analysed separately to determine the 
association with personal health insurance ownership.  
 
Admission to Any Ward  
Table 4.11 presents the results of crosstabs between admission to any ward and 
ownership of personal health insurance. To test the relationship between ownership 
of personal health insurance and experience of being admitted in a ward, a Chi-
square test was administered. The Chi-square value = 3.663, p = .056 suggested that 
there was no statistically significant association between admission to a ward and 
ownership of personal health insurance. In other words, insureds and uninsureds 
were similarly represented by individuals who had been admitted and those who had 
never been admitted to a ward.  
Table 4.11 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Admission to Any Ward 
 
Cross Tabulation Matrix   
Admission to any ward 
Own personal health 
insurance Total 
No Yes  
 
Yes 
Count 781 209 990 
Expected Count 803.6 186.4 990.0 
No 
Count 9831 2252 12083 
Expected Count 9808.4 2274.6 12083.0 
Total 
Count 10612 2461 13073 
Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square    
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.663 1 .056  
128 
 
Self-Assessed Health Status (SAHS) 
Self-Assessed Health Status (SAHS) was used to determine the health risk status of 
respondents. The use of SAHS is consistent with Cardon and Hendel (2001), Kirigia 
et al. (2005), Gius (2010), and Buchmueller et al. (2013). The cross tabulation 
between SAHS and ownership of personal health insurance was done and the results 
are presented in Table 4.12.  
 
Table 4.12 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Good/Bad Self-Assessed Health Status 
 
Cross Tabulation   
SAHS 
Own personal health 
insurance  
Total 
No Yes 
 
Bad  
Count 2334 395 2729 
Expected Count 2215.3 513.7 2729.0 
Good 
Count 8278 2066 10344 
Expected Count 8396.7 1947.3 10344.0 
Total 
Count 10612 2461 13073 
Expected Count 10612.0 2461.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 42.726 1 .000  
 
The cross tabulation results showed that 14.5 per cent of respondents who 
claimed their health status as bad owned personal health insurance while 85.5 per 
cent of this group were uninsured.  For individuals in the good health status category, 
20 per cent owned personal health insurance and 80 per cent of respondents with the 
same health status did not own personal health insurance.   
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A Chi-square test based on the good SAHS and bad SAHS categorisation was 
performed to find its association with ownership of personal health insurance. The 
Chi-square value = 47.726, p = .000 suggested that there was statistically significant 
association between SAHS and ownership of personal health insurance.  The actual 
count of individuals with good SAHS was 2066. It was higher than the expected 
count of 1947, suggesting that individuals with good SAHS were more likely to own 
personal health insurance.   
 
High and Low Health Risk Level  
The computation of admission to any ward and SAHS into a single variable which 
carries “High” or “Low” health risk level has been explained in the Methodology 
chapter. An individual was considered as having a low health risk level or good 
health status when both the rating for admission to a ward and SAHS were good. 
Individuals having at least one bad rating for either of the factors (admission to a 
ward or SAHS) were considered to be in the high health risk level or bad health risk 
status.  However, due to the non-statistically significant result of the Chi-square of 
the variable admission to any ward, the variable admission to any ward was not 
further analysed in the subsequent analysis.  Therefore, health risk level was 
measured only by the variable SAHS. In this relation, good SAHS was redefined as 
low health risk level and bad SAHS was subsequently redefined as high health risk 
level as shown in Table 4.12. 
 
Based on this redefinition of the health risk level, it is suggested that 
individuals in the low health risk level (who assessed their health status as very good 
or good) were more likely to own personal health insurance, while individuals in the 
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high health risk level (who assessed their health status as moderate, not good, and 
bad status) were more likely not to own personal health insurance.  
 
The results also concluded that the personal health insurance market is 
characterised by preferred selection and not by adverse selection. Adverse selection 
can be observed when health risk status and ownership of personal health insurance 
are negatively correlated. The findings are more consistent with the earlier study in 
Malaysia by Kefeli and Jones (2012) who did not find evidence of adverse selection 
in the Malaysian health insurance market.  However, the result is an exception to 
Cutler et al. (2008) who noted that adverse selection was more evident in most health 
insurance markets.  
 
Health status affects the ability to earn income and enjoy life. A decline in 
health status especially at working ages can affect life negatively. While the result 
suggests that insurers have successfully attracted individuals with lower than average 
health status, it might also suggest that individuals who feel that the ability to 
generate earning and enjoy life could be threatened by health status would be 
prepared to maintain good health including by investing in personal health insurance 
for assurance of access to and treatment at private healthcare providers.  
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4.3   Factors Predicting Ownership of Personal Health Insurance 
This section investigates the factors that affect the decision to own personal health 
insurance. Logistic regressions were performed on the data to predict a discrete 
outcome of ownership of health insurance from a set of variables. The variables in 
the analysis were age, gender, occupation, income, education, health risk level, and 
attitude towards risk. Tests on whether the models fit the data were administered 
using Hosmer and Lemeshow test. Two logistic regression models (Model 1, Model 
2) that fit the data are presented to answer specific research questions. 
 
Table 4.13 provides the regression coefficient (B), the Wald statistic and the 
Odds Ratio (Exp (B)) for each variable category of Model 1.  
 
The regression model had good fit to the data (Chi-Square = 6.384, df=8, 
p=0.604) with Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square were 13.4 per 
cent and 21.6 per cent respectively. All variables were included to answer the 
specific questions on the effects of underwriting and non-underwriting factors and on 
the ownership of personal health insurance and the presence of advantageous 
selection. The results of the analysis exhibited that other than occupation, there was 
highly significant overall effect for all variables in equation.   
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Table 4.13 
Logistic Regression Result- Model 1 
 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age   42.574 5 .000  
25-34 .369 .095 15.090 1 .000 1.446 
35-44 .477 .097 24.097 1 .000 1.611 
45-54 .501 .100 25.116 1 .000 1.650 
55-64 .274 .118 5.367 1 .021 1.315 
65 and above -.108 .175 .378 1 .538 .898 
Gender       
Female .300 .058 26.302 1 .000 1.349 
Occupation   12.655 4 .013  
Private sector employee .124 .076 2.649 1 .104 1.132 
Self-employed .133 .080 2.779 1 .095 1.142 
Homemaker/ Unpaid Worker .156 .100 2.425 1 .119 1.168 
Retiree -.265 .147 3.253 1 .071 .767 
Attitude Towards Risk   28.982 2 .000  
Moderate Risk-Taker .104 .121 .740 1 .390 1.110 
Risk -Averse .367 .122 9.103 1 .003 1.443 
Health Risk Level .269 .065 17.217 1 .000 1.308 
 Income   537.201 3 .000  
1001-3000 1.206 .066 332.569 1 .000 3.340 
3001-5000 2.069 .103 406.366 1 .000 7.914 
Above 5000 2.211 .162 187.328 1 .000 9.129 
Education   135.631 3 .000  
Primary Education .525 .150 12.218 1 .000 1.691 
Secondary Education 1.026 .147 48.870 1 .000 2.790 
Tertiary Education 1.400 .156 80.969 1 .000 4.055 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Chi-square df Sig. 
 6.384 8 .604 
Model Summary Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
 .134 .216 
 
Base Category: Age 18-24, Male, Government employee, High Health Risk Level, Risk- 
Taker, No Formal Education, Salary 1000 and below 
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4.3.1 The Effect of Age on Ownership of Personal Health Insurance 
Age had significant effect on the ownership of personal health insurance. For ages 
25-64, the B coefficients for all age categories were significant and positive, 
indicating that age was associated with the odds of having personal health insurance. 
The results show that the odds of having personal health insurance increased steadily 
from ages 25 to 54 but reduced after the age of 54 until age 64. Subsequently the 
odds ratio became not significant after age 64. This suggested that compared to 
individuals aged 18-24, the likelihood of individuals aged 25 to 64 owning personal 
health insurance was higher.  
 
The Odds Ratio (OR) exhibited that individuals aged 25-34 were 1.446 times 
more likely than those aged 18-24 (the reference category) to own personal health 
insurance. In other words, individuals aged 25-34 were 44 per cent more likely to 
own health insurance compared to individuals aged 18-24. Similarly, individuals 
aged 35-44 were 1.611 times more likely to own personal health insurance or it was 
61 per cent more likely for them to own personal health insurance compared to 
individuals aged 18-24. The odds ratio increased further for individuals aged 45-54 
who were 1.650 times more likely to own personal health insurance. However, for 
individuals aged 55-64 years, the likelihood of ownership reduced slightly. The odds 
ratio of ownership of personal health insurance for this age group was 1.315 or 31 
per cent more likely compared to individuals in the 18 to 24 age group.  The odds 
ratio became not significant for individuals aged 65 and above. The difference in 
coefficients confirmed the nonlinear relationship of age on ownership of personal 
health insurance.  
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Although the profile indicated that the mean age of individuals who owned 
personal health insurance was lower than the mean age of uninsureds, controlling for 
other variables, the likelihood of having personal health insurance increased as age 
increased. As argued by Grossman (1972), older individuals tended to invest more in 
their health to ensure a healthy lifetime. The results therefore supported the 
hypothesis that older individuals are more likely to own personal health insurance. 
This is consistent with earlier studies by Cameron and Trivedi (1991), Hopkins and 
Kidd (1996), Barrett and Conlon (2003), King and Mossialos (2005), Abu-Bakar et 
al. (2012), and Kimani et al. (2014). 
 
Another possible explanation for older individuals having personal health 
insurance is the possibility that insured may have owned personal health insurance 
for a number of years. As reported by (Barret & Conlon, 2003), the entry into a 
health insurance plan differs by age and individual status, for example, the head of a 
family owns health insurance at age 45. While the data did not provide duration of 
ownership, having had insurance for a long time was one of the stated reasons for 
ownership of private health insurance (Buchmueller et al., 2013), and perhaps for the 
reason that buying health insurance at a younger age entitles individuals to 
comprehensive deals of cheaper premium and less concern with pre-existing 
conditions.  However, the findings did not show that younger individuals especially 
those aged 18-24 were more likely to subscribe to personal health insurance. The 
lower participation rate by younger individuals was similarly experienced in the UK 
as reported by Foubister, et al. (2006) and by Wallis (2004).  
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After the age of 65, the likelihood of owning personal health insurance became 
not significant. This may suggest that individuals 65 years and above may have been 
denied coverage due to health reasons or the price for coverage becomes prohibitive 
especially for new entrants. However, for individuals who entered a health insurance 
contract at an early age and enjoyed lower premium, health insurance premium could 
be adjusted higher on renewal for the reason that an insured  being moved to new age 
band or adjustment was done to reflect the previous year’s higher than expected 
expenditure across the insured pool. Coverage could also be withdrawn if the insured 
had exceeded the benefits limit. The need for healthcare for individuals aged 65 
years and more would then be fulfilled by the highly accessible public health 
institutions or alternatively by paying through out-of-pocket expenses for attendance 
at private healthcare providers. Therefore, only those who placed greater value for 
their insurance plan would stay with the plan irrespective of age (King & Mossialos, 
2005). 
 
The findings may also be viewed as the result of effective underwriting 
practice where insurers are able to enrol a balanced share of individuals of different 
age groups to ensure avoidance of the problem of adverse selection associated with 
risks from different ages.  
 
4.3.2  The Effect of Gender on Ownership of Personal Health Insurance 
The results of the regression saw that gender was a significant predictor of ownership 
of personal health insurance (Wald = 31.154, p=0.000). The results of the regression 
analysis showed that females were found to be 1.349 times more likely to own 
personal health insurance compared to males. The finding is consistent with the 
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hypothesis developed in this study that female individuals are more likely to own 
personal health insurance compared to male individuals. The result is also consistent 
with the findings of previous studies by Cameron and Trivedi (1991); Barrett and 
Conlon (2003); Abu-Bakar et al. (2005); Gius (2010); Abu-Bakar et al. (2012); 
Kiplagat et al. (2013); and Kimani et al. (2014) who found that women had higher 
propensity to purchase personal health insurance. As women are less willing to take 
risks compared to men (Dohmen, et al., 2005), a greater assurance of access and 
timely payment for healthcare services could be the motivation for females to own 
personal health insurance.  
 
Another possible explanation for the higher tendency for females to purchase 
health insurance could be to rely less on the head of the family especially when 
women have a higher life expectancy.  In some cultures including Asian cultures, the 
male head of the family makes the final decisions for the family, therefore limiting 
the role of females in making important decisions. A similar situation is found in 
female-headed households where more females are likely to own private health 
insurance (Kimani et al., 2014). While the role of the head of family in making 
decision on the ownership of health insurance is important, more females are now 
equally responsible for making decisions for the family and the situation where 
females rely entirely on the male head of the family may have changed. Over- 
reliance on the male head of the family can prove to put the family in a vulnerable 
situation especially when the head of family is faced with extreme economic changes 
such as termination of employment or severe reduction in income.  The other 
possible reason for females losing health insurance protection could be divorce. 
Kulkarni (2012) stated that females could go up to more than two years without 
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health insurance during the process of splitting of assets. Realising the possibility of 
losing health insurance coverage due to unfortunate reasons such as those stated 
above, perhaps more females have begun to make the decision to have their own 
personal health insurance. The ability and willingness to make decisions is consistent 
with Buchmueller et al. (2013) who suggested that the ability to make financial 
purchase decisions was important in health insurance purchases.  
 
With increased awareness of the cost of health treatment, women are more 
prepared to protect their financial independence. Despite the higher premium rates 
that women have to pay for personal health insurance in Malaysia, more women are 
expected to subscribe to personal health insurance. Women may value the expected 
premium as being lower than the expected loss, implying that the current 
underwriting practice with regard to gender is satisfactory.  
 
4.3.3  The Effect of Occupation on Ownership of Personal Health Insurance 
The results of the logistic regression saw that occupation was not a significant 
variable in the ownership of personal health insurance. All categories of occupation 
were not significant to predict the ownership of personal health insurance. The 
results did not support the findings of earlier studies including by Browne and 
Doerpinghaus (1993), Foubister et al. (2006), and Buchmueller, et al. (2013) who 
found certain occupational sectors were strong predictors to ownership of health 
insurance.  
 
Health insurance underwriters categorise certain occupations as riskier than 
others.  The higher exposure level to risk of an occupation increases the exposure to 
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illness and injury, thus leading to higher needs for health insurance. However, certain 
occupations, especially those involving hazardous jobs are excluded from cover. The 
higher needs for coverage for certain occupations is offset by the unavailability of 
insurance coverage, thus occupation becomes not significant.  
 
Another possible explanation is the fact that categorization used in this 
study i.e. the government, semi-government, and private sector may not reflect the 
actual risk involved in performing the tasks. Current underwriting practices in which 
applicants are asked to state the work nature or the exact duty performed may be 
more accurate. Such details are important in personal insurance as they provide 
assurance to insurers of minimum risk posed from the occupation of the individual 
insured. Table 2.2 in the previous section provides more detailed information 
required by insurers. Such data however was not available in this study. 
 
4.3.4  The Effect of Controlled Variables on Ownership of Personal Health 
Insurance 
 
Income  
The logistic regression results confirmed the influence of income on ownership of 
personal health insurance. Using individuals with a monthly income of RM1000 and 
below as the comparative category, individuals with income higher than RM1000 
were more likely to own personal health insurance. For example, individuals with 
monthly salary of between RM1001-RM3000 were three times more likely to own 
personal health insurance (OR=3.340) compared to individuals with monthly income 
of RM1000 and below. Similarly, for individuals earning between RM3001-
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RM5000, the OR = 7.914, and for individuals who earned more than RM5000 
monthly, the OR=9.129, suggesting that the higher the monthly income, the more 
likely the individual to own personal health insurance.  
 
The results proved that the personal health insurance market is income 
sensitive. The finding is consistent with Kefeli and Jones (2012) and Abu-Bakar et 
al. (2012). The result is as expected as individuals in the study did not own any 
employer-sponsored health insurance which typically is not the case for individuals 
in the higher income bracket. Wallis (2004) suggested that individuals with higher 
incomes were more likely to have both personal and corporate health insurance. This 
finding will have implication on overall healthcare services if the majority of the 
population are in the lower income bracket as this will create the possibility of an 
underinsured society. 
  
 
 
Education  
The influence of education has been discussed in earlier studies which showed that 
individuals with higher level of cognitive ability were more likely to own personal 
health insurance. Included in cognitive ability are language proficiency, mental 
health (level of distress), and education (Buchmueller et al., 2013).  The higher 
cognitive ability of the more educated individuals allow them to make better 
decisions in choosing among the various health insurance products and able to make 
the decision not only to purchase products with better coverage but also those that 
will lower healthcare expenditure (Fang et al., 2008).  
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The results of the regression showed that individuals having higher education 
were more likely to own personal health insurance compared to individuals with no 
formal education.  Individuals with primary level education were almost 70 per cent 
more likely to own personal health insurance. The likelihood increased to almost 
three times (2.790) and four times (4.055) for individuals with secondary and tertiary 
education respectively.  
 
The findings suggest that awareness and knowledge of health insurance and the 
ability to make decision such as on the necessity to possibly make small regular 
payments to avoid the risk of catastrophic medical expenditure motivated the 
ownership of personal health insurance. This is matched by insurers’ ability to 
introduce different regular premium products to attract individuals having different 
levels of education. Based on these findings, insurers have been able to select 
insureds of different levels of education by introducing simple-to-understand to 
complicated personal health insurance products.  
 
4.3.5  The Effect of Attitude towards Risk on Ownership of Personal Health 
Insurance 
The logistic regression results exhibited that risk-averse was the only category in the 
variable attitude towards risk that was found to be significant in predicting ownership 
of personal health insurance with OR of 1.443 times. This suggested that risk-averse 
individuals were 44 per cent more likely to own personal health insurance compared 
to risk-takers.  
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This finding supported the hypothesis and was consistent with Barsky, et al., 
(1997), Barret and Conlon (2003), and Buchmueller, et al., (2013) who found risk- 
averse individuals were more likely to purchase health insurance. 
 
The results can be attributed to the risk aversion of individuals where risk- 
averse individuals exhibit cautiousness and are more likely to own insurance. As 
suggested by Einav and Finkelstein (2011), the willingness to spend on insurance 
depends on the individual’s privately known probability of loss. By nature, risk-
averse individuals dislike risks or venturing into risky experience. Given the 
opportunity, they will secure certainty including in healthcare treatment. Personal 
health insurance serves as a transfer of losses mechanism that will undertake to 
protect individuals from financial risk due to illness. It will compensate for losses 
from illness and the cost of recovery. A risk-averse individual will be willing to bear 
and forgo losses in the form of premium to guarantee the avoidance of larger losses 
arising from risks.  
 
4.3.6  The Effect of Health Risk Level on Ownership of Personal Health 
Insurance 
The logistic regression using a two-level measurement of high (bad) and low (good) 
health risk level saw that health risk level had overall significant effect on the 
ownership of personal health insurance (Wald = 17.217, p=.000). The results saw 
that low health risk level (good health status) had significant and positive effect on 
ownership of personal health insurance with OR of 1.308 times, suggesting that 
individuals with good health were 30 per cent more likely to own personal health 
insurance compared to individuals with bad health risk level.  
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A decline in health status will affect negatively the ability to earn income and 
enjoy life.  To ensure their health status will not be threatened, individuals will be 
willing to spend on protecting the health stock from depreciating. This risk aversion 
behaviour has been the reason why personal health insurance has the greatest appeal 
to healthy individuals.  
 
Many people recognise that less healthy individuals may be denied coverage or 
have to pay higher premium. Insurers will decline poor health status or exclude all 
pre-existing conditions from cover as they will expose insurers to greater risk of high 
potential claim. This awareness motivates individuals to enrol in a health insurance 
plan while they are healthy. The capability of insurers to cater for the needs of 
different segments of individual markets including the healthy, and the price- 
sensitive could have encouraged higher enrolment. This includes the ability to offer 
products that differ in scope of cover and pricing from a narrow range of benefits 
with lower premium to the more expensive with a comprehensive range of benefits 
that satisfy the different profiles of healthy individuals.  
 
In issuing a health insurance policy, underwriters need to decide on who is 
qualified based on standard selection guidelines. In their practice, underwriters will 
need information to make up a picture of the client’s current health risk level. 
Current medical condition and personal medical history are among the factors that 
determine eligibility for personal health insurance.  
 
The findings may also be viewed as the result of effective underwriting 
practice where the current manner of selection of insureds is able to identify low 
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health risk and avoid higher than average health risk factors. It may also be viewed 
as asymmetric information that could shield insurers from accurate identification of 
risk factors of insureds is not present. Requiring potential insureds to declare their 
medical history including getting confirmation from medical doctors will reduce the 
chances of inaccurate information provided to insurers.  However, such practice may 
be argued as strict underwriting approach to fail less healthy individuals from 
enrolling into a health insurance plan.  
 
The results support the hypothesis that individuals who have good health status 
are more likely to have personal health insurance. They were consistent with Gius 
(2010), and Barret and Conlon (2003) who found risk-averse individuals were more 
likely to purchase health insurance and supported the finding of Buchmueller, et al., 
(2013) who found the majority of respondents in their study that owned health 
insurance had better health status. The findings did not support Browne (1992), 
Kirigia, et al. (2005), and Musich et al. (2003) who reported that those having bad 
health status were more likely in need of health insurance to cover for medical 
expenses. Similarly, they did not support Sanhueza and Ruiz-Tagle (2002) who 
suggested the presence of moral hazard in their study. 
 
 
4.4  Advantageous Selection in the Personal Health Insurance Market 
The regression analysis of Model 1 presented two key findings.  First, the result from 
the regression saw that individuals with low health risk level were more likely to 
own personal health insurance. Insurance underwriters will categorise these 
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exceptionally good risk individuals under the preferred risk category. Such preferred 
category of insureds is desirous to insurers as it would reduce the likelihood of 
excessive claims. Second, the regression analysis correspondingly confirmed that 
risk-averse individuals were more likely to own personal health insurance.  
  
To test on the presence of advantageous selection, further analysis on the 
association between health risk level and attitude towards risk was required.  Then, 
logistic regression for individuals with low health risk level was conducted. 
Understanding the association between attitude towards risk and health risk level on 
ownership of personal health insurance is essential in coming to the conclusion of 
whether the profile of the respondents suggested the presence of advantageous 
selection.  
 
4.4.1  Association between Health Risk Level and Attitude towards Risks  
The relationship between health risk levels and attitude towards risks was explored to 
understand how both variables were associated. A cross tabulation of health risk 
levels and risk aversion involving all cases was administered. 
 
The results as shown in Table 4.14 indicated that there was statistically 
significant association between risk levels (riskiness) and risk aversion with the 
result of Chi-square value = 18,766, p = .000. The results showed that highly risk-
averse individuals were found to be more likely to be of low health risk as indicated 
by the actual count of 5492 as compared to the expected count of 5392.4. This result 
was consistent with Fang, et al. (2008), who found negative correlation between 
health risk and risk aversion, suggesting the presence of advantageous selection. 
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Table 4.14 
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Health Risk Level and Attitude towards Risk of 
Respondents 
 
Cross Tabulation   
Attitude Towards Risk 
Health Risk Level  Total 
High (Bad 
Health) 
Low (Good 
Health) 
   
Risk-Taker 
Count 160 526 686 
Expected Count 143.2 542.8 686.0 
Moderate Risk-Taker 
Count 1246 4326 5572 
Expected Count 1163.2 4408.8 5572.0 
Risk-Averse Count 1323 5492 6815 
Expected Count 1422.6 5392.4 6815.0 
 Count 3432 9641 13073 
Total Expected Count 3432.0 9641.0 13073.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.766 2 .000  
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2  Association between Attitude towards Risks and Health Insurance 
Ownership among Low-Risk Individuals 
 
Further analysis was conducted focusing on low-risk individuals only. In the test, 
data on health risk status was split into low health risk level and high health risk 
level. A cross tabulation of attitude towards risk and ownership of personal health 
insurance involving 10,344 data of individuals with low health risk level (good 
health) was analysed and Chi-square test was administered. The results are shown in 
Table 4.15. 
 
 
146 
 
Table 4.15  
Cross Tabulation and Chi-Square of Personal Health Insurance Policyholders and 
Non-Policyholders by Attitude towards Risk of Respondents with Low Health Risk 
(Good Health Status) 
 
Cross Tabulation   
Attitude Towards Risk 
Own Personal  Health 
Insurance N=10344 (Low 
Health Risk) 
Total 
No Yes 
   
Risk-Taker 
Count 435 91 526 
Expected Count 420.9 105.1 526.0 
Moderate Risk-Taker 
Count 3564 762 4326 
Expected Count 3462.0 864.0 4326.0 
Risk-Averse Count 4279 1213 5492 
Expected Count 4395.1 1096.9 5492.0 
 Count 8278 2066 10344 
Total Expected Count 8278.0 2066.0 10344.0 
Pearson Chi-Square     
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.757 2 .000  
 
The results saw that for those who were risk-averse, 22 per cent owned 
personal health insurance compared to 78 per cent who did not.  The result of Chi-
square value = 32.757, p = .000 suggested that there was statistically significant 
association between risk aversion and ownership of personal health insurance for 
individuals having low health risk level. The actual count of risk-averse of 1213 was 
higher than the expected count of 1096.9, suggesting that risk-averse individuals with 
low health risk level were more likely to own personal health insurance. Therefore, 
the study supports the hypothesis that individuals with low health risk level and are 
highly risk-averse are more likely to own personal health insurance.  
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4.4.3  Logistic Regression – Model 2  
 
Table 4.16 presents the logistic regression model for low-risk individuals only.  
 
Table 4.16 
Logistic Regression Result- Model 2 for Low Health Risk Level  
 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Gender       
Female .319 .064 24.669 1 .000 1.376 
Age   33.212 5 .000  
25-34 .330 .103 10.224 1 .001 1.391 
35-44 .474 .105 20.211 1 .000 1.606 
45-54 .494 .109 20.606 1 .000 1.639 
55-64 .294 .128 5.234 1 .022 1.342 
65 and above -.055 .191 .082 1 .774 .947 
Occupation   11.177 4 .025  
Private sector employee .076 .084 .825 1 .364 1.079 
Self -employed .097 .087 1.227 1 .268 1.102 
Homemaker/ Unpaid Worker .206 .110 3.531 1 .060 1.229 
Retiree -.276 .162 2.916 1 .088 .759 
Attitude Towards Risk   23.311 2 .000  
Moderate Risk-Taker .074 .133 .310 1 .577 1.077 
Risk-Averse .337 .134 6.360 1 .012 1.401 
 Income   455.519 3 .000  
1001-3000 1.250 .073 294.019 1 .000 3.490 
3001-5000 2.050 .112 333.681 1 .000 7.767 
Above 5000 2.285 .180 161.369 1 .000 9.828 
Education   105.421 3 .000  
Primary Education .532 .164 10.603 1 .001 1.703 
Secondary Education .998 .160 39.117 1 .000 2.713 
Tertiary Education 1.363 .169 64.886 1 .000 3.907 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Chi-square df Sig. 
 9.186 8 .327 
Model Summary Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
 .131 .208 
 
Base Category: Age 18-24, Male, Government Employee, Risk-Taker, No Formal Education, 
Salary 1000 and below 
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The regression model had good fit to the data (Chi-Square = 9.186, df=8, 
p=0.327). Cox & Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square were 13.1 per cent 
and 20.8 per cent respectively. The results show that attitude towards risk had overall 
significant relationship with ownership of personal health insurance. The Odds Ratio 
for risk-averse was 1.401, which suggested that risk-averse individuals who were in 
low health risk level were 1.401 times or 40 per cent more likely to own personal 
health insurance compared to risk-takers who were low in health risk.  
 
The regression results of Model 2 re-confirmed the findings from Model 1 that 
individuals who were risk-averse were more likely to own personal health insurance. 
Taken together, the results of Model 1 and Model 2, and the relationship between 
health risk level and risk attitude confirmed empirically the presence of advantageous 
selection. Hemenway (1992) suggested the presence of propitious selection occurred 
when responses to questions on smoking, alcohol, medical check-up, and food 
questions were associated with insurance purchase in the direction that suggested that 
risk-avoiders would tend to buy insurance.   
 
This empirical evidence supports the theory of propitious selection and the 
findings confirm that the study found the evidence of propitious or advantageous 
selection in the Malaysian personal health insurance market. The findings also 
suggest that asymmetric information may not be present. Asymmetric information 
has been associated with the issue of inefficient selection of insureds, which would 
affect adversely the sustainability of health insurers. The non-evidence of the 
presence of adverse selection suggests that the personal health insurance market in 
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Malaysia has been able to avert the problem of adverse selection perhaps through 
initiatives undertaken by insurers. 
 
A possible explanation for the result is effective risk management on the part 
of insurers in designing and pricing health insurance products to ensure health 
insurance continues to be affordable and accessible. Insurers have strong motivation 
to enrol healthy individuals because of the financial commitment to pay for the 
health services covered under the health insurance policy. The ability to enrol healthy 
and risk-averse individuals suggests that the risk management strategy used by 
insurers to control the levels of risk have been effective. Insurers could avoid high-
risk individuals from enrolling into a plan through various measures including by 
increasing premium, excluding pre-existing medical conditions in the cover or by 
introducing greater cost sharing. These risk management initiatives could avoid 
insurers from making errors due to difficulty in pricing high-risk factors (Foubister, 
et al., 2006).  
 
Another possible explanation for the result is that the pricing structure has 
appealed to individuals with different health risk and risk aversion levels. Typically, 
people will be willing to pay for health insurance cover if the price is viewed as fair, 
i.e. lower than the losses from catastrophic illness.  However, if the price goes 
beyond the fair level, only the most risk-averse will enrol into the plan (Barsky, et 
al., 1997).  
 
Even though the initiatives taken by insurers may have severely limited the 
number of insureds and limited the choices of services available, insurers have 
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nevertheless been able to attract consumers who require the services provided by 
private healthcare providers. The initiatives taken have been able to counter the 
effect of adverse selection that has been faced by insurers in different markets as 
stated in the literature. 
 
The results suggests that insurers have not only been able to effectively select 
insureds that are advantageous but also to reduce the pressure of preserving 
financially viable operations through highly effective selection mechanism.  
 
 
 
4.5  Chapter Conclusion 
Thorough analyses were conducted on 13,073 cases of individuals who owned and 
did not own personal health insurance to address all the research objectives that were 
proposed in Chapter 1. The first section of this chapter profiled the policyholders and 
non-policyholders to fulfil the first objective of the study. The descriptions were 
compared and the results of the profiling exhibited that the two groups were 
significantly different in terms of socio-demographic and underwriting factors of age, 
gender, occupation, income, education and race.  The results also showed that 
policyholders and non-policyholders were significantly different in terms of health 
status and their attitude towards risk. Specifically, compared with individuals who 
did not own personal health insurance, individuals who owned personal health 
insurance were older, employed (government and private sector), self-employed, had 
low health risk level, and were risk-averse. By race, income and education, 
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individuals who owned personal health insurance were mainly Chinese and Indians, 
with monthly income above RM1000, and with formal education respectively.  
 
Chi-square tests on the variables were conducted and the results showed that 
there was statistically significant association between each of the variables (age, 
occupation, health risk level, attitude towards risk) and ownership of personal health 
insurance. Similarly, there was statistically significant association between each of 
the controlled variables (race, income, and education) and ownership of personal 
health insurance. However, gender was found not to be significantly associated with 
ownership of personal health insurance. Significant associations were confirmed 
between risk aversion and health risk level, and between risk aversion and ownership 
of personal health insurance for low health risk individuals.  
 
Subsequently, a regression model was generated on the variables in the 
equation, namely gender, age, occupation, health risk level, attitudes towards risk, 
income, and education. The regression was able to predict the factors that determined 
significantly the ownership of personal health insurance. The results showed that all 
variables were significant predictors of ownership of personal health insurance with 
the exception of variable occupation. Two key variables that were critical for 
subsequent analysis, health risk level and attitude towards risk, had significant and 
positive coefficient with ownership of personal health insurance. This meant that the 
second research objectives of determining the association between a) underwriting 
factors of age, gender, occupation with ownership of personal health insurance b) 
health risk level with personal health insurance ownership, and c) attitude towards 
risk with personal health insurance ownership had been effectively accomplished.  
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Advantageous selection, the key theme in this study, was proven to be present 
in the Malaysian personal health insurance market. This was demonstrated through 
the significant result of the regression which was interpreted as low health risk level 
being more likely to own personal health insurance and risk-averse individuals being 
more likely to own personal health insurance. Additional regressions analyses to 
determine if there was significant association between high-risk aversion and low 
health risk level were administered for individuals in the low level of health risk. The 
results saw that risk-averse individuals who were in low health risk level were more 
likely to own personal health insurance.  
 
The results of the regressions were consistent with the theory of advantageous 
selection that proposes the negative correlation between attitude towards risk and the 
health risk exposure and that cautious individuals would put efforts to avoid loss 
including by buying insurance. Therefore, the overall results could be interpreted as 
empirical evidence that low health risk level and high risk aversion both predict the 
ownership health insurance. This result fulfilled the third objective of the study in 
investigating the existence of advantageous selection in the personal health insurance 
market and the empirical investigation proved the presence of advantageous 
selection.  
 
The findings in this chapter enhance the current knowledge and understanding 
of risk selection in the personal health insurance market in Malaysia. Additional 
discussion on the policy implications and recommendations to stakeholders and 
researchers are presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
5.1  Introduction    
This chapter summarizes and concludes the principal findings of the study. 
Recommendations for stakeholders and future researches are also presented. The 
study contributes significantly to the academic field in the form of new knowledge of 
risk selection and ownership of personal health insurance.  In addition, it provides 
further understanding of current health insurance market practices, particularly 
regarding underwriting factors and the presence of advantageous selection. The study 
adds to the current evidence of advantageous selection (that is present in other 
healthcare markets) in the Malaysian healthcare market which features voluntary 
private health insurance and easily accessible public healthcare.  
  
5.2  Conclusions 
This study investigated the factors that affect the decision to purchase personal health 
insurance with a particular focus on health insurance underwriting factors. In a 
market where information failures exist, accurate risk assessment of potential 
insureds is technically difficult and costly to be administered. Insurance companies 
use underwriting criteria to select and classify the insured. Criteria such as health risk 
level, gender and age have been widely used in health insurance risk selection as 
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these factors have been found to influence healthcare utilizations. In this regard, this 
study analysed the selected socio-demographics factors of adult individuals to 
present the current profiles of health insurance policyholders and non-policyholders. 
In addition, these factors, in particular underwriting factors, were further investigated 
to determine their influence on health insurance ownership. The health insurance 
market is traditionally theorized to attract higher-risk individuals, a situation 
reflecting adverse selection. Higher-risk individuals are assumed to be more likely to 
purchase health insurance in anticipation of higher likelihood of needing medical 
care. However, a limited number of researchers have found that evidence of adverse 
selection is minimal or non-existent, leading to the proposition of advantageous 
selection. The uniqueness of the Malaysian health insurance market and the limited 
availability of market information on personal health insurance may provide new 
evidence of the presence of advantageous selection. Thus, this study discussed in 
depth the issue of risk selection in the health insurance market and investigated the 
presence of advantageous selection.  
 
The theoretical framework of this study was fundamentally based on the 
Theory of Asymmetric Information and the Theory of Propitious Selection.  Both 
theories underline the importance of information balance between insurers and 
insureds and the resulting outcomes of risk selection of either advantage or otherwise 
to the market.  The study examined if the pattern of ownership behaviour of personal 
health insurance in Malaysia can be explained by the proposition of these theories. 
Similarly, the hypotheses were developed in respect of the theories and supported by 
findings from previous literatures.  
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In the data analysis, this study used both bivariate and multivariate analysis. 
Bivariate analysis using Chi-square tests was conducted to profile the adult 
individuals according to selected socio-demographic variables in relation to health 
insurance ownership. Based on the descriptive analysis, a measure of health risk 
level and risk preference was introduced. One novelty was the use of physical 
activities in the measurement of risk preference. Individuals are considered risk-
averse if they have taken sufficient care to avoid potential losses. In this study, 
individuals who were physically active and were non-smokers were considered risk-
averse individuals.  
 
The logistic regression was employed to find the influence of the underwriting 
factors on the ownership of personal health insurance. As the main goal of this study 
is to investigate the presence of advantageous selection, further exploration on the 
interaction of health risk level, risk preference and health insurance ownership was 
conducted by analysing adult individuals with low risk level only.  
 
5.2.1 Profile of Insureds and Uninsureds 
This study has identified that health insurance owners are more likely to be younger, 
work in either the government or the private sector or be self-employed, are in good 
health, are non-smokers and physically active. Insureds are more likely to have at 
least secondary education and earn above RM1000 a month. In terms of risk 
preference, insureds tend to be risk-averse individuals. 
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It is interesting to note that there is no significant difference between insureds 
and uninsureds in terms of gender and admission to hospital. Table 5.1 summarises 
the profile of insureds and the uninsureds.   
 
Table 5.1 
Profiles of insureds and uninsureds  
 
Variables Insureds Uninsureds 
Gender No difference 
Age Younger, 25-54 18-24, Older, above 54 
Income Above RM1000 Below RM1000 
Education Secondary, Tertiary No formal education, primary 
Occupation Employees of government and 
private sectors, self-employed 
Homemakers/ Unpaid workers, 
retirees 
Warded No difference 
SAHS Good Bad 
Health Risk Level Low High 
Smoking No Yes 
Physical Activity Active  Inactive  
Attitude towards risk Risk -averse  Risk-takers, Moderate risk-
takers 
 
5.2.2 Factors that Influence Ownership of Health Insurance 
The logistic regression analysis reveals that the underwriting factors that influence 
health insurance ownership are age, gender and health risk level. Occupation is found 
to be not statistically significant in influencing health insurance ownership. In terms 
of risk preference, insureds are more likely to be risk-averse. Table 5.2 summarizes 
the findings in comparison with the hypotheses. 
 
157 
 
Table 5.2  
Summary of findings in comparison with the hypotheses 
 
Independent Variables Hypotheses 
 
Findings 
   
Gender  Female + Female + 
Age  Older + Older + 
Occupation  + Not significant 
Attitude towards risk Risk-Averse + Risk-Averse + 
Health risk level  Low  + Low  + 
 
 
This study hypothesized that older individuals are more likely to own personal 
health insurance. This study finds that individuals aged 25 to 54 are more likely to 
own personal health insurance compared to those aged 18-24. After the age of 65, the 
likelihood of owning health insurance becomes not significant. An implication of the 
result is that insurers will not be able to rely on the age cohort of 18-24 as preferred 
customers. This youngest age group is most attractive to insurers as young people are 
generally healthier and use less medical care. Their enrolment in a health insurance 
plan will help to moderate the higher medical cost brought about by the older and 
higher health risk individuals. Leaving this age group out of the insurance pool will 
potentially cause inefficiency and reduce risk-sharing ability from the mix of 
insureds. Ultimately it might result in health insurance death spiral (Cutler & 
Zeckhauser, 1998) as discussed in the earlier chapters.  
 
In terms of gender, this study hypothesised that females are more likely to own 
health insurance. In the logistic regression, female individuals are found to be more 
likely to own personal health insurance compared to male individuals. For reasons 
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mentioned in the previous chapter, the willingness and ability of female individuals 
to make decisions to own personal health insurance have changed the market 
structure of the protection industry. This change in structure is seen when comparing 
the results of this study with an earlier study by Abu-Bakar et.al (2016) using NHMS 
III survey data collected in 2006 that found that female individuals were less likely to 
own health insurance. It can thus be concluded that there has been a gender shift in 
the predictors of personal health insurance ownership within a span of five years.  
 
This study hypothesized that occupation influences health insurance ownership 
as occupation is used as an underwriting criteria. However, the logistic regression 
found that occupation is not a significant predictor of ownership of personal health 
insurance. As discussed in the previous chapter, the categorization of occupation 
used in this study may not reflect the risk involved. Besides, certain occupations, 
especially those that involved in hazardous activities are excluded from cover. The 
higher needs for coverage for certain occupations is offset by the unavailability of 
insurance coverage, thus occupation does not seem to affect health insurance 
ownership.  
 
It was hypothesized that individuals who are risk-averse are more likely to own 
health insurance. The regression results showed that risk aversion is significantly and 
positively able to predict ownership of personal health insurance. These findings are 
consistent with and support the theory that risk-averse individuals are more likely to 
own health insurance. The result recognises the role of risk aversion in individuals 
that results in individuals exhibiting cautiousness including buying insurance. 
Cautious individuals view having personal health insurance as a technique of 
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transferring the health risk of paying medical expenses to an insurance company, 
thus ensuring access to healthcare when needed. According to DeMeza and Webb 
(2001) individuals who are highly risk-averse are more cautious and it is important 
for them to buy insurance to prevent potential loss. 
 
Despite the common expectation that high health risk individuals are more 
likely to own health insurance in anticipation of higher healthcare utilization, this 
study hypothesized that low-health risk individuals are more likely to own health 
insurance, following Buchmueller (2013). The results showed that individuals in the 
low level of health risk are more likely to be insured. This finding suggests that 
adverse selection is not observed. The non-presence of adverse selection offers 
overwhelming conclusion that underwriting practices in the industry have been 
effective in ensuring that individuals with higher risk do not subscribe to private 
health insurance. Perhaps the results also suggest that the less healthy individuals fail 
to enrol into a plan due to the rigorous underwriting practice adopted. Such a 
conclusion may send a signal to policymakers that the industry may be neglecting the 
less healthy individuals.   
 
The risk behaviour of individuals is the outcome of differing underlying risk 
attitudes.  In health insurance, certain behaviours are considered risky, resulting in 
the imposition of higher premium or even rejection of health insurance application. 
Risky behaviours such as smoking, alcohol consumption, being inactive, failure to 
use seatbelt, or participation in hazardous occupation, sports or past-time activities, 
which increased the likelihood of utilisation of healthcare services are not easily 
measured. To measure such behaviours, researchers used factors that contribute to 
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uncertainty and the potential for loss.  An individual is considered risk-averse if he or 
she has taken sufficient care to avoid potential loss. Two factors used in this study to 
determine individual attitudes towards risk were smoking behaviour and being 
physically active.  
 
Unfortunately, insurers have no way of differentiating individuals’ attitudes 
towards risk except for common risk behaviour such as smoking. Positive risk 
behaviours such as being physically active or involvement in diet plans or other 
private information that is negatively correlated with risk (Fang, et al., 2008) were 
not taken into consideration.  
 
5.2.3 Advantageous Selection in Malaysian Health Insurance Market 
The major contribution expected of this study is the evidence of advantageous 
selection in the Malaysian personal health insurance market. Hemenway (1990, 
1992) proposed that risk aversion was positively correlated with the purchase of 
insurance and taking efforts in reducing risk of loss. The more recent view by Fang 
et al. (2008) proposed that advantageous selection was when risk aversion was 
positively correlated with insurance coverage and at the same time negatively 
correlated with health risk. Similarly, Einav and Finkelstein (2011), Olivella and 
Vera-Hernandez (2013), Buchmueller et al. (2013) referred to advantageous selection 
as negative correlation between riskiness and risk aversion for individuals who 
purchase insurance. 
 
It is interesting to note that in this study, health risk level is found to be 
negatively correlated with risk preference. In other words, individuals who are of low 
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health risk are more likely to own health insurance. Another important finding was 
that among low-risk individuals, risk preference is found to be positively correlated 
with health insurance ownership.  
 
In a nutshell, the results of the analysis confirm that the personal health 
insurance market in Malaysia features propitious or advantageous selection. The 
findings also suggest that asymmetric information in the market may not be present. 
Asymmetric information has been associated with inefficient selection due to 
unequal information that insurers and insureds have that causes adverse selection that 
potentially affects the sustainability of health insurers.  
 
These results are in accord with the recent studies in other markets by 
Buchmueller et al. (2013) and Olivella & Vera-Hernandez (2013) and earlier studies 
by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Fang et al. (2008), indicating that 
advantageous selection is present.  
 
This study was undertaken to offer an answer to the very little-known 
knowledge of the relationship between individual risk preference and riskiness and 
health insurance ownership. Based on the available literature, the direction of 
relationship may pose a problem that affects the sustainability of insurers. While 
insurers have the responsibility of attaining public policy objectives of promoting 
affordable coverage, they need to remain financially sustainable in the domain of a 
competitive environment and cost escalation. Adverse selection can potentially pose 
a significant barrier to sustainability. Therefore, prudent risk selection is the only 
means to provide a balance in absorbing risk and pricing of risk protection. The 
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understanding of individual characteristics and behaviours and how each of them 
relates to the need for health insurance may improve the current manner of risk 
selection. It is expected that the findings of this study can be used as benchmark for 
insurers to evaluate their performance in attracting healthy insureds and repel sick 
insureds (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998). Therefore, insurers will find it advantageous 
if they are able to select individuals who have both low health risk level (good health 
status) and are high in risk aversion.  
 
Meanwhile, the challenge of the industry is to maintain this advantageous pool 
of insureds. The availability of public and private sector integration in the delivery 
aspect of the healthcare system allows for the option of not having personal health 
insurance. To be able to attract the general public, private sector healthcare in 
Malaysia may have surpassed the aspects of the public system that are of special 
importance in the success of private health insurance. Foubister, et al. (2006) 
identified these aspects as “gaps in coverage” - gaps in terms of services, costs, 
people and expectations - as areas to develop for a strong voluntary health insurance 
market in the UK. The continuous improvement being planned, especially in the 
service delivery aspects of the public healthcare system will have impact on the 
preservation of the personal health insurance pool. With improved services, 
individuals with low health risk level and high in aversion may opt for public 
healthcare services rather than the private providers. All things considered, 
ultimately, fair pricing will prevail as the defining factor for the choice of personal 
health insurance. 
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5.3 Recommendations 
The findings from this study benefit policymakers and insurance industry players, as 
well as provide valuable insight for future research. 
 
5.3.1 Benefits to Policymakers and Insurance Industry Players  
The findings of the study which present a number of factors that are significant 
determinants of personal health insurance ownership have important policy and 
industry implications.  
 
With regard to the profile of the insureds, it can be seen that insurers have 
made effective selection with the participation of younger and healthier individuals 
in the ownership of personal health insurance. It dismisses the idea that the 
Malaysian health insurance market is characterised by adverse selection. This is 
further supported when predicting for potential insureds where individuals with low 
health risk status and who are risk-avoiders are more likely to own health insurance.   
 
A number of conclusions benefitting policymakers and industry players can be 
drawn from the study. Most importantly, the findings suggest that insurers achieve 
the preferred or favourable selection position when low health risk individuals make 
up a larger share of insureds in the personal health insurance market. This favourable 
selection to insurers can be only achieved either by chance of by design. 
Achievement by design includes deterring enrolment of people requiring healthcare 
by imposing cost-sharing structures or the inclusion of pre-existing condition clause. 
However, other initiatives such as offering benefits that appeal to healthy people are 
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not purposively driven. The findings prove that initiatives of insurers in the selection 
of insureds have been effective  
 
The findings conclude that risk-avoiders or those who do not engage in risky 
behaviour are more likely to enrol in a personal health insurance plan. For insurers, 
having such candidates as insureds will be desirous and advantageous as they would 
not be likely to incur high medical expenses. The ability to attract risk-averse 
individuals will ultimately improve the financial position of insurers. Unfortunately, 
insurers have no way of knowing whether potential insureds have engaged in healthy 
and active lifestyles and consequently risk aversion is not translated into any 
enrolment benefits, which potentially will risk insurers losing potentially preferred 
candidates for insurance. It might be useful for insurers to include positive lifestyle 
activities that are of preference to insurers in the proposal form.  
 
The continuous challenge facing the industry is to retain low-risk individuals 
considered favourable to the industry. Low-risk individuals look for health insurance 
plans that are seen to be actuarially fair where the premiums paid are equal to the 
value of the compensation expected to be received in relation to their risk level. 
Foubister et al. (2006) defines actuarial fairness as “a principle of justice according 
to which the price charged should correspond to the level of risk the insured person 
brings to the insurance pool”. Regulators and authorities responsible for designing 
policies to increase the proportion of the population having health insurance must 
look for better strategies in attracting low-risk individuals including young 
individuals aged 18-24. “Bare-bones policies” that offer limited benefits and minimal 
coverage in exchange for less expensive premium could be introduced. This would 
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require insurers to have a special classification for lower than average risk 
individuals to be offered such insurance. The initiatives should be tied together with 
regulation to ensure private healthcare providers are willing to provide the services 
with minimum insurance. This would encourage not only  low-risk individuals to 
enrol in a personal health insurance plan, but will also to motivate existing insureds 
to become more risk-avoiding by leaving risky behaviour.  
 
Policymakers may view the insurance market that features advantageous 
selection as a signal that people who need insurance the most are not insured. In the 
more advanced countries such as in the United States, uninsureds pose serious social 
problems especially when they require medical care. ObamaCare or the Patient 
Protection Affordable Care Act that started in 2010 had the goal of improving the 
quality, access, and affordability of healthcare and health insurance. The law requires 
people who can afford it to buy insurance or pay a per-month fee while those who 
cannot afford be given subsidy. At the same time, larger employers are required to 
insure their employees. In Malaysia, the public health system serves as safety net for 
people without access to or cannot afford treatment at private health- care facilities. 
Nevertheless, some form of systematic social healthcare financing is needed to 
enable access to private healthcare. National Health Insurance (NHI) is envisaged to 
undertake this role. The need is for the government to hasten the move towards 
implementing NHI not only to complement the existing healthcare systems, but also 
to address the affordability issue faced by individuals, especially those aged 18-24 
and those aged above 54 years.   
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Furthermore, in comparing the profile of insureds by occupational categories, 
government employees comprise largest proportion of subscribers to personal health 
insurance. With greater interest among government employees for medical services 
provided by the private sector, NHI could be part of the public sector employment 
benefits to attract better talents into the public sector. NHI when introduced can be 
extended to homemakers/ unpaid workers, and retirees who are proportionally among 
the lowest who subscribe to personal health insurance plans provided by the private 
sector. 
 
In a market characterised by advantageous selection, lower risk individuals will 
benefit from the lower premium. When the pool is disproportionately monopolised 
by lower premium paying insureds, a high claim from a member may disrupt the 
pool which may result in inevitably higher premium for the pool members. The 
ability to effectively manage the risk pool and make adjustment or match 
reimbursement with a beneficiary’s expected cost is critical especially when insurers 
have a number of competing products. Continuous adjustment of premium to match 
the loss ratio from claims will be a concern to policymakers.  
 
Instead of continuously adjusting premium, post-selection benefits may be 
achieved if insurers are able to adopt initiatives that will improve insureds’ health 
risk level to the advantage of insurers. In the US where healthcare costs associated 
with risky behaviour of inactivity continue to increase, insurers adopt wellness 
programmes in response to the problem. An insurance provider, Blue Care Network 
(BCN) of Michigan, launched such a programme for its subscribers targeting 
smokers and those with BMI greater than 30. Insureds are required to participate in 
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the insurer’s weight-management programme until the BMI falls to below 30 and 
smokers have to attend a tobacco cessation programme until it is proven through 
monitoring through urine or blood tests that they no longer use tobacco. Those 
insureds who reach this enhanced level of wellness benefit through reduced 
deductibles and co-payments (Blue Care Network of Michigan, 2017). 
 
In Malaysia, AIA started providing incentives to those who participate in a 
healthy lifestyle. In their Vitality programme, the incentives are based on the points 
collected from participation in physical activities such as running and workouts or 
participation in organised sports events, attending nutrition assessment and 
consultations, as well as participating in health checks. Points are tracked and 
updated though a fitness device linked to a mobile application or entered manually 
into the application. The rewards from the points range from discounts for services 
and products to an additional insurance protection of up to 45 per cent (AIA, 2016).  
 
The initiatives by BCN in the United States and AIA in Malaysia should be 
encouraged and expanded for greater participation by all players in Malaysia with 
incentives to include reduced premium payments. The insurance associations, 
together with the Ministry of Health and Bank Negara Malaysia can take the leading 
role to improve the overall health status of Malaysian insureds through such 
programmes which can eventually reduce healthcare expenditure, health insurance 
premiums and improve the financial health of insurers.  
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5.3.2 Thesis Limitation  
 
The study used NHMS 2011 data that was already collected and archived. The 
advantage of using secondary data is the savings in the collection time and costs. The 
large volume of data allows for generating hypotheses and better statistical analysis. 
However, since the survey was not designed specifically for this study objectives, 
there was a limit to the usage of the data. For example, the data on health insurance 
ownership did not specify the ownership of either takaful or conventional insurance 
even though takaful is increasingly becoming more popular in the Malaysian market.  
In addition, the available data on employment is categorized by sector of 
employment such as private, government and self-employed. This is while the 
ownership of personal health insurance is often associated with occupational status or 
hierarchy of employment as suggested by King & Mossialos (2005) and Foubister et 
al. (2006). Without such employment data, the association between ownership of 
personal health insurance and occupational status may not be able to be established. 
Another possible limitation of the study involves cases having more than one health 
insurance policy. Individuals may be covered by both personal and employer-
sponsored health insurance plans.  Such cases were excluded from the study for fear 
of possible wrong inference in the responses. This resulted in the information 
regarding the decision to own personal health insurance among cases with dual cover 
not being taken into consideration for analysis. Even though it may not impact the 
overall findings due to the availability of large data, the results may be otherwise for 
small dataset.  These are limitations of the current study and areas for further 
investigation. 
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5.3.3 Future Research 
 
Theoretically, advantageous selection occurs when individuals who buy health 
insurance have their health risk status negatively correlated with risk aversion. The 
extreme ends of both risk factors may not necessarily be observed as the level of 
riskiness can fall within a spectrum from low to high. The study explored the use of 
three levels of risk aversion (high, moderate, low) which complicated the making of 
decision on absolute direction of the equation. While it is conclusive that 
advantageous selection exists in the Malaysian health insurance sector, it 
nevertheless could raise the question of whether insurers may find it advantageous to 
select: 1) individuals who have low health risk and are moderate risk-takers, 2) 
individuals who are high health risk but high in risk aversion, and 3) individuals with 
low health risk and high risk taking (low risk aversion). Exploring the effects of 
selection based on the different health risk and risk aversion levels is a topic for 
future research.  
 
This study used SAHS as the measure for health risk status. Using one 
variable is not the only manner to measure health risk status. Fang, et al. (2008) 
suggested that any private information could function as a source of advantageous 
selection if it could provide evidence of the opposing direction of health risk and risk 
aversion. Future research may consider using other measures of health risk status 
including the use of the combination of 36 illnesses that make the standard health 
insurance cover. However, data on the 36 illnesses was not available for the study. 
 
In this study, occupation has not been found to be a significant predictor of 
ownership of personal health insurance. This is in contrast to many other studies. 
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Perhaps the usage of sectorial occupation may not result in better prediction of 
ownership of health insurance. Future studies should consider occupational status or 
hierarchy as in King & Mossialos (2005) and Foubister et al. (2006) to replace 
sectorial category. 
 
The survival of health insurers depends on enrolling younger individuals into 
their health plans. The revenue from young and healthier individuals who seldom 
visit a doctor is supposed to offset the cost of medical expenses incurred by the older 
and sicker ones. While the introduction of NHI may partially improve the enrolment, 
the challenge in attracting young and healthy individuals into a personal health 
insurance plan requires further investigation that takes into consideration the health 
risk, healthcare needs, risk behaviour, and the willingness to pay the premium. This 
is clearly an important topic for further research.  
 
The study concludes that females are more likely to own personal health 
insurance. The factors that motivate females towards ownership of personal health 
insurance are not entirely known even though the supposition is that females now 
play a bigger role in the family including in making the decision to purchase 
insurance. Understanding the factors that motivate females towards the ownership of 
personal health insurance will make good subject for further research.  
 
Finally, it is recommended that further research be undertaken to investigate 
the factors affecting the ownership of health takaful. The study could consider 
choices of health takaful that cover both medical expenses and critical illness, which 
is not covered in the current study. 
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